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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PAMELA J. WISNIEWSKI. Understanding and designing for interactional privacy needs 
within social networking sites. (Under direction of DRS. HEATHER LIPFORD AND 
DAVID C. WILSON) 
 
 
―Interpersonal boundary regulation‖ is a way to optimize social interactions when 
sharing and connecting through Social Networking Sites (SNSs). The theoretical 
foundation of much of my research comes from Altman‘s work on privacy management 
in the physical world. Altman believed that ―we should attempt to design responsive 
environments, which permit easy alternation between a state of separateness and a state 
of togetherness‖ (1975). In contrast, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook‘s CEO, claims that 
sharing is the new ―social norm‖ for Facebook‘s 800 million users (Facebook 2011), and 
it is Facebook‘s job to enable ―frictionless sharing‖ (Matyszczyk 2010). My research 
focuses on reconciling this rift between social media sharing and privacy by examining 
interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs as a means to align privacy needs with 
social networking goals.  
To do this, I performed an in-depth feature-oriented domain analysis (Kang, 
Cohen et al. 1990) across five popular SNS interfaces and 21 SNS user interviews to 
understand boundary mechanisms unique to these environments and their associated 
challenges. From this, I created a taxonomy of different interpersonal boundaries users 
manage within their SNSs, identified interface features that directly supported these 
boundary mechanisms, and uncovered coping behaviors for when interface features were 
inadequate or inappropriately leveraged. By better understanding this dynamic, we can 
begin to build new interfaces to help support and possibly even correct some of the 
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maladaptive social behaviors exhibited within SNSs. Finally, I conducted two empirical 
studies that quantitatively validated some of the relationships in my theoretical model of 
the interpersonal boundary regulation process within SNSs. Specifically, I examined the 
role of risk awareness, feature awareness, burden, and desired privacy level on SNS 
privacy behaviors. I also examined the relationship between privacy outcomes and SNS 
goals of connecting and sharing with others. Through this research, I show that boundary 
regulation allows SNS users to reap the benefits of social networking while 
simultaneously protecting their privacy.  
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1CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES, A NEW SOCIAL ORDER
1.1 Introduction 
Social Networking Sites (SNSs) build social capital, the intrinsic value of 
participating in social exchanges, through emotional support, access to new information 
and people, camaraderie, a sense of social identity, and more (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 
2007; Burke, Marlow et al. 2010; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2010). According to Neilson 
Media, Americans spend over a quarter of their time online engaged in social networking 
activities (2010). Facebook, the most popular SNS, has over 800 million users worldwide 
(Facebook 2011). Indeed, SNSs are embedded in our everyday lives and changing the 
way in which we connect with others. For instance, Facebook‘s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, 
declared that privacy is no longer the social norm:  
―People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information 
and different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social 
norm is just something that has evolved over time. We view it as our role 
in the system [Facebook] to constantly be innovating and updating what 
our system is to reflect what the social norms are‖ (Matyszczyk 2010).  
However, not everyone agrees that unbounded sharing is the key to building 
plentiful and meaningful interpersonal relationships through SNSs. SNS friendship has 
been called ―brief and tangential,‖ characterized with ―ambient intimacy‖ (Hesse 2010). 
In other words, we are surrounded indirectly by ―friends,‖ but we lack true connection. 
Comedian Jimmy Kimmel echoed this sentiment when he declared November 17, 2010 
―National Unfriend Day‖ (Kitchen 2010). Kimmel complained, ―Friendship is a sacred 
thing, and I believe Facebook is cheapening it.‖ SNS users are also starting to realize that 
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connection comes with a cost. Only a month after launch, Web 2.0 Suicide Machine 
helped SNS users to ―make the switch to Web 2.0 free life‖ (SuicideMachine.org) and 
severed over 80,500 Facebook friendships (Yan 2010). Therefore, unbounded sharing 
does not seem to be the key to building stronger interpersonal relationships. In some 
cases, sharing too much can be detrimental to relationships (Petronio 2002), cause social 
crowding (Altman 1975), and inflict emotional harm (Altman 1975). My research 
explores interpersonal boundary regulation as a way to balance benefits and drawbacks 
that individuals experience when interacting within online social networks and ultimately 
improve the quality of online social interactions. I use Altman‘s seminal work, The 
Environment and Social Behavior, as a theoretical foundation to my research. Altman 
believed that privacy optimization through ―interpersonal boundary regulation‖ is the key 
to maintaining appropriate levels of interaction within one‘s social environment.  So, 
while Zuckerberg and Facebook are truly ―making the world more open and connected‖ 
(Zuckerberg), my work leverages Altman‘s findings on optimizing social interactions 
through boundary regulation to improve the quality of how SNS users connect. 
1.2 Research Overview 
My research presents an in-depth examination of SNS privacy through 
interpersonal boundary regulation. Chapter 1 provides an overview of past research 
related to SNSs, privacy and boundary regulation, and combines the two in order to 
identify unique challenges and research questions that build upon previous findings. As 
such, my high-level research questions include: 
1. What are different types of interpersonal privacy boundaries SNS users manage, 
and what strategies do they use to do so? 
2. What are salient factors involved in the SNS interpersonal boundary regulation 
process? 
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3. What factors impact SNS users‘ interpersonal boundary negotiation behaviors?  
4. What is the relationship between desirable privacy outcomes and social 
networking benefits for SNS users? 
I address these research questions through a variety of approaches that allowed us 
to develop a comprehensive theoretical understanding as well as empirical validation of 
my theory. In Chapter 3, I combine a feature-oriented domain analysis (Kang, Cohen et 
al. 1990) across five different SNSs with semi-structured end user interviews to 
qualitatively derive ten distinct types of privacy boundaries. I discuss specific interface 
controls and strategies SNS users implement to manage these boundaries along with 
associated challenges. A pivotal finding was that SNS privacy boundaries extended 
beyond information disclosure to also include more nuanced types of interactional 
relationship management. I carried this finding throughout the subsequent studies which 
greatly enhanced the scope of the understanding of SNS privacy. In Chapter 4, I focused 
on coping strategies SNS users develop outside of the SNS interface in order to mitigate 
boundary regulation challenges. I found that many coping strategies are maladaptive 
while true boundary negotiation often happens outside of the SNS interface. In Chapter 5, 
I combined my research findings from Chapters 2 through 4 into a theoretical framework 
of interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs. I identified common themes from the 
qualitative findings that I felt were salient factors contributing to the process.  For 
instance, individual characteristics, awareness, and one‘s desired privacy level surfaced 
as contributing factors to one‘s boundary negotiation behaviors. I also theorized a 
positive relationship between more optimal privacy outcomes and social networking 
goals. This relationship would more closely reflect Altman‘s view than Zuckerberg‘s – 
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boundary regulation (as opposed to unbounded sharing) – as the key to enhance one‘s 
social interactions.   
In Chapters 6 and 7, I used a web-based survey and quantitative methods to 
validate some of the main relationships from the theoretical framework. In Chapter 6, I 
examined the role of desired privacy level, self-awareness, risk awareness, feature 
awareness, and burden when understanding SNS users‘ privacy negotiation behaviors. I 
discuss the ―Privacy Paradox,‖ the discrepancy between privacy attitudes and privacy 
behaviors (Barnes 2006; Norberg, Horne et al. 2007; Utz and Krämer 2009). Although 
relationships varied between the constructs for each of the ten boundary types, I found a 
strong main effect of feature awareness on SNS users‘ privacy behaviors and also a 
significant impact of risk awareness on one‘s desired privacy level. My findings suggest 
that the relationship between one‘s desired privacy level and privacy behaviors is 
impacted by a number of other factors specific to each boundary type. In Chapter 7, I 
explored the relationship between privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes. 
While desired privacy level was often negatively associated with social capital, achieved 
privacy level was often positively associated with social capital.  In addition, the 
relationship between one‘s privacy outcome (desired minus achieved privacy level) and 
social capital varied between the different privacy outcome states.  For social crowding, 
more social interaction than desired, I often found a significant, negative relationship 
with social capital. For social isolation, I occasionally found a significant, positive 
association with social capital, which was contrary to my expectations. I also tested the 
relationship between privacy outcomes and self-esteem but found very little statistical 
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significance. Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarize the findings and present design 
guidelines for enhancing SNS interactional privacy. 
1.3 Research Contributions 
In summary, the main research contributions of this dissertation include: 
 A taxonomy of SNS boundary types and associated SNS interface controls for 
interpersonal boundary management that expands the scope of SNS privacy to 
better mirror real world social interactions. 
 A framework of coping mechanisms for SNS interpersonal boundary regulation 
that helps SNS designers pinpoint opportunities for improved interface design. 
 A theoretical framework of the SNS interpersonal boundary regulation process 
that is the first of its kind to apply Altman‘s process-level model of privacy to 
SNS environments.  
 Quantitative validation of aspects of the theoretical model which create a better 
understanding of SNS user privacy behaviors and the relationship between 
privacy and SNSs. 
 Design guidelines for SNS interactional privacy that support the boundary 
regulation process and can serve to improve SNS user experience. 
My research applies established theory regarding social behavior and 
environmental design, which has developed through decades of research, to a new type of 
social environment. I found that these theories remain extremely relevant and can serve 
as a framework for SNS interface design. Instead of imposing new social norms on SNS 
users, I encourage SNS designers to reflect real world social norms and processes when 
constructing online social environments as a way to improve social interactions. Yet, I 
also acknowledge that the differences between offline and online social interactions need 
to be accounted for when applying these principles.  For instance, the lack of physical 
mechanisms such as distance and non-verbal body language lead to new challenges and 
the development of new behaviors for managing social interactions within SNSs. 
 
6 
Therefore, my research bridges the old with the new to create an in-depth understanding 
and viable solutions for improved social engagement through SNSs. 
 
 
2CHAPTER 2: PRIVACY AND SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
In this chapter, I briefly review the general concepts of SNSs and privacy. Then, I 
relate the two to discuss SNS boundary challenges and existing research related to SNS 
privacy. 
2.1 Social Networking Sites 
Today, popular culture equates the term ―social network‖ to Facebook and other 
SNSs synonymously. However, social network theory as a concept was developed as 
early as the 1920‘s when anthropologists, psychologists, and other social scientists 
desired ways to represent and examine the ―fabric or web of social life‖ (Scott 2009). 
Yet, SNSs revolutionized social networks by providing an online interface so that we 
could visibly see social networks for the first time and remain constantly connected. 
SNSs are defined as having the following unique characteristics: 1) a public or semi-
public profile 2) an explicit way to connect with others and 3) a means of traversing this 
connection-based network (boyd and Ellison 2007). Though SNSs are a form of social 
media popularized by Web 2.0, not all social media such as blogs, message boards, and 
instant messaging are considered SNSs. For instance, Google Blogger and Yahoo Groups 
are types of social media, but they lack the property of a connection-based network 
required to be classified as social networks. Examples of SNSs include Facebook, 
MySpace, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Google+; SNS users often hold accounts across 
multiple SNSs. Many SNS users are adopting the use of social integrators and 
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aggregators such as TweetDeck and OpenSocial that allow users to manage multiple SNS 
accounts through one portal (Patriquin 2007).  
Around 2002 to 2003, SNS pioneers such as Friendster, MySpace, and Club 
Nexus (an online community at Stanford University) became a popular topic in academic 
research. Researchers studied the characteristics of friendship via these new media and 
social phenomenon such as the strength of weak ties (Adamic, Buyukkokten et al. 2003; 
boyd 2004; boyd 2006; Thelwall, Wilkinson et al. 2009). MySpace was the most popular 
SNS in 2006 but was overtaken by Facebook in 2008 (Wikipedia 2011). Therefore, 
Facebook studies in the recent years have dominated SNS research (Acquisti and Gross 
2006; Stutzman 2006; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007; Mazer, Murphy et al. 2007; Tufekci 
2008; Valenzuela, Park et al. 2008; Lipford, Besmer et al. 2008 ; Christofides, Muise et 
al. 2009; Debatin, Lovejoy et al. 2009; Valenzuela, Park et al. 2009; Barkhuus and 
Tashiro 2010; Frampton 2010; Nosko, Wood et al. 2010; Stutzman and Kramer-Duffield 
2010; Ledbetter, Mazer et al. 2011; Park, Jin et al. 2011). SNS researchers have 
compared and contrasted multiple SNSs and found notable differences (Crandall, Cosley 
et al. 2008; Leskovec, Huttenlocher et al. 2010; Xiang, Neville et al. 2010). For instance, 
94.9% of Facebook users reported using their real names while only 62.8% did so on 
MySpace (2008). Boyd and Ellison provide a good historical overview of SNSs and point 
out that while SNSs have characteristics in common, they each allow for varied 
technological affordances that differentiate themselves from their competitors and affect 
their user base (2007). SNS research methodologies have ranged from ethnography (boyd 
2004) to social network analysis (SNA), which utilizes graph theory to quantitatively 
examine agents and the connections between them (Scott 2009). SNS research topics 
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have ranged from the intention and motivation to use SNSs (boyd 2004; boyd 2006; 
Cheung and Lee 2010; Lampe, Wash et al. 2010), nature of SNS connections 
(Brzozowski, Hogg et al. 2008; Kunegis, Lommatzsch et al. 2009; Leskovec, 
Huttenlocher et al. 2010), nuances of SNS relationships (or ―friendships‖) (boyd 2004; 
boyd 2006; Zinoviev and Duong 2009), SNS user behaviors (Stutzman 2006; boyd and 
Ellison 2007; Lampinen, Tamminen et al. 2009; Thelwall, Wilkinson et al. 2009), and 
SNS outcomes – from benefits such as social capital and social well-being (Ellison, 
Steinfield et al. 2007; Burke, Marlow et al. 2010) to negative consequences such as 
privacy implications (Debatin, Lovejoy et al. 2009; Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). For 
example, research has discovered a strong relationship between Facebook use and social 
capital and psychological well-being for college students (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007). 
In addition, SNS users who used enhanced privacy settings also reported higher levels of 
social capital (Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). Therefore, privacy may be a key factor in 
balancing the benefits and tradeoffs when participating in online social networking. 
2.2 Privacy and Boundaries 
Altman defines privacy as, ―an interpersonal boundary process by which a person 
or group regulates interaction with others,‖ by altering the degree of openness of the self 
to others (Altman 1975).  Boundary regulation is an interactive process where two 
individuals or more collaborate in order to negotiate an acceptable level of social 
interaction (Altman 1975; Petronio 2002); the process is dialectic in nature, balancing 
both the restriction and seeking of social interaction with others. The boundary regulation 
process allows for feedback and readjustment along with a dynamic need for varying 
levels of separateness and togetherness. Boundary mechanisms are behaviors employed 
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in combination and adjusted over time to achieve one‘s desired level of privacy. 
Individuals have different mechanisms for erecting boundaries, and they adjust these 
mechanisms as their needs change. Interpersonal boundaries are important because they 
help us define self, give us protection (physically and emotionally), help us manage our 
personal resources, and forge deeper relationships (Altman 1975; Petronio 2002). 
―Healthy boundaries protect without isolating, contain without imprisoning, and preserve 
identity while permitting external connections‖ (Katherine 1991).  
2.3 SNS Boundary Challenges 
―One of the most obvious issues emerging from the impact of social network site 
use is the challenge of drawing boundary lines that denote where relationships begin and 
end,‖ noted Child and Petronio (2010). Past research has identified three potential threats 
to interpersonal boundary regulation that arise out of the unique nature of SNSs (Tufekci 
2008). First, the threat to spatial boundaries occurs because our audiences are obscured so 
that we no longer have a good sense of whom we may be interacting with. Second, 
temporal boundaries are blurred because any interaction may now occur asynchronously 
at some time in the future due to the virtual persistence of data. Third, multiple 
interpersonal spaces are merging and overlapping in a way that has caused a ―steady 
erosion of clearly situated action‖ (Grudin 2001). Since each space may have different 
and, at times, mutually exclusive behavioral requirements, acting accordingly within 
those spaces has become more of a challenge (Tufekci 2008). Along with these problems, 
a major interpersonal boundary regulation challenge is that SNS environments often take 
control of boundary regulation from the end users. For instance, Facebook introduced its 
―News Feed‖ in September 2006; this was the first time that the content and interactions 
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an individual contributed to Facebook was broadcasted to all of his or her friends 
(Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). Since then, Facebook continues to modify the presentation of 
one‘s News Feed and Wall (now Timeline); Facebook users struggle to keep up-to-date 
on how to manage interactions within these spaces as Facebook, not the end user, 
controls who and what is shared with others. 
Technology aside, boundary regulation is a difficult process for any of us to 
master. The interpersonal boundary development process within SNSs is even less 
understood as we are just now developing social norms that shape our online interactions 
with others. Virtually, SNSs are an unparalleled, new social order that have redefined 
―normal‖ practices and behaviors for relating with others. Evidence suggests that 
interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs is a problem that has and will continue to 
cause negative consequences for SNS users.  Therefore, interpersonal boundary 
regulation within SNSs needs to be more deeply understood so that these negative 
consequences can be mitigated to maximize the benefits reaped from online social 
networking. 
2.4 SNS Privacy 
Altman‘s work on boundary regulation has been used to frame research in privacy 
in social media in the past (Tufekci 2008; Stutzman and Hartzog 2009; Lampinen, 
Lehtinen et al. 2011). However, privacy within the SNS research community is often 
defined as ―the ability of individuals to control when, to what extent, and how 
information about the self is communicated to others‖ (Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). 
Therefore, SNS privacy research reframes privacy as a means to limit information 
disclosure, increase control, and perpetuate social withdrawal (Tufekci 2008; Xu, Dinev 
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et al. 2008). This definition has moved away from Altman‘s conceptualization of privacy 
as an ―interpersonal event‖ enmeshed in relationships for optimally regulating one‘s 
social interactions (Altman 1975). As a result, SNS privacy goals are often characterized 
as diametrically opposed to goals of sharing and connecting via SNSs. In addition, the 
definition of privacy is further narrowed specifically to a means to regulate private versus 
public disclosures (Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011). This conceptualization comes most 
readily from Petronio‘s well known Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory, 
an extension of Altman‘s work specifically dealing with private disclosures (Altman 
1975; Petronio 2002).  
To highlight some of the work that has focused on SNS privacy from an 
information sharing perspective, Child and Agyeman-Budu applied Petronio‘s CPM to 
blogging disclosures made by young adults on websites such as MySpace, Facebook, and 
LiveJounal (2010).  They found that high self-monitoring bloggers displayed more 
privacy oriented management practices than bloggers who were low self-monitors but 
high self-monitors tended to blog more often. They also found support that individuals 
with higher Concern for Appropriateness (CFA) had more permeable privacy boundaries 
so they disclosed in more detail and with higher frequency than bloggers with low CFA 
(Child and Agyeman-Budu 2010). Tufekci examined disclosure mechanisms used by 
college students on MySpace and Facebook to manage the boundary between private and 
public. Findings suggest that students are more likely to adjust profile visibility rather 
than limiting their disclosure (Tufekci 2008). Stutzman examined the creation of multiple 
profiles on social media websites, primarily Facebook, as an information regulation 
mechanism. Through grounded-theory, he identified three types of boundary regulation 
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within this context (pseudonymity, practical obscurity, and transparent separations) and 
four over-arching motives for these mechanisms (privacy, identity, utility, and propriety) 
(Stutzman and Hartzog 2009). Lampinen et al. created a framework of strategies for 
managing private versus public disclosures. It defined three dimensions by which 
strategies differed: behavioral vs. mental, individual vs. collaborative, and preventative 
vs. corrective (Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011). Xu et al. developed their ―Information 
Boundary Theory‖ by studying privacy attitudes on information disclosure across e-
commerce, finance, healthcare, and social networking web sites. They found that privacy 
intrusion, risk, and control were all important factors related to privacy concerns in the 
context of social networking (Xu, Dinev et al. 2008). Other information privacy models 
have been developed such as the Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) and Internet 
User Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) models, but, again a commonality among 
SNS privacy research, the focus has been on information privacy (Xu, Dinev et al. 2008). 
2.5 Research Extensions 
My research hearkens back to Altman‘s definition of privacy, broadening the 
scope of this research in two ways. First, the nature of interpersonal boundary regulation 
is dialectical where individuals open and close their boundaries to achieve their desired 
level of privacy (Altman 1975). In this way, privacy is an optimization process for 
desired levels of social interaction instead of a means of social withdrawal. Second, true 
to Altman‘s definition of privacy as regulating ―of openness of the self to others,‖ we 
acknowledge that access to ―self‖ can include more complex social interactions with 
others, as opposed to just ―information about one‘s self.‖ My research frames SNS 
privacy as both informational and interactional. It makes sense that early computer-
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mediated communications research focused less on interactions and more on information 
because little end user ―interaction‖ actually occurred. Now, as we lean heavily towards 
Web 2.0 technologies such as SNSs, social interactions and collaboration between users 
is encouraged and facilitated (Maia, Almeida et al. 2008), in a way we have never seen 
before. Therefore, my conceptualization of SNS privacy reflects that both information 
exchanges and social interactions occur within SNSs. These conceptual distinctions 
strongly influence my research lens for all of my studies.  Specifically, in Chapter 3, I 
create a taxonomy of the different types of privacy boundaries and associated boundary 
mechanisms available for privacy regulation. While information disclosure boundaries 
represent one of the five main categories in the framework, other types of privacy 
boundaries also emerged. 
3CHAPTER 3:  A TAXOMONY OF BOUNDARY TYPES AND MECHANISMS FOR 
SNS PRIVACY MANAGEMENT
As noted in Chapter 2, boundary mechanisms are behaviors employed to achieve 
one‘s desired level of privacy. The primary mechanisms of interpersonal control used to 
negotiate boundaries in Altman‘s privacy model were, for instance, personal space, 
territory, verbal behavior, and nonverbal behavior. As an example, personal space is the 
immediate area surrounding an individual and this boundary could be maintained through 
the use of physical distance. Nonverbal behaviors would include eye contact, clothing 
choice, and body language. Similarly, individuals can erect physical boundaries in the 
form of geographically owned territories. All of these mechanisms together serve to 
regulate one‘s social interactions with others and different levels of privacy can be 
achieved through different behavioral mechanisms (Altman 1975). To achieve our 
optimal level of desired interaction with others, we readjust our arsenal of boundary 
regulation mechanisms by increasing the number of behaviors, the intensity, or 
employing them in different combinations. Altman (1975) explained, ―If a person cannot 
achieve a desired level of boundary regulation, additional mechanisms may be 
mobilized.‖  
Unfortunately, Altman‘s boundary mechanisms were specific to the physical 
environment and cannot readily be applied to SNSs. The tangibility yet lack of 
physicality of SNSs changes the overall dynamics of the boundary regulation process. 
First of all, Altman‘s mechanisms do not readily translate into virtual environments. For 
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instance, if someone posts something inappropriate on one‘s Facebook Wall, using 
physical distance or body language to signal one‘s disapproval is not an option. 
Moreover, new mechanisms have emerged that are not often employed in the physical 
world, such as creating multiple profiles (Stutzman and Hartzog 2009) to manage 
different groups of friends. Overall, mechanisms for boundary regulation within SNSs 
have not been well-defined. I believe that the lack of understanding of SNS boundary 
mechanisms largely contributes to the difficulties SNS users have in maintaining their 
boundaries. Therefore, we aim to define the set of boundary types and mechanisms 
available and applicable specifically to this unique social environment. My goal is to 
identify boundary regulation mechanisms, both technological and behavioral, that are 
relevant to SNSs and better understand how end users employ these mechanisms to 
manage their social interactions with others. In this chapter, I present a taxonomy of five 
categories of privacy boundary types: relational, network, territorial, disclosure, and 
interactional. I further break down these categories into sub-categories. I also present 
specific interface controls provided by SNSs as mechanisms for each type of privacy 
management. In addition, I show evidence from SNS users that suggests boundary 
regulation is a mounting concern that, if improved, could serve to enhance SNS user 
experience and possibly facilitate true connection through online social networking. 
3.1 Methodology 
Two qualitative approaches were combined to develop the taxonomy of 
interpersonal boundary types within SNSs. First, I applied the concept of feature-oriented 
domain analysis (Kang, Cohen et al. 1990), using SNSs as the application domain, to 
systematically identify prominent interface controls that could be leveraged for 
 
17 
interpersonal boundary regulation. I performed this analysis in February 2011 by 
examining commonalities and variations in the features available within five popular 
SNSs: Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Hi5, and Ning. Features were abstracted and 
conceptually grouped to lay the foundation of the taxonomy. Next, I conducted semi-
structured interviews of SNS users by asking them how they managed their SNS social 
interactions. For instance, I asked participants how they handled friending and 
unfriending, overlapping social circles, personal disclosures, updates from others, and 
interpersonal conflicts within their SNSs. Boundaries are often the points where 
interpersonal conflicts occur; therefore, understanding the types of conflicts that SNS 
users experienced helped us identify the different types of privacy boundaries SNS users 
had to manage. Participants were asked to base their responses on actual past experience 
as opposed to speculating what they would do given a particular scenario. Interview 
participants were recruited via postings on Facebook and email. I specifically targeted 
adult Facebook users, as opposed to students, as a criticism of past research has been the 
predominant use of college students. Interviews were conducted via Google Voice, 
Skype, or email. I transcribed the audio recorded interviews using InqScribe and 
qualitatively coded them using Atlas.ti 5.5. Priori codes (Gibbs and Taylor 2010) were 
first applied to the interview data based on a review of the literature and the results of the 
domain analysis. Then I used open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) to finalize the 
taxonomy. Quotes and anecdotes from participants are presented using a pseudonym first 
name for anonymity and consistently used throughout the remainder of this research. I 
also provide each participant‘s profession and age to help personify each SNS user. 
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3.2 Participants 
I collected interview data from 21 participants, 10 females and 11 males. Thirteen 
interviews were audio recorded averaging 58 minutes each. Eight interviews were 
completed via email with follow up questions totaling 50 single-spaced pages (out of 
over 200 pages overall). The average age of participants is 36 years old, ranging from 21 
to 60. Participants primarily used Facebook, with 16 participants logging in daily and 
four participants logging in weekly. Six participants reported using MySpace weekly to 
annually, and three said they used to have MySpace accounts but had deactivated them. 
Eight participants reported having Twitter accounts and six participants had LinkedIn 
accounts. Participants also reported being a member of a variety of other SNSs, including 
Ning, Hi5, LibraryThing, Shelfari, Xanga, and others. I interviewed one participant who 
is not a member of any SNSs, though he frequently used his wife‘s Facebook account. 
The interviews confirmed priori codes and identified additional, emerging boundary 
categories. They also led us to build a hierarchical taxonomy by identifying key 
dimensions within each of the categories presented below.  
3.3 SNS Boundary Mechanism Taxonomy 
TABLE 1 summarizes the taxonomy of SNS boundary mechanisms, and I will 
define each component of the taxonomy in detail in the subsequent text. 
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TABLE 1: Taxonomy with Definitions for SNS Boundary Types 
Boundary Type Dimensions Definition 
Relationship Connection Regulating whom to let into one's social network 
Context Regulating appropriate interpersonal interactions 
given the type of relationship 
Network Discovery Regulating access others have to one's network 
connections 
Intersection Regulating social interactions between connections 
or groups of connections 
Territorial Inward-Facing Regulating incoming content for personal 
consumption 
Outward-Facing Regulating semi-public content available through 
interactional spaces 
Disclosure Self-Disclosure Regulating what personal information one 
discloses within one's network 
Confidant-Disclosure Regulating how co-owned personal information is 
disclosed within one's network 
Interactional Disabling Regulating potential interaction through turning 
on/off interface features 
Blocking Regulating overall access of oneself to specific 
individuals outside of one's network 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Relationship Boundaries 
SNSs implement friend-based privacy policies, where sharing and connecting is 
based on whether or not someone is part of one‘s social network. Yet, the process of 
friending and unfriending is so complex that it has created social anxiety and drama for 
many SNS users (boyd 2006; Brzozowski, Hogg et al. 2008; Hogg, Wilkinson et al. 
2008). Studies have shown that social pressures influence us to accept friend requests 
from ―weak ties‖ as well as true friends (boyd 2006; Brzozowski, Hogg et al. 2008). 
Thus, we have developed an online social norm called ―hyperfriending‖ (Fono and 
Raynes-Goldie 2006) where only 25% of our online connections represent true friendship 
(Zinoviev and Duong 2009). Once a ―friend‖ has been added to one‘s network, 
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maintaining appropriate levels of social interactions in light of one‘s relationship context 
with this individual (and the many others within one‘s network) becomes even more 
problematic (boyd 2006). Since each friend may have different and, at times, mutually 
exclusive expectations, acting accordingly within a single space has become a challenge. 
As boyd points out, teenagers cannot be simultaneously cool to their friends and to their 
parents (boyd 2006; boyd and Ellison 2007). While real life relationships are notorious 
for being complex, one of the biggest criticisms of SNSs are that they often simplify 
relationships to a ―binary‖ (boyd 2004) or ―monolithic‖ (Brzozowski, Hogg et al. 2008) 
dimension of friend or not friend. Due to this collapsed context of relationships within 
SNSs, acquaintances, family, friends, coworkers, and significant others all have the same 
level of access to an SNS user once added to one‘s network - unless appropriately 
managed. To manage these challenges, relationship boundaries must be negotiated when 
deciding to form a relationship connection and subsequently when defining the 
appropriate context for that relationship. However, relationship boundaries are often 
overlooked when discussing SNS privacy. Therefore, I will discuss both relationship 
connection and relationship context boundary mechanisms specific to SNSs. 
Primary mechanisms for managing relationship connection boundaries included: 
access level permission to request friendship, denying friend requests, and unfriending. 
The SNSs in this study are all reciprocal networks (where a friend request must be 
accepted for a connection to be formed) while SNSs such as Twitter and Google+ allow 
unilateral relationships. SNSs differed on access level options users could specify for 
allowing friend requests. For instance, Facebook access levels include Everyone and 
Friends of Friends while MySpace users can specify Everyone, 18 or Older, and Bands, 
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Filmmakers, or Comedians. All SNSs provided controls for denying a friend request or 
unfriending, but social cues discouraged such actions. For instance, Facebook asks users 
to ―Confirm Friend‖ or ―quietly ignore‖ a friend request. Friendship is often encouraged 
visually by emphasizing accepting over denying the request, as illustrated for MySpace 
(FIGURE 1). Conversely, interface controls for unfriending are de-emphasized or 
difficult to find. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Approving a Friend Request on MySpace 
 
 
Relationship context directly impacts our boundary regulation choices. The 
interaction one desires with a spouse, for instance, is different than interaction 
appropriate with a stranger. Three main groups of SNS friends have been delineated 
through past research: true friends (strong ties), acquaintances, and random acquaintances 
(both weak ties) (Zinoviev and Duong 2009). All the SNSs except Ning allow users to 
label friend groups for personal use - for example: ―College Buddies‖ or ―Co-Workers.‖  
Boyd describes this as ―overloading‖ friends to represent different contexts than just 
friendship (2006). However, only Facebook lets users leverage those friend groups to set 
access levels for sharing items such as status updates, contact information, and pictures. 
TABLE 2 includes a summary of the relationship management controls for both 
relationship connection and context available across the five SNSs. 
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TABLE 2: Relationship Boundary SNS Interface Controls 
Boundary Type Interface Controls Facebook MySpace Hi5 LinkedIn Ning 
Connection Access Level - Friend Request X X X X  
Deny Friend Request X X X X X 
Unfriend/Remove Connection X X X X X 
Context Group Labeling X X X X  
Group Management X     
 
 
 
My participants had very different boundary permeability, or level of openness 
(Petronio 2002), when choosing whom to friend. Three distinct relationship connection 
boundary profiles emerged – closed, moderate, and open. I grouped participants by their 
stated perception of their boundary permeability and validated this by recording their 
number of Facebook friends. 
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TABLE 3: Participants' Boundary Permeability 
Friending 
Strategy 
Participants 
(Number of 
Friends) 
Average No. 
Friends 
Standard 
Deviation 
Example Quotes 
Closed - Only 
Intimate Friends 
and Family 
Alana (42), Dollie 
(42), and Antonio 
(69) 
51 15.59 ―Definitely intimate 
friendships and family 
members‖  
– Alana  
Moderate - 
Friends and 
Acquaintances  
Gina (100), Larry 
(101), Gordon 
(112), Becky (161), 
Nelson (162), Steve 
(279), Edward 
(363), Corinne 
(551), Tia (563), 
Fred (219) 
261 176.80 ―I do not friend strangers 
on Facebook.  I think the 
majority of my ―friends‖ 
would be classified as 
acquaintances, 
colleagues, and friends 
from the past.‖ –Becky  
Open - Friends 
to Strangers 
Lorrie (69), Allen 
(130), Regina (410), 
Kurt (585), Lynn 
(795), Kristine 
(1246), Tyrone 
(1554) 
684 556.04 ―honestly mostly 
strangers right now, I will 
except your friend as long 
as I have more than a 
couple friends in 
common.  That‘s just 
because mainly I get 
friend requests from, 
mothers and kids who are 
needing pictures, so I 
kind of have to let them 
in.‖ –Lynn  
 
 
 
The first group only allowed intimate relationships into their networks, and were 
very quick to reject friend requests and remove friends should they cause them problems. 
This was the smallest group with the lowest average number of friends and lowest 
standard deviation. 
―No strangers, no colleagues, and no immediate family [are in my 
network]. I wanted to keep it just for friends, close friends not usually 
anyone that I don't typically associate with on a daily basis.‖ –Dollie, 
Mother, 34 
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The second group had moderate relationship boundaries by allowing friends to 
acquaintances into their networks. They consistently had moderate rules developed for 
denying friend requests, but most of them (80%) rarely unfriended anyone, ever.  
Finally, the third group had very open relationship connection boundaries 
allowing anyone from friends to strangers into their networks. This group had a very 
large deviation in the average number of friends with friend counts ranging from 69 to 
1554. Upon further examination, participants fell into two subcategories that explained 
this large difference.  Lorrie, Allen, and Regina friended strangers in order to more 
effectively play games through SNS apps.  
― I have a lot of people friended quote-unquote, that I don't actually know.  
But I friended them because they played the same games that I did and I 
needed people to boost my numbers and stuff.‖ –Lorrie, Security Officer, 
22 
Kurt, Lynn, Kristine, and Tyrone friended strangers as a way to promote their 
professions. Lynn and Tyrone are both photographers who post many of their clients‘ 
pictures on Facebook for self-promotion. Kurt is a dating coach who often gets clients 
(and picked up girls) through Facebook. Therefore, his very social profession is 
intertwined with his large social network. 
―I don't have that much of the defined boundary between my personal life 
in my professional life.  In fact, for the dating coach thing part of it is kind 
of living the life style.  Being that guy, if you will.  To an extent, it is a 
little like being a little bit of a celebrity.‖ –Kurt, Dating Coach, 32 
Kristine is a young adult author who says she ―blanket accepts‖ friend requests 
from almost anyone because they could be one of her fans. 
―When I get a friend request, they might be somebody who has read my 
book or they might be some random troll or who knows. So I pretty much 
just blanket accept everyone and just kind of assume that either they read 
my book.‖ –Kristine, Author, 37 
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Individuals who let strangers into their social network to play games tended to 
have lower overall friend counts than those who consistently let strangers into their 
networks for work promotion purposes. In either case, individuals with loose friending 
boundaries also rarely unfriended, often leaving their networks large and open. 
Overall, regardless of boundary permeability, I found that unfriending was rare, if 
at all. Seventy-five percent of participants said they rarely unfriended anyone (1-3 
people), while 24% had never unfriended anyone. In general, individuals let people into 
their inner circles relatively easily and had a hard time removing them.  
 ―I‘ve remained friends with some people because I know it would cause 
more of an issue if I unfriended them then if I just left them on there.‖ –
Becky, Teacher, 29 
Relationship context boundaries were even more problematic for SNS users. Even 
though relationship context is so important to regulating interpersonal boundaries, the 
majority of the participants did not manage relationship context within their SNSs at all. 
Only 33% of SNS users separated friends into groups, and only two participants actually 
used these groups to manage access level privacy. Grouping friends by type of 
relationship was characterized more as a strategy to organize friends to be able to 
reference later and manually use the list to send directed communications to a group. 
However, grouping rarely led to contextual interactions, such as posting status updates 
directed to a specific group. Individuals felt that using this mechanism was a hassle or did 
not trust their own abilities to categorize and keep groups up-to-date. In addition, many of 
the participants did not know they could use groupings, such as Facebook friend lists, to 
post directed status updates or pictures.  
―I've never done that because I did not know that I could do that.  If I am 
addressing a group, it is a general message to everybody, on my wall 
anybody can see it, but if I say what's up PDC, what's going on for the 
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night?  The people and that group know who I'm talking about.‖ –Tia, 
Administrative Assistant, 37 
In summary, I found that most participants did not frequently leverage 
mechanisms available for managing relationship connection and context boundaries. 
Only a few participants limited their networks to close friends and family members and 
very few unfriended. Therefore, many participants had relatively large networks that 
included multiple relationship contexts ranging from family members to strangers. Even 
so, participants did not often use the mechanisms available for managing relationship 
context. Lack of relationship boundary management can be attributed to a few factors.  
Some individuals experienced peer pressure which led to accepting unwanted friend 
requests and not unfriending. Others lack the awareness that interface controls even 
existed to manage relationship context while those who were aware found it to be too 
much of a hassle. It is possible that these problems are exacerbated by the fact that 
relationship management is rarely characterized as a means of privacy regulation within 
SNSs. Lack of appropriate relationship boundary regulation contributed to reduced 
intimacy as participants made their interactions more generalized, as to be appropriate for 
a large and varied audience, a coping mechanism addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Because of this, some individuals experienced a sense of loss of their authentic selves 
within their SNSs. This was especially true for the four participants who used their 
networks for both professional and personal use.  
3.3.2 Network Boundaries 
An individual‘s social network structure contains cliques, groups of people whom 
all know each other, as well as independent sets of friends that have no common 
connections (Scott 2009). SNS users not only have to manage their boundaries with 
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individual connections, but also the transitive interactions that may arise between those 
connections. Network boundaries are necessary mechanisms to demark separation 
between one‘s connections or groups of connections. Traditional social networks are 
physically spread out and linkages between individuals are implicit or hidden to others; 
therefore, they are more easily managed. For example, estranged friends are invited to 
dinner on separate occasions. Online, those connections become transparent (boyd and 
Ellison 2007) and physical distance is removed, making one‘s network more accessible to 
discovery and affording potential social interaction between otherwise unconnected 
parties. Overlap of different social contexts can cause problems for consistent self-
presentation. I uncovered two types of network boundaries in this study: network 
discovery and network intersection boundaries. Network discovery deals with how 
individuals manage the exposed, traversable nature of their networks to regulate overall 
access by others. Network intersection boundaries are used to regulate how different 
social circles within one‘s network overlap and interact.  
This analysis concluded that SNSs lack interface controls for flexible 
management of network boundaries. Only Facebook provides a separate functionality for 
managing access level of one‘s friend list from being discoverable by everyone, friends 
of friends, friends only, or specific individuals. However, Facebook users cannot partially 
separate sets of friends from others. The other SNSs are even less flexible. MySpace, 
Hi5, and Ning tie one‘s friends list to one‘s profile visibility. Therefore, entire profile 
access level must be changed in order to manage discoverability of one‘s network. Hi5 
and LinkedIn allow users the binary option to show or hide their connections completely, 
while MySpace users have learned how to use Cascading Style Sheets in their templates 
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in order to hide their friend list. Thus, managing discovery of others within one‘s network 
is only available to users at a very high level. The same is true for managing network 
intersection boundaries. Similar to relationship context management, the only support for 
network intersection boundaries is the ability to create friend groups or lists. However, 
this does little to facilitate or prevent interaction between one‘s friends. Only Facebook 
provides a mechanism for posting information to specific groups so that only members of 
that group can interact within that thread. In this case, Facebook users can prevent groups 
of friends from overlapping for narrowed contexts, but they still have no way to manage 
social interactions between individuals. Therefore, current network boundary 
management tends to be all or nothing. TABLE 4 summarizes the interface controls for 
each SNS for maintaining network discovery and intersection boundaries. 
 
TABLE 4: Network Boundary SNS Interface Controls 
Boundary Type Interface Controls Facebook MySpace Hi5 LinkedIn Ning 
Discovery Access Level – Friend List X     
Access Level – Profile   X X  X 
 Hide Connections  X X X  
Intersection Group Management X     
 
 
 
Serendipitous discovery of unknown relationships or as Allen described it, ―six 
degrees of separation,‖ tended to outweigh potential risks for SNS users when it came to 
network discovery boundaries. Six participants shared stories about how they were able 
to discover interesting linkages between their friends or use connections to find others. 
―I discovered that a girl I know from roller derby is ‗friends‘ with the 
woman that runs the burlesque show I attend - never would have thought 
that one!‖ –Becky, Teacher, 29 
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However, in cases where individuals with large networks utilized their accounts 
as a means for marketing their services, they often found that others exploited their lack 
of network discovery boundaries for personal gain. This was especially the case for Lynn 
and Tyrone, photographers who have competitors in their networks.  
 ―Every time I take pictures of someone and tag them in it, he [competitor] 
will friend request that person to his page, and that bothers me because it 
feels a little stalker-ish. He is trying to build his numbers to get a bigger 
name on his page.‖ –Lynn, Photographer, 30 
Self image was also a network discovery issue where three participants were 
mindful of whom was visible in their networks as it could be perceived as a bad reflection 
on them. However, only two participants had ever hidden their friends list from others; 
Alana had done so accidentally.  
Network intersection boundaries were a bigger concern than network discovery to 
many participants due to potential for conflict. However, due to the lack of interface 
controls for regulating network intersection boundaries or awareness of how to use them, 
only two participants used Facebook‘s ability to post statuses, pictures, and other 
information to limit interaction to specific groups. The lack of relationship context 
management, unfortunately, led to many instances of unwanted conflict between 
participants‘ Facebook friends. 
―I have friends and relatives who are at extreme opposites religiously and 
politically. A close friend asked me once, ―Who ARE those people and 
why are they so angry all the time? It is very likely to lead to a heated, 
sometimes hateful confrontation between my ‗friends‘. I really don‘t like 
that!‖ –Steve, Minister, 57  
However, Regina had a different perspective:  
―I find it kind of wonderful that we have this space where we can talk 
about things that we disagree.  And I think I help contribute to that being 
the kind of space that people can experience.  I think that's what 
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democracy ought to be all about so I think it is kind of cool when it 
happens.‖ –Regina, HIV Awareness Coordinator, 60 
Regina manages how her friends interact within her network by personally 
moderating conversations when they get out of hand.  
―I am 60 years old, so I can pull out the grandma and say ‗you know, that 
really wasn't okay.‘ Sometimes it works, and sometimes there is a bit of 
huff but people do pipe down at that point.‖ –Regina, HIV Awareness 
Coordinator, 60 
Participants did little to manage network boundaries using SNS interface controls 
which often resulted in unwanted interactions and conflicts between one‘s friends. While 
feature awareness was a contributing factor, lack of effective controls for boundary 
regulation tended to be the primary reason for the lack of use. 
3.3.3 Territorial Boundaries 
Territorial boundaries involve ―use of places and objects in the environment‖ to 
personalize or mark ―ownership, possession, and occasional active defense‖(Altman 
1975). I found two types of SNS territories in use: inward-facing territories and outward-
facing territories. Inward facing territories such as Facebook‘s ―News Feed,‖ LinkedIn‘s 
―Updates,‖ Hi5‘s ―Network Updates,‖ MySpace‘s ―Stream,‖ and Ning‘s ―Latest 
Activity‖ serve as spaces for personal consumption of updates from connections or 
friends (e.g., photo uploads, links, videos, new connection updates). Overall, SNSs 
provided three mechanisms for managing inward-facing territories: filters, preference 
settings, and hiding. Filters provide a temporary territorial boundary; managing 
preference settings gives users more permanent control over what appears and from 
whom. Hiding generally occurs on a real-time basis and is specific to all content from a 
specific individual. Unhiding an individual requires additional work of modifying 
accounts settings. The five SNSs were very inconsistent as to the filters and preference 
 
31 
settings provided through their interfaces. For instance, MySpace allows users to set a 
preference for what type of friend updates they would like to see in their Stream. In 
contrast, Facebook does not currently provide any preference settings to permanently 
manage News Feed updates by type. 
Outward-facing territories, such as Facebook‘s Wall or Timeline, are dynamic 
representations of users and their SNS activities. Based on Altman, I classify such 
outward-facing territories as secondary or ―interactional‖ territories that are a ―blend of 
public or semipublic availability and controlled by regular occupants‖ (Altman 1975). 
Because these secondary territories are bridges between private and public there is often 
boundary confusion. ―Secondary territories, because of their semipublic quality often 
have unclear rules regarding their use and are susceptible to encroachment by a variety of 
users, sometimes inappropriately and sometimes predisposing to social conflict‖ (Altman 
1975). Different SNSs choose to implement different management techniques including 
access level manipulation (managing who can see what), deletion, untagging, and 
moderation. For instance, LinkedIn has the fewest controls in terms of regulating 
outward-facing territorial boundaries. This choice may reflect higher expectations within 
a professional network to appropriately self-monitor. Facebook does not provide the 
ability to moderate posts or comments before they are viewable by one‘s network. 
Therefore, action has to be taken proactively by setting access level permissions for 
everyone within one‘s network or retroactively by deleting or untagging unwanted 
interactions or content after the fact. TABLE 5 summarizes SNS interface controls 
available for territorial boundary support across the five SNSs.  
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TABLE 5: Territorial Boundary SNS Interface Controls 
Boundary Type Interface 
Controls 
Facebook MySpace Hi5 LinkedIn Ning 
Inward-Facing Filters X X X X  
  Preference 
Settings 
 X X X  
  Hiding X X  X  
Outward-
Facing 
Access 
Level - 
Viewing 
Permissions 
X X X  X 
  Delete Posts 
or 
Comments 
X X X X X 
  Untagging X X X   
  Moderation  X X  X 
 
 
 
Inward-facing territories were often perceived by participants as ephemeral in 
nature, undirected, and private; therefore, inward-facing territorial management was not a 
high priority for participants. Inward-facing territorial boundary regulation was also 
perceived as unwieldy due to the sheer amount of content posted by participants‘ friends 
on a daily basis. Thus, the predominant mechanism for managing inward-facing 
territorial boundaries used by nearly half (43%) of the SNS users was to skim then ignore 
unwanted content, a coping behavior discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
Otherwise, four participants expressed confusion over their ability to regulate 
their inward-facing territories within SNS environments, saying they were unaware or 
unsure about how to hide someone from their News Feeds. Participants who leveraged 
hiding differentiated between hiding games and hiding people on Facebook. While 
almost half of the participants said they hid Facebook games from their News Feed, only 
29% said they hid individuals from their feed. Participants chose to hide content from 
people they wanted to remain in their networks but had issues with the type of content the 
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person most frequently posted. Interestingly, hiding tended to be a fairly permanent 
boundary. Once an individual was hidden, they were rarely unhidden again in the future. 
Therefore, participants had to actively engage with these individuals or be the recipient of 
direct communication from the hidden friend in order to have continued interaction 
through the SNS. 
― I don't unfriend them but I just cut off their news feed, and if I am that 
interested in what she is doing then I'll just go to her page and check her 
out.  I hide their status updates from my news feed. –Tia, Administrative 
Assistant, 37   
A potential negative consequence of hiding friends instead of unfriending is that 
SNS users may forget that person is part of their social network and continues to have 
access to interact and consume information that they share with their social network. 
Outward-facing territorial boundary regulation was characterized with even more 
uncertainty and implied lack of control. When asked how they managed content that was 
publicly shared with others in their network, 29% of the participants immediately started 
talking about how they managed information contained in their user profile instead of 
what was being shared on their Walls (or equivalent outward-facing territories). This 
suggests that individuals feel like they have control over personal information in their 
profiles but rarely think about managing how information and interactions are shared 
through their interactional territories even when SNSs provided the functionality to do so. 
In the few cases where access level viewing permissions were manipulated, they were 
generally to hide pictures (3 participants) or posts from others in order to avoid conflict 
(2 participants). 
―My wife and I have had to make her father unable to see any of our 
photos of a niece, since she is black. [Her] dad is a horrible racist so his 
knowing about her would negatively affect her and no one deserves that.‖ 
–Allen, Technical Services, 31 
 
34 
Many participants did report removing individual items from their territories: 52% 
of the participants said they have deleted a post or comment while 38% have untagged 
themselves in a photo. Reasons for doing so included avoiding conflict, filtering out 
negativity, protecting personal information, or maintaining a certain self-image. 
However, some participants expressed discontent with this strategy because they felt they 
always had to monitor their outward-facing territories to delete unwanted content 
immediately to minimize any potential damage. Therefore, three participants who were 
both MySpace and Facebook users said that they wished Facebook also allowed 
moderation. 
―I  did not accept a friend request from an ex [on Facebook]. …not 
knowing what he was going to say. If I could monitor what he would post 
before he could post it, then we could have been friends.‖ –Tia, 
Administrative Assistant, 37  
Participants generally expressed a level of frustration over their lack of control 
when trying to manage their outward-facing territories. 
―I hate Facebook. I don‘t trust it, and I have no idea what I‘m really 
sharing and who‘s seeing what.‖ –Alana, Substance Abuse Counselor, 28 
For inward and outward-facing territories, I found a general frustration with the 
boundary regulation process even though interface controls were available for boundary 
management.  Inward-facing territories were just too difficult to control, while 
participants felt they lacked control over their outward-facing territories. This led to 
dissatisfaction in use as well as maladaptive coping behaviors. 
3.3.4 Disclosure Boundaries 
Existing SNS literature is heavily focused on disclosure boundaries, otherwise 
known as information privacy (Palen and Dourish 2003; Iachello 2007; Tyma 2007; 
Frampton 2010); therefore, disclosure boundaries are also an integral component of the 
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taxonomy. Petronio‘s work Boundaries of Privacy. Dialects of Disclosure outlined five 
suppositions related to disclosure boundaries. First, disclosure privacy dealt specifically 
with the disclosure of private information. Second, a boundary exists between private and 
public information. Third, individuals have a sense of ownership or control in regard to 
this private information. Fourth, a rule-based system defines how individuals manage this 
privacy boundary. The rule management operations associated with this supposition 
include boundary linkages, co-ownership, and permeability. Boundary linkages are 
―connections that form boundary alliances‖ (Petronio 2002). Co-ownership deals with the 
privilege to have joint ownership of one‘s private information, and permeability deals 
with ―how opened or closed the collective boundaries are once they are formed‖ 
(Petronio 2002). Therefore, disclosure boundaries require a coordination process between 
co-owners of private information. Fifth, this process is dialectical in nature. Here 
Petronio borrowed from Altman‘s theory to reiterate that an individual‘s desire for 
information privacy may change over time. In sum, these suppositions are the basis of 
Petronio‘s Communication Privacy Management Theory (CPM) (Petronio 2002). 
Petronio describes two types of boundaries: personal and collective. Personal boundaries 
deal with how one shares private information about one‘s self. Alternatively, collective 
boundaries involve private information shared with others. ―A boundary is transformed 
from a personal to a collective when someone self-discloses to a confidant,‖ explained 
Petronio (Petronio 2002). Therefore, I examined two types of disclosure boundaries: Self-
disclosure involving private information about one‘s self, and confidant-disclosure 
mechanisms to set boundaries for information that is co-owned or shared by others 
(Petronio 2002).  
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Self-disclosure is undoubtedly the most prolifically studied boundary mechanism 
within SNS privacy research (Joinson 2001; Mazer, Murphy et al. 2007; Norberg, Horne 
et al. 2007; Tufekci 2008; Christofides, Muise et al. 2009; Krasnova, Kolesnikova et al. 
2009; Nosko, Wood et al. 2010; Caine, Kisselburgh et al. 2011; Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011; 
Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011; Ledbetter, Mazer et al. 2011; Park, Jin et al. 2011; 
Stutzman, Capra et al. 2011). Privacy settings related to self-disclosure have been studied 
in detail (Acquisti and Gross 2006; Debatin, Lovejoy et al. 2009; Ellison, Vitak et al. 
2011); therefore, I will just highlight some of the key dimensions of variation between 
the SNSs. SNS interface controls that support self-disclosure boundaries vary along two 
primary dimensions. First, is the level of granularity or type of information that one can 
share with others. Facebook is the most complex, allowing users to disclose and control 
more granular boundaries for categories such as bio, website, email addresses and 8 other 
categories. Others have fewer information groupings which make user profiles chunkier, 
and thus self-disclosure boundaries less granular. The second dimension is whom one can 
share this information with or one‘s access level permissions. All SNSs examined err on 
the side of sharing more information to more people by allowing users to give access to 
―Everyone‖ or ―All Users.‖ Similarly, all these SNSs give the option for access for 
―Friends‖ or ―Connections‖ only. Comparatively, Facebook gives the most flexibility by 
giving users even more options for controlling personal information access level. 
Facebook users can customize privacy settings by group, network, or down to an 
individual level (TABLE 6). 
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TABLE 6: Self-Disclosure Access Level 
Privacy Level Facebook MySpace LinkedIn Hi5 Ning 
Everyone X X X X X 
Friends X X X X X 
Everyone 18 and Older  X    
Friends of Friends X     
Friends and Networks X     
Specific Individuals X     
Only Me X  X X X 
 
 
 
Because technology fully mediates social interactions within SNSs, confidant-
disclosures are strongly linked to one‘s outward-facing territories. For instance, 
confidant-disclosures typically occur when a connection posts one‘s personal information 
so that it is viewable for others to see on one‘s Wall, such as tagging pictures of friends 
without their permission. Therefore, the same mechanisms that are used to form outward-
facing territorial boundaries are the same ones SNS users must employ to create 
confidant-disclosure boundaries (TABLE 5). The distinction in practice is that confidant-
disclosure boundary regulation focuses on disclosure of private information of oneself by 
others. Outward-facing territorial boundaries can apply to any type of interaction. To 
illustrate the difference, when Tia deleted profanity from her Wall, she enforced an 
outward-facing territorial boundary. Yet, when Dollie deleted a comment from a friend 
congratulating Dollie on her pregnancy (before she shared the news publicly), she formed 
a confidant-disclosure boundary.   
In terms of self-disclosure boundaries, SNS users were unconfident or skeptical 
about their SNS privacy settings and, thus, tended to not take advantage of the granularity 
and access levels provided to manage self-disclosure. Seven participants displayed a lack 
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of understanding in their settings or experienced an accidental, negative disclosure that 
made them distrust that the settings even worked correctly. 
 ―I was annoyed that Facebook had my phone number for all my friends 
and family and their friends and family to see.‖ –Gina, Student, 30 
Therefore, instead of supplying personal information to the SNS and managing 
access level, they simply did not supply the information at all, a form of self-censorship 
which is a coping mechanism discussed further in Chapter 4. 
While participants generally distrusted SNS privacy settings, they exhibited a 
general trust towards those in their social networks to not breach confidant-disclosure 
boundaries. 
―Most people are pretty good. And I think that is also because so many 
people are friends with people who are family and you know people from 
high school or whatever.‖ –Kristine, Author, 37 
Yet, a failure to coordinate confidant-disclosures often led to unintentional 
interpersonal conflict. For instance, Dollie‘s friend innocently congratulated Dollie on her 
pregnancy via her Facebook Wall. Dollie had not announced her pregnancy to the 
majority of her family and friends and was upset by this breach of confidence. As another 
example, Kristine had to delete a comment from her niece regarding an out-of-state move 
because Kristine‘s husband had not yet notified his company that he was changing jobs 
and relocating. This finding is consistent with Altman‘s observations that interactional 
territories are pre-disposed to boundary confusion and interpersonal conflict because 
participants are unclear of appropriate boundaries. In summary, individuals tended to 
distrust self-disclosure interface controls and instead leveraged coping mechanisms to 
manage their self-disclosure boundaries. In contrast, participants tended to have an 
implicit trust towards their friends but often had to leverage interface controls for 
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retroactively managing unwanted confidant-disclosures due to misunderstandings and 
failures in boundary coordination. 
3.3.5 Interactional Boundaries 
Interactional boundaries limit direct access to oneself, thereby avoiding the need 
for other types (i.e. relational, territorial, etc.) of boundary regulation with others. SNS 
users can erect interactional boundaries by disabling interactive interfaces such as one‘s 
Facebook Wall or MySpace Comments. Also in ―Things others share‖ Facebook allows 
users to specify whether or not one‘s friends ―can comment on posts,‖ ―Suggest photos of 
me to friends,‖ and ―Friends can check me into Places.‖ The most drastic form of 
interactional boundary management is ―Blocking.‖ When one blocks another user that 
user cannot view or contact that person at all. LinkedIn is unique that it does not provide 
any controls for interactional boundary regulation, perhaps because of the more limited 
interactions provided by a site aimed at business professionals. TABLE 7 summarizes the 
interface controls for interactional disabling and blocking. 
 
TABLE 7: Interactional Boundary SNS Interface Controls 
Boundary Type Interface Controls Facebook MySpace Hi5 LinkedIn Ning 
Disabling Disable Search 
(Finding You) 
X     
 Disable 
Posts/Commenting 
X X X   
 Disable Tagging X     
 Disable Friend 
Requests 
  X   
 Disable Chat X X   X 
Blocking Blocking X X X  X 
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Participants who implemented disabling or blocking interactional boundary 
mechanisms tended to have past negative experiences and wanted to avoid confrontation 
and potential future drama. Interactional boundaries were characterized as an extreme 
measure for when the risk of boundary violations outweighed any potential social value 
that could come from interaction. However, only five participants reported disabling 
features including their Wall (2), picture tagging (1), and chat (2). 
 ―I do not feel safe or trustful of [people] to NOT post bad things on my 
statuses and photos. I turned off my wall on Facebook as a result.‖ – 
Allen, Technical Services, 31 
However, five participants were unaware or had never thought about disabling 
interactional features of the interface while one accidentally disabled a feature by 
mistake.  
Only four participants blocked others due to extreme conflicts, stalking, or ―just 
being nosey.‖ Three participants reported blocking due to spam. However, most 
participants had never blocked anyone because they never felt ―uncomfortable enough‖ 
to do so or in fear of being rude.  
 ―I‘m not good with confrontation, so I just [unfriended] him, but I‘m 
struggling with trying to block him because he can still see my pictures. I 
don‘t want to be rude to him, so I‘m struggling with do I just be rude or do 
I just let it go? I don‘t know.‖ –Lynn, Photographer, 30 
Social norms and feature awareness problems were the primary reasons 
individuals did little to create interactional boundaries through the use of SNS interface 
controls.  These two obstacles were only overcome when extreme negative experiences 
motivated users to reassess their interactional boundaries. 
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3.4 Discussion 
Boundary mechanisms used in the physical world do not translate well to the new 
world of online social networking, and thus need to be understood in this new context. 
The taxonomy of boundary types and associated mechanisms demonstrates at the 
conceptual level the variety of ways SNS users can regulate their boundaries through 
SNS interfaces.  I found that network, territorial, disclosure, relationship, and 
interactional boundaries can be employed individually, and in combination, by end users 
who want to better regulate their social boundaries with others. I broadened the definition 
of SNS privacy so that it is no longer focused solely on protecting private, personal 
information and instead acts as a means of optimizing social interactions. It serves as a 
foundation to build additional SNS boundary regulation theories and as a basis for the 
design of improved SNS interfaces. My approach is novel in that it incorporates 
perspectives of both environmental design of SNS interfaces and end user behaviors into 
a cohesive taxonomy. This taxonomy can be used as a framework to benchmark 
boundary regulation features across the domain of SNSs or evaluate new SNSs. For 
example, Google+ improved support for relationship context boundaries through circles 
and reduced emphasis of outward-facing territories by not implementing the equivalent to 
Facebook‘s Wall. Of the five SNSs in this study, Facebook provided the most 
affordances and since the initial analysis has updated its interface to incorporate new 
boundary mechanisms such as the ability to review tags before they are posted to one‘s 
Timeline (previously Wall). Finally, by showing that SNS users struggle to negotiate 
their social interactions online, I motivated the need for design considerations to improve 
support for these mechanisms. A better understanding of interpersonal boundary 
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regulation with respect to SNS interface design can help users achieve a deeper level of 
connection while also protecting them from harmful interactions with others. 
Overall, the participants had fairly loose friending criteria, feeling obligated to 
accept most friend requests and rarely removing connections. Very few participants 
modified their interactions given relationship context. Instead, they often had strict 
requirements for self-disclosure which reduced their personal level of sharing. Yet, 
confidant-disclosures were managed through an implicit level of trust within one‘s 
network (even though relationship boundaries were not well monitored). Network 
discovery was often encouraged by participants, but network intersection was a problem 
due to lack of interface controls and the ability to manage interactions between 
independent sets of friends. Participants deemphasized inward-facing territorial 
boundaries because of low perceived risk and high levels of burden; outward-facing 
territorial boundaries were reactive instead of proactive, requiring constant monitoring to 
remove unwanted content. Interactional boundaries were used, though rarely, by 
individuals who felt the possibility of future negative interactions outweighed any 
potential for future positive interactions.  
In all cases, participants cited points of contention when regulating each of the 
boundary mechanism categories. As a result, boundary violations led to conflict or 
negative emotional impact on SNS users. This motivates the need for improved SNS 
interface support for interpersonal boundary regulation in order to improve social 
outcomes and reduce interpersonal conflict. Overall, this study found that SNS interface 
controls by themselves were not effective in facilitating boundary negotiation. Some 
interface controls were inflexible to change such as the permanence I saw when hiding 
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individuals from one‘s News Feed. Other controls, such as the ones for network 
boundaries, did not provide enough options and forced SNS users to make all-or-nothing 
decisions regarding their privacy. Still others, such as mechanisms for managing inward-
facing territories, required too much effort to be effective. Otherwise, SNS users lacked 
knowledge that interface controls existed for boundary management or the risk awareness 
that motivated them to more actively manage their privacy boundaries. I was surprised to 
find that participants often opted to develop their own coping mechanisms over using 
built in interface controls to manage each of the different boundary types. This 
unexpected finding led us to further analysis of these coping behaviors, which is 
presented in Chapter 4. 
4CHAPTER 4: FIGHTING FOR MY SPACE: COPING MECHANISMS FOR SNS 
BOUNDARY REGULATION
Based on the interview findings in Chapter 3, I established that SNS users often 
struggle with SNS interface controls to maintain appropriate interpersonal boundaries 
within their SNSs. Technology-supported boundary mechanisms are specifically 
designed to address particular boundary regulation needs through interface controls but 
still may not completely meet SNS users‘ privacy needs. I summarized these mechanisms 
through a feature oriented domain analysis in Chapter 3. Typical problems experienced 
by the participants when using SNS interface controls as boundary mechanisms included 
lack of feature awareness, difficulty in use, and a disconnect between privacy goals and 
functionality provided by the SNS interface. Therefore, I repeatedly observed participants 
finding other ways to achieve the privacy level they desired. I define coping mechanisms 
as the behaviors developed by SNS users outside of the SNS interface or through the 
unintended use of interface features in an attempt to effectively maintain or regain their 
interpersonal boundaries. Coping behaviors are employed to reduce emotional distress 
when desired privacy levels have not been achieved (Altman 1975). For instance, 
untagging is a technology-supported boundary mechanism for managing photo sharing, 
while using chat to tell a friend to take down a picture is a form of coping. These round-
about and often sub-optimal approaches give us insight into interactional design problems 
SNS users face when trying to socialize online. They also afford design opportunities for 
SNS developers. This chapter focuses specifically on how users try to overcome interface 
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controls for boundary regulation that do not meet their privacy needs. Through a focused 
qualitative analysis of the interviews, I identify and categorize the myriad of coping 
mechanisms SNS users have developed to manage their social interactions. 
4.1 Background and Motivation 
One of Altman‘s guidelines for environmental design stated that ―if privacy and 
its associated mechanisms are ignored or rigidly incorporated into designs . . . then 
people will have to struggle against the environment to achieve what they consider to be 
appropriate degrees of interaction‖ (1975). Altman‘s theories of environmental design for 
regulating social interactions in physical spaces are often referenced in SNS privacy 
literature but are rarely applied as principles of design for SNS interfaces. Because SNS 
visionaries such as Zuckerberg value sharing over boundary regulation, SNS interfaces 
shamelessly promote open and unbounded sharing. This helps explain the conflicts and 
struggles I observed from the participants during the interviews and the unexpected and 
frequent emergence of coping behaviors. Ineffective boundary regulation can lead to a 
state of social crowding or isolation, having much more or much less social interaction 
than one desires (Altman 1975). In these states, individuals experience stress and develop 
coping mechanisms to reduce that stress. Altman (also referencing Milgram) outlined a 
number of coping mechanisms individuals employ in the physical world in order to 
achieve acceptable levels of stimulation (Milgram 1970; 1975). They included reducing 
interaction through filtering, ignoring, and blocking as well as withdrawing from 
interaction or meeting it with aggression. For instance, crime, juvenile delinquency, 
homicide, and civil strife have all been related to social crowding and high population 
density (Altman 1975). These categorizations corresponded closely to Horney‘s mature 
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theory and coping strategies related to patterns of neurotic needs: compliance, aggression, 
and detachment (Horney 1945). Yet, manifestations of these coping mechanisms have not 
been examined within the context of SNSs. 
Very few researchers have examined coping mechanisms in response to 
undesirable SNS privacy outcomes (Tufekci 2008; Stutzman and Hartzog 2009; 
Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011). The related research in privacy and coping strategies 
often studied a specific coping mechanism in detail (Stutzman and Hartzog 2009), used 
students as a sampling frame (Tufekci 2008; Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011), and 
defined privacy in terms of private versus public information disclosures (Tufekci 2008; 
Stutzman and Hartzog 2009; Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011). While this past research is 
closely related, my research differs in several distinct ways. First, I studied a variety of 
emergent coping mechanisms and applied existing social theory to my findings. Second, I 
felt that it was important to examine how a diverse set of adults coped in this new social 
environment, and sought a variety of non-student participants. Third, past research does 
not make a distinction between strategies readily supported by SNS interface capabilities 
and those that are not (Tufekci 2008; Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011). I make a clear 
distinction between technology-supported boundary mechanisms and coping 
mechanisms. Finally, and most importantly, I do not characterize privacy as only a means 
to regulate private versus public disclosures. Privacy encompasses multiple boundary 
types as presented in Chapter 3. Therefore, when I discuss coping mechanisms for 
interpersonal boundary regulation, I included coping behaviors from this broader 
perspective instead of limiting the scope to information privacy. 
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4.2 Methodology 
Using the same semi-structured interviews of SNS users as in the previous 
chapter, I used Altman‘s definition of coping along with my conceptual distinction 
between technology-supported boundary mechanisms and coping mechanisms as a lens 
for analysis. I used open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) to uncover different types of 
coping behaviors exhibited by participants. These codes were then conceptually grouped 
based on the coping mechanisms outlined by Altman to determine if similar coping 
mechanisms were observed in SNS environments. Pseudonyms used in Chapter 3 are 
consistently used throughout this chapter. 
4.3 Results 
The interviews confirmed priori codes were present within SNS environments; 
filtering, ignoring, blocking, withdrawal, aggression, and compliance are all coping 
mechanisms previously identified as ways to reduce emotional stress and anxiety 
(Horney 1945; Milgram 1970; Altman 1975). However, the specific behaviors associated 
with these mechanisms drastically differ from the physical world. While I originally 
sought to match each coping mechanism to the boundary taxonomy I presented in 
Chapter 3, I found that many strategies were used across various boundary types. 
However, for the most common trends I observed, I will relate the coping mechanisms to 
the boundary types. To Altman‘s coping mechanisms, I added one additional coping 
strategy – compromise. Using filtering, ignoring, blocking, withdrawal, aggression, 
compliance, and compromise as our framework of coping mechanisms, each section 
below gives examples of specific coping behaviors unique to SNS environments. 
 
48 
4.3.1 Filtering 
―Reduction of intensity of inputs by filtering devices (Milgram 1970; Altman 
1975)‖ was a coping mechanism participants often used specifically when regulating 
their relationship boundaries, such as choosing with whom to connect and managing SNS 
interactions based on relationship context. Even though SNS participants are not confined 
due to physical space, many participants found that social networks that were too large 
became too cumbersome to manage. 
―I don't see how people can maintain if they have 1,000 friends. If I had 
1,000 friends and 1/4 them are posting, I mean that is 250 posts a day. I 
am trying to keep it at a reasonable number.‖ –Gordon, Restaurant 
Manager, 48  
Filtering as a means for relationship boundary management was one way 
participants avoided ―overmanning,‖ which occurs when the capacity of a space is 
exceeded by the number of applicants. In other words, there are more people than the 
setting can handle. This ―results in pressure to reduce applicants, raise the standard for 
those admitted, or increase the setting capacity‖ (Altman 1975). Therefore, some 
individuals coped with this problem by leveraging small social cues as filtering devices 
for relationship management as a means to keep their friend count at a manageable 
number. For instance, four participants noted that they use a person‘s profile picture as a 
way to decide if they would accept or deny a friend request from someone they did not 
know. 
―If it is a picture of somebody and they are half naked in it, then I don't 
accept it. So if you are showing your boobs in your picture, I am going to 
say no to that. Those I will turn down if it is obvious, but if it is not 
obvious, I will accept it.‖ –Kristine, Author, 37 
Two participants relied on relationships with mutual friends when determining if 
they would form a new relationship connection. 
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―If we have absolutely no friends in common, I will not accept it at all.‖ –
Lynn, Photographer, 30  
Overall, the reliance on such minor social cues when determining whom to friend 
reveals that SNS users must sometimes use sub-optimal mechanisms when developing 
criteria for filtering potential relationship connections. Therefore, in addition to social 
cues, SNS users have developed other filtering mechanisms. My previous work showed 
that group management within one SNS account was rarely used for regulating social 
interactions (Karr-Wisniewski, Lipford et al. 2011), instead SNS users segregated friends 
through separate SNS profiles or even different SNSs. Consistent with past research 
(Stutzman and Hartzog 2009), four of the participants explained the need for two SNS 
profiles within the same SNS to separate personal interactions from work. 
 ―I chose to keep my work and play profiles separate. I don‘t need any [co-
workers] reading my work rants!... I don‘t accept any friend requests on 
my [work] page from real friends, and vice versa.‖ –Tia, Administrative 
Assistant, 37  
Four other participants mentioned accepting different types of friends on different 
SNSs (i.e. Facebook versus LinkedIn) in order to maintain appropriate network 
intersection boundaries. 
―I, for example, do not have some IRC friends on Facebook since they 
smoke marijuana. I do not. … I keep them on MySpace, mainly so they 
don‘t make me look bad, as well as harass the attractive friends I have [on 
Facebook] when they are high.‖ –Allen, Technical Services, 31  
The use of separate profiles or different SNSs to manage social interactions by 
relationship context possibly reduced the cognitive filtering process instead of doing so 
within one SNS account. A disadvantage of using relationship management filtering as 
one‘s primary boundary regulation mechanism was the upfront time investment required 
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to properly leverage this technique. Consistent rules for filtering need to be developed 
from the onset because implementing them after-the-fact is often difficult to do. 
―It is so hard to do at this point. If I had started off that way, I think it 
would have worked. [Some authors] use the fan page just for fan stuff and 
their regular Facebook page just for people they really know. But I think at 
this point I have over 1000 friends on Facebook that it would be 
impossible to separate it out.‖ –Kristine, Author, 37  
4.3.2 Ignoring 
When individuals are presented with more information than they have the time or 
cognitive ability to process, they tend to make satisficing decisions versus optimal 
decisions due to their limited capacity (Simon 1955; Agosto 2002). In addition to 
experiencing social crowding, more social interaction than one desires (Altman 1975), 
participants also struggled with information overload which was exacerbated by the 
amount of content enabled through SNSs. Often, individuals felt overwhelmed by the 
amount of interaction they could engage in or information they could consume within 
their online social networks. This was especially true for individuals who did not use 
filtering strategies for relationship management. 
 ―I pretty much let everybody in, so it is tough to manage. I've got 1600 
[Facebook friends] now. . . Within the last week I think I've had 100 new 
people so I can‘t manage it . . . it is just too much.‖ –Tyrone, 
Photographer, 31  
One coping strategy for this type of information overload that was often used by 
participants was the ―disregard of low-priority inputs which results in ignoring,‖ giving 
attention only to interactions that have direct, personal meaning (Milgram 1970; Altman 
1975). Within SNSs, ignoring is most strongly associated with inward-facing territories 
such as one‘s Facebook News Feed. Eight of the participants mentioned reducing the 
amount of attention they paid to News Feed content. They skimmed or ignored incoming 
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content because they characterized it as ―annoying‖ or ―too much,‖ and they did not feel 
it pertained directly to them.  
―It's a really long list that I haven't read yet, and I'll just read the first, 
whatever comes up on the screen, and I won't use the scroll bar. If it's 
something that I needed to know, they would have contacted me directly. 
They would have either sent me a message on Facebook or a text or a 
phone call or an email. Chances are if they didn't do that then I really 
didn't need to know it.‖ –Lorrie 
Alternatively, three participants actually expected their friends to ignore (or hide) 
them if they did not like what they posted or were annoyed by over postings. That way, 
they did not have to censor what they wanted to post. However, a negative consequence 
of ignoring was that SNS users often missed important information that was shared 
within their networks which, at times, resulted in hurt feelings. For instance, Gordon 
recounted how he felt when one of his close friends who was also in his Facebook 
network missed his posts about his daughter‘s heart surgery: 
―She had so many friends that mine was just another post. It had obviously 
slipped through the cracks. It hurt a little bit thinking that, hey, I am 
reading your posts but you are not reading mine.‖ –Gordon, Restaurant 
Manager, 48  
4.3.3 Blocking 
Individuals who feel filtering and ignoring are not adequate coping mechanisms 
may escalate to blocking (Milgram 1970; Altman 1975). Interestingly, blocking is a 
feature that is explicitly built into most SNS interfaces. I characterized it as an 
interactional boundary mechanism; however, I found that individuals rarely took 
advantage of this feature. Instead, they develop more covert coping mechanisms for 
blocking unwanted interactions with others. For instance, Dollie and Alana use 
pseudonyms on Facebook even though Facebook encourages individuals to use their real 
names.  
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―I changed my name because I was hiding. I wanted to be less able to be 
found. I changed my name, but it didn't work. Because then I realized that 
people were finding me under other people's names ...My sister was still 
able to find me.‖ –Dollie, Mother, 34  
Another way SNS users block interactions with others is by using someone else‘s 
Facebook account and never creating their own. Richard does not have an SNS account 
due to strict ethical standards of his career. He logs into his wife‘s Facebook account so 
that he can stay up-to-date with their mutual friends; Becky‘s husband benefits from her 
SNS interactions in a similar way: 
―My husband does not have a Facebook page. He doesn‘t understand why 
I check it all the time but does enjoy the ‘gossip‘ when I tell him about 
recent updates. He sometimes asks me to check his sister‘s or brother‘s 
status to figure out where they are, if he can‘t get in touch with them ...(I 
think he just feels left out!)‖ –Becky, Elementary School Teacher, 29  
Blocking through the use of pseudonyms or someone else‘s account can 
effectively remove unwanted social interactions while allowing one to still participate as 
part of an SNS. However, blocking as a coping mechanism often does not derive the 
same level of benefits enjoyed by others. Both Richard and Becky‘s husband (according 
to Becky) feel isolated from others by not having their own SNS accounts where they can 
be active participants. Richard consumes but does not post or interact with his friends on 
Facebook because it is not his own account. He joked that he may create an account for 
his dog so that he can have more interactions with friends without compromising his 
privacy. 
―I do feel left out when the majority of my personal friends are sharing 
their lives with each other online, and I am not included.‖ –Richard, 
Architect, 31 
Due to the high potential for boundary violations, four participants felt that 
proactive and retroactive blocking were not enough to protect them from negative 
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consequences. Therefore, they were forced to find ways to constantly monitor their 
outward-facing territories and confidant disclosures so that they could block any threats 
in as close to real-time as possible. Kristine used social aggregators such as TweetDeck 
to monitor her MySpace comments. Tyrone and Tia frequently checked Facebook from 
their mobile phones. 
―When I do get comments or tagging pictures or something that comes to 
my phone and says hey, so and so commented. If it is something that I am 
like ‗this is not kosher,‘ then I can logon and delete that comment.‖ –Tia, 
Administrative Assistant, 37  
4.3.4 Withdrawal 
Withdrawal is characterized as an ―allocation of less time to each of the many 
inputs‖ (Milgram 1970; Altman 1975) in which an individual can interact or a general 
unwillingness to help others (Altman 1975). Individuals withdraw to distance themselves 
from perceived threats in order to avoid harm (Horney 1945). Participants showed 
evidence of withdrawal through self-censorship, detachment, and retreat. Seventeen, 
almost all, of the participants felt that they needed to censor what they shared within their 
SNS. Because most of them do not limit their sharing based on relationship context 
through the creation of friend lists or groups, they used the heuristic of only sharing what 
was appropriate based on everyone in their network seeing it. Therefore, self-disclosure 
was reduced to the lowest common denominator and stripped of personal intimacy. 
―There's certain things you maybe want to post about, but there's people 
on there that you maybe really don't want to know that, or you don't really 
want to share that with, so yeah, I've censored myself and/or not put things 
on there that I would have otherwise.‖ –Nelson, Office Manager, 53  
In this case, Nelson was unaware that he could limit the visibility of posts on 
Facebook to specific friend lists using existing controls. In other cases, individuals 
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censored themselves in the present out of fear that those interactions could persist and 
harm them in the future. 
 ―You don't want people to get things that they can hold against you. It's 
difficult because you post something and you are friends with someone, or 
a company you want to hire you comes and looks at it and then your 
relationship with that person or company changes and what was ok before 
isn't ok now.‖ –Lorrie, Security Officer, 22  
Therefore, many participants compensated for this by only accentuating the 
positive when sharing within their SNS. Eight participants said they suppressed any 
negative thoughts or feelings and only shared content they felt was positive or humorous. 
In fact, they frowned upon other people not doing the same. 
―Some people use it as a diary. I would not do that. I would not tell how I 
feel...if I say anything on my wall it is going to be either, one, that I am 
going to complement something that someone else already said ...or it's 
going to be something positive. I feel like I will never put anything that 
has negative energy on my wall.‖ –Tyrone, Photographer, 31  
Self-censorship reduced perceived social intimacy and emotional support from 
one‘s network and suppressed a sense of authentic self. 
―There are times when I am feeling sort of depressed, and I just want to 
share but I don't want to share it with everybody. That is where it becomes 
difficult because you want to share like you are sharing with your friends 
but not everyone is on equal footing so I do find myself sort of trying to 
speak in code sometimes or just hold back what I really am feeling.‖ –
Gordon, Restaurant Manager, 48 
In addition to self-censorship, six SNS users managed their boundaries by 
carefully staying out of any conflict they observed between others. In a sense, this was 
their way of withdrawing by ―shifting social transactions to others‖ (Milgram 1970; 
Altman 1975) and offloading the responsibility of managing conflict to others. 
 ―I don't usually interject myself in those kind of posts. I figure 
somebody's upset somebody but I really don't need to know about it.‖ –
Regina, HIV Awareness Coordinator, 60  
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However, when avoiding conflict was not a successful mechanism for 
maintaining their boundaries, some participants resorted to retreat. They created 
interactional boundaries of retreat through dropping off conversation threads, not logging 
in to their SNS, or even deactivating their account completely. For example, Gordon and 
Edward abandoned arguments that were started on Facebook for a time or indefinitely. 
 ―What I do is I just back off and try to come back to it later. And just say 
‗Ok, This conversation about the ethics of termination of unborn children 
is not a really a conversation I'm happy having right now. … I probably 
need to take a step back.‘" –Edward, Youth Minister, 30  
Kristine explained that she needed a break from her SNSs when she could not 
maintain a positive persona for her readers. 
―I do take Twitter Holidays or Twitter-cations where you don't go on for a 
while. Same thing with Facebook. Sometimes if I am feeling down or 
depressed, I don't want to go on Twitter and Facebook. One of the bad 
things about having all these people who are fans or whatever or that aren't 
family and friends, who are in a third category is that they expect you to 
be on and up and they don't expect you to have doubts or things like that.‖ 
–Kristine, Author, 37  
When Kurt was over stimulated by his SNS, he also chose to withdrawal from all 
interaction for a while. 
―Twitter I'm pretty much overwhelmed.  So my way of dealing with it is 
pretty much basically been to kind of, I don't know, kind of run and hide.  
I'm kind of like ahhh too much information, I can't deal with it. I am 
ADHD to begin with, and that is one thing that happens with us, too much 
information causes well someone to want to run and hide pretty much, 
withdraw from the stimulus.‖ –Kurt, dating coach, 32 
Alana has deactivated and reactivated her Facebook and MySpace accounts on 
multiple occasions as she is generally ambivalent about online social networking, 
believing that its main purpose is to violate one‘s privacy. 
―I get on it to start off with, save all my good friends, even post updates to 
start off ...then my friends and I catch up in real life, have our girlfriend 
powwows and the pizazz of the site goes away. I don‘t use it, realize over 
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and over that my most meaningful relationships benefit little from social 
networking, and I stray away from the site.‖ –Alana, Substance Abuse 
Counselor, 28  
Dollie deleted the offending Wall post where her friend congratulated her on her 
pregnancy, but because her confidant-disclosure boundary had been violated, she deleted 
her Facebook account entirely until months after her baby was born. Dollie believes that 
when Facebook becomes more of a nuisance than a positive social outlet, the best thing to 
do is to remove herself from it completely. 
―If I don't like Facebook, if I don't like being there, I could as easily get 
out of it. I can just delete the whole thing and leave. Delete is fabulous. I 
can delete you or delete myself and all my issues go away.‖ –Dollie, 
Mother, 34  
Self-censorship, detachment, and retreat are ways that SNS users withdraw from 
social interactions within SNSs, often when they feel there are no other ways to engage 
without being harmed. Withdrawal is an extreme coping mechanism for protecting 
oneself by limiting one‘s own behaviors in contrast to blocking which limits the actions 
of others. In both cases, social interaction is limited because the cost of interacting is 
perceived to be higher than the benefits.  
4.3.5 Aggression 
Filtering, ignoring, blocking, and withdrawal are all characterized as defensive 
coping mechanisms. However, some SNS users resort to offensive measures within their 
SNSs in order to hurt others. Aggression is a coping mechanism where individuals 
threaten those they perceive as a threat in order to protect themselves (Horney 1945). For 
instance, aggression due to social crowding in physical spaces may manifest as violence 
or verbal behaviors (Altman 1975). However, within SNSs, aggression is a coping 
mechanism that tends to be used to seek revenge in a covert yet public way, leveraging 
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outward-facing territories such as Wall posts. Interestingly, aggression within SNSs was 
a response to neurotic needs of acceptance and approval (Horney 1945) instead of social 
crowding (Altman 1975). SNS users leveraged aggression to get attention or enhance the 
level of social interaction within their networks, even if the interaction was negative. 
Seven participants explained using or having a friend use a status update to all of their 
friends as a way to retaliate against one particular person and garner attention or 
sympathy. 
―[My boyfriend‘s daughter] would make a comment on her Facebook page 
to look at it would be kind of general but then for us to read it to know 
what situation she's talking about it is like wait a minute why are you 
putting our business out on the street? It is more of a connotation, I am not 
saying your name, but I am talking to you.‖ –Tia, Administrative 
Assistant, 37 
Kurt went as far as to create a separate Facebook page and change his profile 
visibility to Friends of Friends in order to make his ex-girlfriend jealous and regret 
breaking up with him. 
―I had the bachelor of the year thing which was a good way to get back at 
her and say look, you gave this shit up. Now all your friends are going to 
see. They would say it why did you walk away from that he has all these 
other qualities and he is hot too?‖ –Kurt, Dating Coach, 32 
Aggression also surfaced, at times, when SNS users enjoyed generating 
discussion and even causing conflict between their friends, possibly even pitting them 
against one another and intentionally converging one‘s network intersection boundaries. 
Regina, Larry, and Dollie often found entertainment value in starting political arguments 
on their Facebook Walls. Edward and Nelson often encouraged religious debates. Kurt, in 
general, liked provoking his audience as a means of personal promotion and even used 
them to bolster his own causes. 
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However, being the target or even just witness of others‘ aggression certainly has 
negative consequences. Having experienced some form of aggression in the past, 
participants tended to have a tainted view of SNSs as environments that breed drama and 
revert adults back to juvenile tendencies. Six participants emphasized the need to avoid 
the ―drama‖ present within online social networks. 
―The site causes enough drama, as it is, or rather the people on the site 
using it in nefarious ways. Same thing for Myspace and all the others.‖ –
Allen, Technical Services, 31  
4.3.6 Compliance 
Compliance is a ―self-effacing solution‖ to boundary turbulence and leads to 
sacrificing one‘s own needs to accommodate others and avoid harm (Horney 1945). 
Altman explained that individuals do this in response to ―repeated failures to achieve a 
balance between achieved and desired levels of privacy‖ (1975). In some cases, 
individuals adjust their desired privacy level instead of trying to alter the social 
environment (Altman 1975). Often, compliance was implemented without any boundary 
discussion with others; therefore, adjustment towards more mutually acceptable 
boundaries would not occur in the future. Six participants admitted to adjusting their 
boundaries and relinquishing their interactional privacy needs to please others. This 
resulted in changing their disclosures, friending and unfriending preferences, and even 
their offline behaviors to account for the inevitable sharing within their social networks. 
 ―I am worried what people say or tag of me or whatever, so I do not 
engage in as many crazy drinking sessions with people who might not 
execute the best judgment when uploading, or the very least, marking who 
has access to view the more unsuitable photos. I do not say or do crazy 
things with my friends in town (usually) and keep some things I might 
normally share by my nature, to myself, so it doesn‘t end up on 
Facebook.‖ –Allen, Technical Services, 31  
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Being able to properly maintain one‘s interpersonal boundaries is important for 
self realization and healthy relationship management (Horney 1945; Altman 1975; 
Katherine 1991; Petronio 2002). Therefore, over accommodation of others could result in 
a perceived loss of control over one‘s social interactions. As Allen admitted above, he 
feels that he cannot always be himself, even offline, due to the online interactions that 
may occur as a result. 
4.3.7 Compromise 
Many SNS behaviors I saw, as illustrated above, fit nicely within the coping 
mechanisms previously identified by Altman for dealing with stress in social 
environments (Milgram 1970; Altman 1975). However, Horney identified one ―healthy‖ 
coping mechanism to meet neurotic needs that Altman did not mention. Compromise 
involves the interpersonal process of communicating, agreeing, disagreeing, 
compromising, and reaching mutual decisions (Horney 1945). In effect, compromise is 
the primary mechanism for regulating interpersonal boundaries instead of satisficing 
through compensatory actions. I observed boundary coordination through compromise in 
this study, but ironically, this coordination almost always happened external to the SNS 
environment – characterizing compromise most frequently as a coping mechanism 
instead of a technology-supported boundary mechanism. For instance, SNSs lacked the 
ability to signal one‘s privacy desires to co-owners of private information to ensure 
proper confidant-disclosure boundary coordination. Instead, SNS users found ways to use 
offline or private communication with others in order to coordinate boundaries 
beforehand (as a preventative strategy (Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011)), and 
subsequently (as a corrective strategy (Lampinen, Lehtinen et al. 2011)). Participants 
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exhibited this coping behavior most frequently when posting and tagging photos on 
Facebook. Besmer and Lipford examined photo tagging and untagging behaviors in detail 
on Facebook (Besmer and Lipford 2010). In most cases, coordination happened before 
the photo was posted. Generally, people were very accommodating when it came to 
posting and tagging photos of others. However, photo tagging was also a point of 
contention where most participants said they had untagged a picture of themselves in the 
past. (Note: the interviews were conducted prior to Facebook‘s recent changes that allow 
tag review.) 
―I texted her and asked her if she wanted me to email her the pictures or 
did she want me to tag it? I wanted to tag it because I thought it was a hot 
picture. She said no no no you can't tag it, I am about to graduate . . . The 
shoot didn't show any nudity or anything. I think it was just really tight 
clothing, and it was really sexy but she did not want that to get out. She 
said that no do not ever tag me and that image.‖ –Tyrone, Photographer, 
31 
I also observed offline boundary compromise when setting relationship 
connection boundaries. Becky and Dollie told co-workers in person that they did not 
accept friend requests from co-workers so as to manage their expectations. 
―I don't want to have coworkers on my page … I would say it at work, ‗oh 
no, don't send me a friend request because I don't allow coworkers on my 
page.‘‖ –Dollie, Mother, 34  
When SNS users were confronted with interpersonal conflict or negative social 
interactions, they made a point to take the interaction off of outward-facing territories to 
other more private mediums. It was important to participants to not allow interpersonal 
conflict to be visible to everyone within their networks. Communication was initiated 
either through the SNS‘s private email messaging capabilities or by more direct 
communication such as calling or face-to-face conversations. While the primary response 
to conflict was to withdraw, an alternative strategy 13 SNS users employed was private 
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confrontation for reconciliation. However, the effort to reach a compromise or truce was 
reserved for close friends as opposed to acquaintances. A benefit of this approach, 
however, was that SNS users were often able to resolve misunderstandings instead of 
ending the relationship or propagating drama within their SNSs. 
―If it [conflict occurring] was just in my news feed, I would filter them 
out, if it was on my wall, I would probably just unfriend them unless they 
were a close friend, then I would ask them to stop.‖ –Fred, Sales Manager, 
33  
4.4 Discussion 
I presented a framework of SNS coping strategies by identifying analogous online 
behaviors to theoretically based, offline coping mechanisms. Filtering, ignoring, 
blocking, withdrawal, aggression, compliance, and compromise are all strategies SNS 
users have developed in an attempt to achieve their desired level of privacy and social 
interaction outside of the use of traditional SNS privacy controls. TABLE 8 summarizes 
the types of coping mechanisms, gives a specific example, and relates the example to 
types of interpersonal boundary management. 
 
TABLE 8: Summary of Coping Mechanisms 
Coping 
Mechanism 
Example (Boundary Type) 
Filtering Creating two separate SNS profiles to segregate different circles of friends 
(Relationship Context) 
Ignoring Skimming or ignoring one‘s News Feed (Inward-Facing Territorial) 
Blocking Using a pseudonym so that others cannot find oneself 
(Interactional/Relationship Connection) 
Withdrawal Censoring oneself (Self- Disclosure) 
Aggression Intentionally starting arguments between one‘s friends (Network 
Intersection/Outward-Facing Territorial) 
Compliance Accepting almost all friend requests and rarely unfriending (Relationship 
Connection) 
Compromise Confirming that it is okay to tag someone in a picture (Confidant-Disclosure) 
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Such adaptations suggest, first, that social interactions through SNSs frequently 
cause emotional distress that users feel the need to mitigate. Second, it suggests that SNS 
environments are not optimally designed to be responsive and flexible to SNS user 
privacy needs. Third, such coping mechanisms tend to produce sub-optimal social 
outcomes such as neurotic tendencies (Horney 1945) and additional stress. With the 
exception of compromise, these coping strategies tend to be maladaptive, where short 
term stress may be decreased but potentially at the cost of increasing long term stress 
(Horney 1945). For instance, feeling like you constantly have to monitor your SNS, 
participate using a pseudonym, or even change your offline behavior due to potential 
SNS interactions are generally not beneficial coping behaviors and can be stressful in and 
of themselves.  
As an example, Dollie, who is an extreme filterer when it comes to relationship 
connection boundaries (not allowing family or coworkers into her network) does so 
because she has been hurt in the past. She only has 62 Facebook friends and unfriends 
often in order to avoid conflict or compromise. However, this coping behavior reduces 
her opportunity to forge deeper relationships with these individuals through her SNS at 
any point in the future. Individuals like Kurt and Tyrone, who use their SNSs for 
professional marketing, often ignore their News Feed, or inward-facing territories, due to 
the sheer volume of status updates from their extremely large networks, and miss 
important updates from true friends. Therefore, while they welcome others to interact 
with them, they rarely engage others in the same level of interaction in return, possibly 
making others feel ignored or unimportant. Individuals who withdraw emotionally 
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through self-censorship tend to express a dissatisfaction of not being able to present an 
authentic self to others and feel a reduced sense of intimacy within their SNSs. 
Understanding SNS coping mechanisms can help pinpoint areas where improved 
interface design can potentially enhance online social interactions. These findings can 
inform design guidelines that can improve SNS interface support for interpersonal 
boundary regulation. For instance, SNSs could support one‘s relationship connection 
filtering process by requiring more information as to the motivation one wants to connect 
with another. This would have saved Gordon from significant emotional torment when a 
high school bully friend-requested him on Facebook. 
―He used to bully the shit out of me in high school. I am looking at him, 
and I am thinking, why in the world would he send a friend request to me 
when he tortured me in high school? I really struggled over it, and I was 
about to decline him actually. I decided to say yes, to see what's going on 
...the next day he sends an email in which he apologizes for the grief that 
he gave me through high school.‖ –Gordon  
SNS interfaces would also benefit from better inward-facing territorial boundary 
support to reduce cognitive overload from updates streaming in from one‘s friends. For 
instance, many Facebook users reported frustration that Facebook controls who they see 
in their News Feed instead of allowing them to do so themselves. Because SNSs often 
take control of boundary regulation for end users, they have to find ways to regain 
control. For instance, when Edward wants to see a particular friend show up in his 
Facebook News Feed, he makes sure to post a comment on their Wall so that the recent 
interaction bumps them into his Top News. To address this problem, in September 2011, 
Facebook just rolled out a change to filter one‘s News Feed by different friend lists. 
Overall, the biggest gap this study highlights in SNS interface design for 
boundary regulation support is a lack of built-in capabilities to compromise by actively 
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negotiating one‘s boundaries with others. SNS users are forced to use communication 
mediums outside of the SNS interface to coordinate interpersonal boundaries with others. 
Therefore, the SNS environment is not responsive to these needs. SNS interfaces, such as 
Facebook, are designed to encourage sharing and being open, and de-emphasize 
boundary coordination. For instance, many of the participants expressed anguish over 
having no closure from being unfriended. SNSs do not notify and certainly do not 
facilitate communication to explain why the relationship was severed or attempt to 
reconcile conflict. There also are no tools for explicitly signaling or collaboratively 
negotiating disclosure for co-owned information such as pictures and tags. SNS users 
have to resort to external coordination though such means as private messaging or face-
to-face conversations. By integrating this negotiation process into SNS interfaces in 
positive ways, it could facilitate and make online boundary regulation a more socially 
acceptable process. 
4.5 Summary 
Now that individuals are interacting online instead of merely sharing information 
asynchronously, it is important to reapply existing psychology of social interaction and 
behavior to virtual, social environments. This research applied social theories of 
interpersonal boundary regulation through boundary and coping mechanisms to the 
unique social environments of SNSs. I found that filtering, ignoring, blocking, 
withdrawal, aggression, compliance, and compromise represent coping mechanisms 
individuals use within SNSs to maintain their interpersonal boundaries. In many cases, 
coping and incongruent boundary mechanisms created sub-optimal social networking 
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experiences or introduced unnecessary complexity, which in turn reduced end user 
satisfaction with the SNS and negatively impacted their social interaction with others. 
Hence, when SNS users employ coping strategies, this can signify opportunities 
for improved interactional interface design. Integrating, improving, or realigning 
boundary mechanisms supported by SNS interfaces could actually enhance relationship 
development. Privacy through effective interpersonal boundary regulation serves as a 
way to improve how individuals connect and share with others. Interpersonal boundary 
regulation through compromise can increase one‘s level and quality of engagement 
through SNSs. Therefore, SNS interface design that supports the complexities of the 
interpersonal boundary regulation process could serve to improve, instead of prevent, 
higher levels of social interaction. Next, I will discuss the interpersonal boundary 
regulation process for SNSs in more detail. 
5CHAPTER 5: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERPERSONAL 
BOUNDARY REGULATION WITHIN SNSS
Now that the mechanisms, both technology-supported and coping, for 
interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs have been identified, the next step is to 
incorporate them into a cohesive, theoretical framework of interpersonal boundary 
regulation. Based on a culmination of the literature and the interviews, I have created a 
theoretical framework for interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs. The key 
components of interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs include: individual 
differences, awareness, desired privacy level, boundary negotiation, and privacy outcome 
(FIGURE 2). In addition, through this research, I explore the relationship between 
particular privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes such as social capital, social 
connectedness, and self-esteem. The remainder of this chapter will step through the SNS 
interpersonal boundary regulation process and define salient constructs. Chapters 6 and 7 
will serve to quantitatively validate some of the key relationships between the constructs. 
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FIGURE 2: Theoretical Framework of Interpersonal Boundary Regulation within SNSs 
 
 
5.1 Individual Differences 
 ―Individuals use certain criteria such as cultural expectations, gender, motivation, 
context of situation, and risk-benefit ratio to establish privacy rules,‖ according to 
Petronio (Petronio 2002). One‘s ―desired level of boundary regulation‖ is ―derive[d] from 
a combination of personal, interpersonal, and situational factors‖ (Altman 1975). Many of 
the rules for interpersonal boundary regulation derive from contextual factors or 
individual characteristics. Personal factors include experience, personality, and 
biography. Interpersonal factors may include group cohesion and structure. Situational 
factors could include environmental properties or task demands (Altman 1975). A 
plethora of individual characteristics have been related to boundary regulation. Whitfield 
mentions humility, hyper vigilance, compassion, fear of abandonment, low self-esteem, 
control, trust, dependence, grieving, tolerance, assertiveness, and aggression (1993). 
Altman discussed anxiousness, extroversion, introversion, authoritarianism, dominance, 
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birth order, stress, culture, vulnerability, and mood. For instance, Altman suggested that 
individuals who exhibit a high level of dominance may be more territorial; individuals 
who are more anxious or stressed tend to be more distant (1975). Petronio included 
cultural expectations, gender, motivation, loneliness, stress, and Machiavellianism. For 
instance, lonely people are less likely to disclose personal information (Petronio 2002). 
While I cannot cover all individual differences and experiences that culminate in rule 
acquisition for boundary regulation, I have attempted to cover some of the most over-
arching and relevant characteristics. The contextual factors that I feel will effect rule 
development for boundary regulation are personality, emotional state, culture, race, 
gender, and age. I will briefly discuss these characteristics as they relate to boundary 
regulation. 
5.1.1 Personality 
Personality is one of the fundamental characteristics of an individual that 
researchers have measured (or attempted to measure) for decades. Controversy remains 
over the different dimensions of personality. However, the ―Big Five‖ personality 
dimensions became a first consensus among many researchers as a standard taxonomy of 
personality traits. The five dimensions used in this taxonomy are Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Openness (Gosling, 
Rentfrow et al. 2003; John 2008). Though I have not formulated formal hypotheses for 
how these traits may influence boundary regulation, it is reasonable that they will have an 
impact given prior research. For example, Altman suggested that extroverts adopt a closer 
personal space than introverts (1975) which may equate to more open territorial 
boundaries.  
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5.1.2 Emotional State 
Stress, anxiousness, vulnerability, loneliness, and mood are documented as 
contributing factors that affect private disclosures (2002) and one‘s desired privacy level 
(Altman 1975). Such individual characteristics can be grouped as one‘s emotional state. 
Other researchers have determined that the two most salient characteristics of emotional 
experience or mood are Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) (Campbell, 
Trapnell et al. 1996). PA is the extent to which an individual feels ―enthusiastic, active, 
and alert‖ (Watson, Clark et al. 1988). Meanwhile, NA ―is a general dimension of 
subjective distress and unpleasureable engagement that subsumes a variety of aversive 
mood states, including anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness‖ (Watson, 
Clark et al. 1988). PANAS has been measured in SNS research as it relates to social 
capital and self esteem (Burke, Marlow et al. 2010), but it has not been captured as a 
factor in SNS privacy research previously. 
5.1.3 Culture, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age 
Culture or ethnicity largely affects the social norms that individuals use to 
develop boundaries. For instance, more individualistic cultures tend to desire higher 
levels of privacy than collective cultures (Petronio 2002). Many researchers have studied 
the differences between Western and Eastern cultures and found notable differences 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kashima, Yamaguchi et al. 1995). These differences have 
been described as two different self construals: individualism and collectivism (Kashima, 
Yamaguchi et al. 1995; Oyserman, Coon et al. 2002). The individualistic of independent 
construal is epitomized by Western culture with an emphasis on the separateness of 
distinct individuals. Behavior is driven by ―one‘s own internal repertoire of thoughts, 
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feelings, and actions of others‖ (Markus and Kitayama 1991). In contrast, collective or 
interdependent cultures (usually associated with the Eastern hemisphere) focus on 
connectedness of individuals: 
 ―Experiencing interdependence entails seeing oneself as part of an 
encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one‘s behavior is 
determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the 
actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the 
relationship‖ (Markus and Kitayama 1991). 
Past research has found differences in concerns for information privacy based on 
cultural differences (Bellman, Johnson et al. 2004; Xu, Dinev et al. 2008). For instance, 
cross-cultural differences in desired privacy level and perceptions of crowding were 
found between American and Turkish students (Kaya and Weber 2003). Within SNS 
research, ethnicity played a role as MySpace researchers found that white Anglo students 
were more likely to disclose their real names, romantic status, and interests while African 
American students were more likely to disclose their religion (Tufekci 2008). White 
college students on Facebook exhibited higher levels of bridging social capital than non-
white students (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007). 
Gender differences are also reflected in privacy and interpersonal boundary 
decisions. Research has found statistically significant differences between men and 
women on the prerequisites necessary for self-disclosure. Women place a higher level of 
importance on sender and receiver characteristics. Women emphasize the importance of a 
receiver to be ―discreet, trustworthy, sincere, liked, respected, a good listener, warm, and 
open‖ (Petronio, Martin et al. 1984). As for the sender of a disclosure, women value 
honesty, willingness to disclose, and sincerity more so than men. Research also suggests 
that women tend to disclose more than men (Petronio, Martin et al. 1984) and in different 
ways. Women are more relational than men, but men develop more cohesive groups 
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(Kashima, Yamaguchi et al. 1995). Other research suggests that men desire a higher level 
of privacy than women (Kaya and Weber 2003). When looking at gender differences 
within SNSs, Thelwall and Uppal found that female MySpace users made significantly 
more positive comments to their friends than males (Thelwall, Wilkinson et al. 2009). 
Other research found that men were significantly more likely to make their MySpace 
profile visible to everyone on MySpace than women and three times more likely to 
disclosure their phone number. However, men were more likely than women to think 
about government or corporate entities viewing their profiles (Tufekci 2008). Based on 
these differences, I believe that gender is an important contextual factor for interpersonal 
boundary regulation. 
Age may also play a role in boundary regulation within SNSs. Because younger 
individuals tended to adopt online social networking more quickly than older individuals, 
some research suggests that younger SNS users are more comfortable sharing and 
disclosing than older SNS users (Gross and Acquisti 2005; Stutzman 2006; Ellison, 
Steinfield et al. 2007; Tufekci 2008). ―It seems that the younger students are more 
political, more comfortable with sexual orientation, more motivated for publicity, and 
more willing to give up their privacy‖ (Tufekci 2008). Tufekci suggests that this may be 
because the desire to be seen or known outweighs the desire to protect (Tufekci 2008). 
However, adults may also react differently to boundary signals. For instance, older SNS 
users tend to not get as emotionally invested in the process of ―friend ranking‖ as 
younger ones (boyd 2006).  
In summary, personality, emotional state, culture, ethnicity, gender, and age are 
all contextual factors that represent individual differences that contribute to unique 
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privacy boundary preferences when individuals prepare to engage in boundary 
negotiation.  
5.2 Awareness 
Although awareness is an individualistic phenomenon, I chose to separate it from 
the individual differences outlined above for two reasons.  First, personality, emotional 
state, culture, ethnicity, and age are individual differences that cannot be manipulated or 
changed whereas awareness can be altered due to outside influences. Second, awareness 
is an increasingly important construct in the empirical studies I will be discussing in the 
upcoming chapters.  At least some level of awareness is a prerequisite for interpersonal 
boundary development (Whitfield 1993). This includes both awareness of oneself and 
one‘s environment. I have identified three types of awareness necessary for the SNS 
boundary process: self-awareness, risk awareness, and feature awareness.  
5.2.1 Self-Awareness 
Self-awareness is defined as a realization of one‘s ―beliefs, thoughts, feelings, 
decisions, choices, and experiences,‖ (Whitfield 1993) and thus becomes important when 
individuals develop their interpersonal boundaries with others. A key aspect is the 
awareness of what one shares. ―Presence‖ or boundary awareness is one of the key 
characteristics of boundary development (Whitfield 1993). Self-awareness is often 
differentiated in the literature into public self-awareness and private self-awareness. 
―Public self-awareness involves attention to oneself as a social object‖ (Prentice-Dunn 
and Rogers 1982). This includes ―concerns about one‘s appearance in social situations‖ 
(Sassenberg, Boos et al. 2005). Private self-awareness, on the other hand, has an inward 
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focus ―on personal, more covert aspects of oneself such as perceptions, thoughts, and 
feelings‖ (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers 1982).  
SNS privacy research, to my knowledge, has not determined the relationship of 
self-awareness on boundary development or information disclosures. The closest research 
that is relevant deals with disclosures within computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
mediums. Two major yet diverging perspectives have developed on the impact self-
awareness has in CMC. First, some researchers believe that CMC reduces social cues and 
reduces overall self-awareness causing deindividuating effects that lead to impersonal 
tendencies. Deindividuation occurs when an individual loses sight of one‘s individuality. 
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers studied the effects of self-awareness on deindividuation or 
aggression. They found that attentional cues (focusing the attention either towards the 
individual or externally) impact private self-awareness. External attentional cues 
heightened aggression. Meanwhile, accountability cues (focusing on accountability to a 
set of social standards) heightened public self-awareness and decreased deindividuation 
(Prentice-Dunn and Rogers 1982). Another stream of research examined the effect of 
CMC on self-awareness. CMC was found to heighten private self-awareness which 
lowers attitude change thereby leading to less interpersonal influence and more conflict 
than face-to-face (FTF) communication. However, this was only true of individuals with 
high trait private self-awareness, the tendency of an individual to focus inwardly 
(Sassenberg, Boos et al. 2005). Another study also confirmed that CMC significantly 
increased acute private self-awareness while marginally lowering public self-awareness. 
Individuals with lower public self-awareness tended to evaluate their social context more 
negatively (Matheson and Zanna 1988). Conversely, the hyperpersonal perspective posits 
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that the ―visual anonymity‖ of CMC creates an opportunity for more favorable 
impressions leading to greater levels of intimacy than within FTF interactions (Yao and 
Flanagin 2006).  
5.2.2 Risk Awareness 
Risk can be defined as ―uncertainty resulting from a potential for a negative 
outcome‖ that can result in personal loss (Xu, Dinev et al. 2008). Risk awareness is 
another component of awareness that is relevant to interpersonal boundary regulation 
within SNSs. If SNS users are not aware that potential boundary violations could occur or 
their ramifications, they would be less likely to vigilantly defend that boundary from 
potential violations. Petronio described the negative consequences from private 
disclosures in terms of risk level or type. High-risk disclosures can result in shame, 
threat, or severe embarrassment. Moderate-risk disclosures may cause discomfort or 
aggravation, and low-risk disclosures may result in white lies or conflicting opinions. 
Other risks associated with opening one‘s boundaries could include stigma-risk, face-risk, 
relational-risk, and role-risk (Petronio 2002). Olivero and Lunt found that perceived risk 
reduces the level of trust and increases the demand for control within e-commerce 
exchanges when retailers request consumers to disclose personal information (2004). 
Therefore, perceived risk is a factor when SNS users make boundary regulation 
decisions.  
5.2.3 Feature Awareness 
Social interactions within SNS environments are fully mediated by the 
technological interface; therefore, feature awareness plays a crucial role in boundary 
negotiation. According to Altman, ―environmental awareness and environmental-usage 
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training might help people better use, shape, and reshape their environments‖ (1975). 
Feature awareness is defined as the degree of user knowledge about or recognition of a 
particular interface feature or functionality necessary to perform a given task (Findlater 
and McGrenere 2010). Awareness of functionality is a major issue in the learnability of 
any interface which impacts usability and ultimately a user‘s ability to effectively interact 
within the environment or achieve desired outcomes (Grossman, Fitzmaurice et al. 2009). 
Feature awareness is vital within SNS environments because employment of boundary 
mechanisms often directly depends on the ability to utilize SNS interface controls 
effectively. According to Facebook‘s Site Governance, ―At Facebook, we are constantly 
developing new experiences and features to help you control your information. . . . 
However, there is more to controlling your information than just settings. It‘s also 
important that you understand how information is used and what your choices are‖ 
(Faceboook 2011). Unfortunately, SNS privacy settings are often too complex for SNS 
users or change so quickly that it is hard for them to keep up. I experienced this problem 
first-hand during the interface analysis as SNS interfaces completely changed within a 
matter of months and with no notification.  I also saw this was the case in the SNS user 
interviews.  If SNS users do not know that an SNS interface control is available for 
boundary regulation, then it will not be employed. In the interviews, a majority of 
participants lacked awareness of interface controls provided by SNSs for boundary 
regulation.  
5.3 Desired Privacy Level and Privacy Negotiation Behaviors 
In Altman‘s model, one‘s desired level of privacy is the optimal goal one tries to 
achieve at a given time for his or her need of interaction with others (Altman 1975). 
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Boundaries are not static; instead, they change over time and circumstance. Past research 
established that desired privacy level is negatively correlated with extraversion, 
sociability, and self-disclosure and positively correlated with shyness and loneliness 
(Harrison 1993). Harrison developed a scale to measure an individual‘s desired privacy 
level and noted that ―it is not assumed that all individuals with a strong desire for privacy 
desire all forms of privacy equally‖ (Harrison 1993). I found that this also held true for 
the boundary types I presented in the taxonomy. Different SNS users had distinct profiles 
for managing their boundaries, desiring high and low privacy levels across different 
boundary types. For instance, an individual may desire a high level of disclosure privacy 
and low levels of relational privacy. In other words, this person may not want any 
personal information shared within his or her network but wants to have a large network 
comprised of both strong and weak ties. This would be like Kristine, the young adult 
author, who ―blanket accepts‖ friend requests but does not disclose anything personal 
within her SNS.  Inversely, an individual may desire low levels of disclosure privacy yet 
high levels of relational privacy.  This would be like Dollie, a stay-at-home mother, who 
says whatever she likes within her SNS (from vulgar language to strong political 
opinions), but does not let family or co-workers into her social network and keeps her 
friend list as small as possible. Because desired privacy level can vary by individual 
across boundary types, I created measures of desired privacy level across each of the ten 
boundary types for the quantitative studies in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The negotiation stage occurs when the different interpersonal boundary 
mechanisms (defined in Chapter 2) are mobilized in combination in attempt to achieve 
one‘s desired privacy level. Individuals employ different boundary mechanisms at 
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different times, at different levels, and in different combinations to achieve their desired 
level of privacy (Altman 1975). Mechanism deployment is very dependent on the 
individual. For instance, past research found that college students are better at managing 
disclosure boundaries through profile visibility than managing the disclosures themselves 
(Tufekci 2008). Both desired privacy level and boundary negotiation behaviors can vary 
by different boundary types. I found that different SNS users have different styles when 
choosing mechanisms to regulate their interactions. These strategies included both 
technology-supported and coping mechanisms.  
Given the different types of privacy boundaries, it is important that the boundary 
of mechanism of choice supports the privacy goal SNS users are trying to achieve. 
However, this is not always the case.  I observed that it was often the case that SNS users 
implemented boundary mechanisms that did not specifically meet their privacy goals. I 
call this incongruent boundary negotiation given a boundary goal.  For instance, if 
someone is not one‘s friend, a congruent boundary mechanism would be to unfriend 
them. Thus, an appropriate relationship connection boundary would be established. 
However, a common incongruency I observed was when SNS users crossed relationship 
connection boundaries with inward-facing territorial boundaries.  Quite a few participants 
hid someone from their News Feed who was no longer a friend, while others unfriended a 
real friend due to an annoyance such as over-posting. In most cases, when a boundary 
mechanism was incongruent with the boundary goal, it also created potential for negative 
consequences. For instance, hiding someone still allows that person access to one‘s 
network, personal disclosures, and future interactions. Inversely, unfriending someone 
who is truly a friend removes the possibility of future interactions that could strengthen 
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the relationship, and could even harm the relationship by emotionally hurting the other 
person. Therefore, both desired privacy level and privacy negotiation behaviors within 
SNSs need to be captured with respect to the different boundary mechanism types 
defined in the taxonomy.  This will give us a better understanding of intent, behavior, and 
the fit between the two. 
5.4 Privacy Outcomes 
In optimal cases, boundary negotiation results in boundary coordination; however, 
individuals do not always achieve their desired level of social interaction which results in 
―boundary turbulence‖ (Petronio 2002) or a boundary violation (Altman 1975; Katherine 
1991). Three privacy outcomes are possible; Individuals can achieve their optimal desired 
privacy level, become crowded, or be left feeling isolated given their actual level of 
social interaction. Crowding occurs when one becomes over stimulated from undesirable 
levels of social interaction. Inversely, isolation can also be a result of improper boundary 
regulation when an individual receives less social interaction than intended (Altman 
1975). These types of ―distance violations‖ can occur ―when intimacy is less than what is 
appropriate to the relationship‖ (Katherine 1991). Generally, there are three causes of 
boundary asynchrony: intentional violations, mistakes, and fuzzy boundaries (Petronio 
2002). Both crowding and isolation are considered boundary violations and can result in a 
variety of negative outcomes including physical, physiological, and psychological stress; 
vulnerability, illness, anxiety, embarrassment, anger, bewilderment, discomfort, flight 
reactions, anger, and more (Altman 1975). Boundary violations can have extreme 
consequences from abandonment to abuse (Katherine 1991). Privacy outcomes can, in 
turn, affect other aspects of the interpersonal boundary regulation process. Due to 
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negative privacy outcomes, an individual‘s awareness may be heightened, their boundary 
rules modified, or their boundary mechanisms adjusted to be more effective. In this way, 
the entire interpersonal boundary regulation process is iterative in nature.  
5.5 Social Networking Outcomes 
SNS privacy research often assumes that optimal social networking outcomes 
(sharing and connecting with others) are negatively associated with privacy outcomes 
(framed as restricting information disclosure). However, my theoretical framework of 
interpersonal boundary regulation within SNSs does not make this assumption.  In fact, I 
propose that optimal privacy outcomes (framed as receiving one‘s desired level of social 
interaction) are directly related to positive social networking outcomes. Interpersonal 
boundaries help individuals achieve self-worth, self-esteem, self-respect, self-freedom, 
self-identity, emotional release, self-evaluation, self-observation, identity differentiation, 
independence, autonomy (Altman 1975; Whitfield 1993), self-expression, and self-
clarification (Petronio 2002). Thus, boundary regulation is essential for personal growth 
and the development of fulfilling relationships. Both increased self-esteem (Ellison, 
Steinfield et al. 2007; Steinfield, Ellison et al. 2008) and higher social capital (Williams 
2006; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007; Steinfield, Ellison et al. 2008; Jiang and Carroll 
2009; Burke, Kraut et al. 2011; Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011; Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 
2011) are positive outcomes often related to social network use. 
5.5.1 Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem is an individual‘s inner thoughts and feelings regarding one‘s own 
worth (Rosenberg 1989). Altman related self-esteem to one‘s ability to regulate privacy 
boundaries (Altman 1975). ―When one has a clear sense of boundaries between inside 
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and the outside, one is able to develop healthy self-esteem based on a sense of autonomy‖ 
(Paine-Gernee and Hunt 1990). SNS research often evaluates self-esteem when 
measuring social capital (Burke, Marlow et al. 2010; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2010) and 
suggests that Facebook usage provides greater benefits to college students who have low 
self-esteem and low life satisfaction (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007). Since a main 
function of boundary regulation is to help define self from other and a key motivation to 
use SNSs is to display personal identity and for self promotion (boyd 2006; Hogg, 
Wilkinson et al. 2008), I believe there is a positive relationship between achieving one‘s 
desired privacy level and self-esteem. In addition, boundary violations can negatively 
impact one‘s self-esteem as seen in cases of cyber-bullying. 
5.5.2 Social Capital 
Social capital is one of the most prevalent constructs represented in SNS research 
(Williams 2006; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007; Valenzuela, Park et al. 2008; Jiang and 
Carroll 2009; Valenzuela, Park et al. 2009; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2010; Ellison, Vitak 
et al. 2011; Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011). Social Capital is a benefit of social 
networking that is derived from the development and maintenance of relationships with 
others (Williams 2006; Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011). Social capital benefits can 
include ―emotional support or the ability to mobilize others‖ (Williams 2006). Williams 
developed an ―Internet Social Capital Scale‖ (ISCS) through an in-depth review of the 
literature and statistical validation of the emergent dimensions of social capital. Overall, 
social capital varied along two dimensions: bridging and bonding; online and offline. 
Bridging social capital refers to the resources gained through connections with weak ties 
or acquaintances whereas bonding social capital deals with more intimate relationships 
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such as those between actual friends and family (Williams 2006; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 
2007). Ellison et al. expanded these dimensions to add maintained social capital. 
Maintained social capital is present when virtual networks allow individuals to stay 
connected with others when physical distance would otherwise sever or weaken the 
relationship (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007). Koroleva et al. differentiated between the 
sources and benefits of social capital specific to the SNS environment.  Sources included 
network structure and social connectedness (defined in previous section); benefits 
included horizon broadening, networking value, emotional support, and offline 
participation (Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011). Network structure dealt with ―expansion 
and diversification‖ of one‘s network. Horizontal broadening refers to increasing the 
range of one‘s knowledge and experiences. Networking value is the tangible value from 
having ―access to the resources contained in the networks of others‖ (Koroleva, Krasnova 
et al. 2011). Emotional support is the comfort one can receive from those in one‘s 
network, and offline participation is the increased participation in offline social activities 
(Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011). Ellison et al. and Koroleva et al.‘s measures for social 
capital have been adapted to the context of Facebook (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007; 
Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011). 
Quite a few studies have found relationships between various SNS variables and 
social capital. For instance, Facebook usage is significantly and positively correlated to 
increased levels of social capital while general Internet usage does not contribute to 
social capital (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007). However, later research clarified that only 
social information-seeking behaviors, not initiation of new relationships or maintaining 
existing relationships, on Facebook lead to the creation of social capital. Also, active 
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contributions as opposed to passive consumption contributed to social capital (Ellison, 
Steinfield et al. 2010). The number of actual friends a Facebook user has is positively 
correlated to social capital but exhibits diminishing marginal returns as the number of 
friends becomes too high (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2010). Only one study, to date, has 
focused on the relationship between privacy and social capital. Facebook researchers 
found that the use of advanced privacy settings was positively correlated with higher 
levels of perceived social capital (Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). Therefore, this is evidence 
that more positive interpersonal boundary regulation outcomes can positively impact 
social capital.  
5.6 Summary 
Through the delineation of different SNS boundary types, examination of coping 
mechanisms, and development of a theoretical model of interpersonal boundary 
regulation within SNSs, I made the following notable contributions:  First, I expanded the 
scope of privacy within the context of SNSs to include multiple types of privacy 
boundaries beyond personal information disclosure. I did this through a two-fold 
approach; I examined five different SNS interfaces and interviewed 21 SNS users. 
Second, I categorized and compared SNS interface controls based on the boundary 
mechanism in which they supported. Third, I differentiated between these technology-
supported boundary mechanisms and coping mechanisms. I found that existing social 
theory on coping could help us frame specific SNS coping behaviors and pinpoint areas 
for improved design. Fourth, I couched the findings about SNS boundary mechanisms in 
a theoretical model for the interpersonal boundary regulation. The theoretical model is 
consistent with Altman‘s conceptualization of privacy as a boundary regulation process.  
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I incorporated salient constructs that emerged during the review of the literature and SNS 
user interviews. I discussed past findings that related each of these constructs to one 
another and components of the boundary regulation process. I also theorized a 
relationship between privacy outcomes from the boundary regulation process and social 
networking outcomes. This is the first comprehensive model of SNS interpersonal 
boundary regulation that is grounded in social psychology theory, refined through 
empirical qualitative analysis, and to be subsequently validated through quantitative 
methods in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
6CHAPTER 6: UNPACKING THE ‗PRIVACY PARADOX‘
Referring back to the theoretical framework, this chapter focuses on the 
relationship between SNS users‘ desired privacy level and their actual boundary 
negotiation behaviors. One recurring theme in SNS privacy research is the ―privacy 
paradox,‖ where end user privacy concerns are not reflected in their actual SNS privacy 
behaviors (Acquisti and Gross 2006; Barnes 2006; King, Lampinen et al. 2011). This 
finding is contrary to the widely accepted theory of planned behavior that states intent is 
the strongest predictor of actual behavior (Fishbein 1975). In addition to the role of 
desired privacy level on privacy behaviors, I examine the impact of three types of 
awareness (self-awareness, risk awareness, and feature awareness) and burden on privacy 
behavior.  I provided definitions and detailed discussion for each construct tested in this 
model in Chapter 5.  Therefore, in this chapter, I discuss how I operationalized each of 
these constructs and formally hypothesize some potential relationships between the 
constructs. 
6.1 Research Model and Hypotheses 
6.1.1 Desired Privacy Level 
Desired privacy level was operationalized as the desire to open or close oneself 
with respect to the different types of interpersonal boundaries defined in the earlier 
taxonomy (relationship connection, relationship context, network discovery, network 
intersection, territorial inward-facing, territorial outward-facing, self-disclosure, 
confidant disclosure, interactional disabling, and interactional blocking). Based on my 
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theory development, overall desired privacy level is a formative construct (Freeze and 
Raschke 2007) derived by the ten different types of privacy boundaries identified in the 
taxonomy. The individual dimensions of desired privacy all influence overall desired 
privacy but they are not necessarily expected to be correlated with one another. For 
example, one could have high desired privacy for relationship connection but low desired 
privacy for network discovery. As such, each privacy dimension was modeled as a 
reflective construct where the individual measures all represent the underlying construct 
and are expected to be correlated (Freeze and Raschke 2007). To do this, I compiled a list 
of initial item pools to measure each dimension based on quotes from interviews and the 
review of the literature. I simplified the item wordings and removed redundant items. 
Following the ―rule of three (Freeze and Raschke 2007),‖ I chose three items to measure 
each of the ten boundary types.  
Although the qualitative findings found overlap in some of these dimensions, it 
was difficult to leverage axial coding to identify exactly how each of these dimensions 
related to one another.  One basic relationship I identified, for instance, was the five 
higher order categories (relationship, network, territorial, disclosure, and interactional).  I 
also noted in the earlier discussion that the technology-supported mechanisms for 
managing one‘s boundaries for relationship context and network intersection were 
virtually the same (creating groups or lists), as well as the technology-supported 
mechanisms for managing outward-facing territories and confidant disclosures.  So, while 
I predict overlap between these dimensions, I operationalized them independently so that 
future quantitative analysis could help clearly identify these relationships. In this study, 
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however, I performed confirmatory analysis on each of the ten boundary types 
individually to reflect the ten boundary types represented in the current theory. 
To pre-validate the measures of the different types of SNS desired privacy (10 
dimensions x 3 items = 30 items) for discriminant validity, I applied established q-sorting 
(card sorting) techniques (Moore 1991; Straub 2004). I performed five rounds of card 
sorting where participants were asked to electronically sort items into pre-defined 
categories using Optimal Sort from OptimalWorkshop.com (OptimalWorkshop.com). 
Unique participants were recruited through Facebook for each round, and items were 
revised subsequent to the round. For rounds one through four, participants were given all 
ten dimensions at once to categorize. However, based on participant feedback, they were 
overwhelmed by the large number of categories. Therefore, in round five, I chose six 
categories for each of four separate rounds of card sorting. The individual accuracy rates 
for round five were 71%, 79%, 77%, and 92%; the average of these four rounds is shown 
in the table below. The hit rates for each round are presented in TABLE 9. These 
accuracy rates suggested adequate initial construct validity for SNS desired privacy level 
to move forward. 
 
TABLE 9: Card sorting accuracy rates 
Round Accuracy Rate # of Participants 
1 53% 6 
2 71% 5 
3 69% 10 
4 71% 10 
5 79% 40 
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In TABLE 10, I also examined the common card sort cross-loadings (greater than 
10% of the occurrences) between the dimensions which gave us some interesting 
insights. Dimensions that were in the same higher level category tended to cross-load. 
Most cross-loadings within the same higher level  category ranged from 8% to 13% 
frequency which validates the original groupings but is not high enough to justify 
collapsing them into one dimension. For example, disabling was classified as blocking 
12% of the time, and the taxonomy grouped both under interactional boundaries. 
However, one high (24%) cross-loading suggested that relationship connection could 
possibly be an aspect of relationship context instead of its own dimension.  Also, 
relationship context was missclassified as network intersection 14% of the time.  This 
finding was consistent with the qualitative analysis which noted that both relationship 
context and network intersection were managed using the same SNS interface controls, 
primarily creating groups or lists of friends.  Thus, I believe this further validates the 
results I presented earlier in the taxonomy. Desired privacy level will represent an 
exogenous, latent variable in the model (Byrne 2012) and was measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale from ―Strongly Disagree‖ to ―Strongly Agree.‖ See Appendix A for the full 
item scales. 
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TABLE 10: Card sorting cross-loadings 
Categories Dimension Cross-loaded 
Dimension 
Frequency 
Relationship (Same) Connection Context 24% 
Relationship-Network Context Intersection 14% 
Network (Same) Intersection Discovery 13% 
Network (Same) Discovery Intersection 12% 
Interactional (Same) Disabling Blocking 12% 
 
 
 
6.2 Privacy Negotiation Behaviors 
I operationalized privacy negotiation behaviors as technology-supported boundary 
mechanisms that are available through SNS interface controls. (I outlined these 
mechanisms in Chapter 2.) While I believe that coping mechanisms are equally as 
important, they are harder to capture due to their more nuanced nature and will be saved 
for future studies. I measure technology-supported boundary negotiation behaviors 
through a combination of observed variables and perception sub-scales.  When possible, 
SNS artifacts of behavior were captured, such as one‘s reported privacy settings. 
However, as Ellison et al. noted, ―privacy behaviors on SNSs are not limited to privacy 
settings‖ (Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011).   Therefore, not all privacy behaviors left behind 
artifacts of use.  For instance, SNSs do not record a history of whom one unfriends or 
how often they delete content from their outward-facing territories. Thus these behaviors 
were represented on a 7-point Likert scale of the perceived frequency (Never to Always) 
of the behavior. All technology-supported boundary negotiation behavior items were 
coded on an ordinal scale from most open to most closed with respect to privacy. For 
example, default privacy level settings provided by Facebook included public, friends, 
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friends of friends, and specific people or lists. Public was considered most open and 
coded as a ―1‖ while specific people or lists was considered most private and coded as 
―4.‖ All scale items for privacy behavior across the ten boundary types are included in 
Appendix A. 
Privacy paradox research suggests that there is not a correlation between privacy 
concern and actual behavior (Barnes 2006). I believe, however, that ―privacy concern‖ as 
a construct has been loosely defined and operationalized in various ways in past research 
(Acquisti and Gross 2006; Xu, Dinev et al. 2008; King, Lampinen et al. 2011). For 
instance, Acquisti and Gross examined general privacy attitudes in relation to students‘ 
liklihood of providing certain types of private information on Facebook (Acquisti and 
Gross 2006). Therefore, instead of measuring general privacy attitudes, I measure SNS 
users‘ desired privacy level for each type of privacy boundary. Given one‘s desired 
privacy level for a particular type of privacy, it follows that SNS users would employ 
boundary mechanisms that are congruent to their privacy goals in order to achieve 
optimal privacy.  However, I saw through the interviews that this was not always the 
case. In some cases, such as with network discovery boundaries, SNS users often did not 
perceive a high level of risk from exposing their networks to others. In many cases, SNS 
users were unaware that interface features even existed. When they did know about SNS 
interface controls, some still opted out of using them because it took too much effort. 
Therefore, I acknowledge that the relationship between one‘s desired privacy level and 
privacy behaviors is more complex, involving multiple moderating factors. However,  I 
believe that limitations of the past studies can account for the lack of relationship 
between intent and behavior that has been labeled the privacy paradox. In my research 
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model, I hypothesize that one‘s desired privacy level is directly related to technology-
supported boundary negotiation behaviors for each type of SNS interpersonal boundary. 
In other words, if SNS users desire a high level of network discovery privacy,  they will 
use technology-supported boundary mechanisms specific to achieving their desired 
privacy level. 
H1: There is positive association between SNS desired privacy level and 
technology-supported boundary negotiation behaviors. 
 
6.3 Awareness 
6.3.1 Self-Awareness 
Self-Awareness was operationalized as private and public self-awareness using 
pre-validated measures (Fenigstein, Scheier et al. 1975). Past CMC research often 
manipulated self-awareness to see its impact on various behaviors (Fenigstein, Scheier et 
al. 1975; Prentice-Dunn and Rogers 1982; Joinson 2001). This is not the case in this 
study; I will only capture an individual‘s trait specific self-awareness. Past research tends 
to be contradictory or ambiguous on how self-awareness may affect the boundary 
regulation process. While deindividuation and aggression have been studied as outcomes 
in the past, they do not necessarily equate to boundary regulation attitudes or behaviors. 
Joinson showed that CMC was characterized by higher levels of self-disclosure than FTF 
interactions, and when public self-awareness is low and private self-awareness is high, it 
leads to higher levels of CMC self-disclosure (Joinson 2001). Therefore, it is plausible 
that: 
H2:Lower levels of public self-awareness coupled with higher levels of 
private self-awareness are negatively associated with SNS desired privacy 
levels for disclosure (self and confidant). 
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H3: Lower levels of public self-awareness coupled with higher levels of 
private self-awareness are negatively associated with technology-
supported boundary negotiation behaviors for disclosure (self and 
confidant). 
Furthermore, as the theoretical framework suggests, I believe that a heightened 
level of self-awareness is necessary for effective boundary regulation.  Therefore,  
H4: Self-awareness moderates the relationship between SNS desired 
privacy level and technology-supported boundary negotiation behaviors 
such that higher levels of self-awareness will strengthen the relationship 
between the two. 
6.3.2 Risk Awareness 
Risk Awareness was operationalized as the self-reported likelihood of potential 
privacy loss (Xu, Dinev et al. 2008) due to a boundary violation and the occurrence of 
past adverse privacy events (King, Lampinen et al. 2011). This operationalization was in 
regard to each of the ten boundary types defined in the taxonomy and measured on a 7-
point Likert scale. Since potential loss and actual experience are not always expected to 
correlate, I view risk awareness as a formative construct. See Appendix A for the full 
item scales. Individuals assess a risk-benefit ratio when negotiating their boundaries with 
others (Petronio 2002). Higher levels of perceived risk are associated with lack of trust 
and a stronger need for control (Olivero and Lunt 2004) in e-commerce relationships. 
Yet, research shows that Facebook users ―generally believe that others in their network 
are at more risk than they are in regards to negative privacy-related outcomes‖ (Debatin, 
Lovejoy et al. 2009). King et al. found that past adverse privacy events were the strongest 
predictor of privacy attitudes on Facebook (King, Lampinen et al. 2011). Overall, I 
believe that higher levels of an individual‘s risk awareness will be associated with higher 
desired privacy levels and positively impact privacy behaviors: 
 
92 
H5: Higher levels of risk awareness are positively associated with higher 
SNS desired privacy levels. 
H6: Risk-awareness moderates the relationship between SNS desired 
privacy level and technology-supported boundary negotiation behaviors 
such that higher levels of risk-awareness will strengthen the relationship 
between the two. 
6.3.3 Feature Awareness 
Feature Awareness was operationalized using Findlater and McGrenere‘s measure 
of feature awareness (Findlater and McGrenere 2010). For each technology-supported 
boundary mechanism, I had participants report their usage or current settings, then I 
subsequently asked, ―For the feature or setting shown above, please indicate whether you 
remember noticing it prior to participating in this survey.‖ Responses included, ―No, I 
didn‘t see this item,‖ ―I vaguely recall seeing this item,‖ and ―Yes, I definitely recall 
seeing this item‖ (Findlater and McGrenere 2010). The qualitative findings identified 
feature awareness as a main contributing factor to the lack of use of technology-
supported boundary mechanisms. This is consistent with past research which found that 
―Facebook literacy‖ was a problem as Facebook users were unconfident about privacy 
settings or did not know how to employ them (Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). Facebook 
researchers have found that users who exhibit privacy concerns are generally unaware of 
their privacy settings and the accessibility others have to their content (Acquisti and 
Gross 2006; Strater and Lipford 2008). An individual‘s ability to set boundaries is often 
dependent on knowing the SNS interface controls available to support boundary 
regulation. Thus, 
H7: Feature awareness is positively associated with technology-supported 
boundary negotiation behaviors. 
H8: Feature awareness moderates the relationship between SNS desired 
privacy level and technology-supported boundary negotiation behaviors 
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such that higher levels of feature awareness will strengthen the 
relationship between the two. 
6.4 Burden 
Although burden was not included in the theoretical framework, it becomes a 
pertinent factor when specifically dealing with technology-supported boundary 
mechanisms.  Therefore, I included it as a latent variable in this model. Burden was 
operationalized as the effort level required (Stutzman and Hartzog 2009) to effectively 
negotiate boundaries through the use of technology-supported boundary mechanisms. For 
each technology-supported boundary mechanism participants reported, I subsequently 
asked, ―Please answer this question based on the feature or setting shown above. How 
much effort do you feel it takes to customize this feature or setting effectively?‖ 
Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ―None at All‖ to ―A 
Great Deal.‖ Environmental psychology research has proposed that ―the overall ease of 
regulation in a setting depends on the effectiveness of the privacy mechanism used and 
on the ease of implementing these mechanisms‖ (Harris, Brown et al. 1996). Past SNS 
privacy research has also shown that burden plays a factor in boundary regulation; 
Stutzman found that technical skill level mediated the effectiveness of using multiple 
profiles to manage personal disclosures and that the burden was proportional to the size 
of one‘s network (Stutzman and Hartzog 2009). It is reasonable to believe that a high 
level of burden will deter SNS users from utilizing a particular mechanism for boundary 
regulation. For instance, I found that while some participants knew that they could 
categorize friends into groups on Facebook, they found it too hard to do so. Therefore, 
when the burden of using a feature is too high, feature awareness became insignificant. 
Therefore, I propose that:  
 
94 
H9: Burden moderates the relationship between feature awareness and 
technology-supported boundary negotiation behaviors such that high 
levels of burden will decrease technology-supported boundary negotiation 
behaviors even when feature awareness is high. 
6.5 Individual Differences 
Individual differences were captured as contextual factors in this study and used 
as control variables. My future research will use these variables to determine between 
group differences for various levels of this model. Demographic information included 
gender, age, ethnicity, and education level. The Facebook Intensity Scale (Ellison, 
Steinfield et al. 2007) and the types of SNS activities (Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011) 
SNS users engaged in were included as control variables. I also asked whether or not 
each participant was a UNC Charlotte student.  
FIGURE 3 summarizes the research model and hypotheses. This general model 
was tested across each of the ten boundary types and results are presented below.  
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FIGURE 3: Research Model 
 
 
6.6 Methodology 
To test this model, I created a web-based survey instrument using Survey Share. 
Because technology-supported boundary mechanisms are dependent on SNS interface 
controls, I chose to use Facebook as the platform and Facebook users to test the research 
model.  Facebook was chosen due to its unproportionally large user base compared to 
other SNSs. However, due to changes that occurred post-analysis from Chapter 3, I had 
to update some of the previously reported technology-supported boundary mechanisms 
from the taxonomy. In order to report technology-supported boundary negotiation 
behaviors (or privacy behaviors), participants were asked to simultaneously log-in to their 
Facebook accounts for a portion of the survey. Screenshots and detailed directions were 
given so that users could locate the particular feature or setting I was trying to capture. As 
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an example, FIGURE 4 shows a screen shot from the survey. This question was related to 
privacy behaviors for inward-facing territorial boundaries. 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Example of Reported Privacy Behavior for Inward-Facing Territories 
 
 
In order to make this survey comprehensive of all the different boundary types 
and different boundary mechanisms, it became necessarily long, often taking participants 
over an hour to complete in one sitting. All questions were optional, thus I will discuss 
how I handled missing data in the results. All individual scale items for each construct 
were randomly placed in the survey as to reduce method bias. 
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Participant recruitment was done through snowball sampling (Babbie 2004) using 
two different methods. First, the primary researcher seeded the snowball through her 
personal SNSs, (such as Facebook Twitter, and LinkedIn), via email, and posting to 
Craigslist‘s volunteer‘s message board in her local city. Second, a random sample of 
5,000 UNC Charlotte email addresses were selected and emailed an invite to participate 
in the survey. The data from the two snowball sampling methodologies were collected in 
separate repositories to later check for between group differences. The justification for 
this methodology was to obtain as diverse of a sample as possible and to be able to 
expedite data collection. Participants had to be over 18 and have an active Facebook 
account. Participation was incentivized through the chance to win one of two $200 
Amazon gift certificates through a random drawing of participants. Each participant who 
opted in to enter the drawing received one drawing entry. As an extra incentive to share 
the survey, participants received one additional entry for referring someone else who 
completed the survey. Each survey participant, however, was limited to a maximum of 25 
drawing entries and was eligible to receive at most one $200 gift card. Both the survey 
questions and recruitment methodology described were approved by the university‘s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
For analysis, I first screened the data for univariate and multivariate outliers. 
Next, I generated descriptive statistics from the data as presented below. To test the 
hypotheses of the research model, data were analyzed using MPlus covariance based 
structural equation modeling (SEM) (Byrne 2012). I created separate SEMs for each of 
the ten theoretically derived types of privacy boundaries from the earlier taxonomy. 
Because desired privacy level is conceptualized as a formative construct instead of a 
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reflective construct, I do not believe that the different types of privacy will covary with 
one another. Therefore, each model will test the hypothesis of congruent desire and 
privacy behaviors. Future research may analyze the data in more depth in order to better 
understand incongruent desire and privacy behaviors. In light of this, I first conducted a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the measures to assess convergent and 
discriminant validity as well as internal consistency of the constructs. I then tested the 
model using SEM in two steps. First, I tested the SEM model without the moderating 
effects to obtain general model fit. Then I conducted a latent interaction analysis in order 
to appropriately test the moderation predictions.  Given latent interactions, MPlus does 
not provide goodness of fit statistics; therefore, I will report overall fit statistics from the 
un-moderated models. 
6.7 Results 
6.7.1 Data Screening 
Data were screened for missing data, outliers, and normality prior to data analysis. 
Fortunately, Survey Share differentiates between complete and incomplete surveys and 
only includes completed surveys for download. Due to the lengthiness of the survey I had 
a total of 374 incomplete survey responses which were not included in the analysis. I 
collected a total of 314 completed surveys; however, six responses were deleted due to 
excessive missing data leaving us with a total sample size of 308. Univariate outliers 
existed as is expected with a large dataset (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) and, therefore, 
were not removed from the analysis. Multivariate outliers were screened by calculating 
Mahalanobis distance (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). No Mahalanobis distance exhibited 
a z-score over 3.29; therefore, no multivariate outliers were identified in this data set.  
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Most multivariate data analyses, including SEM, require the assumption of 
normality of distribution to hold. Therefore, I screened the data for normality. Items with 
skewness or kurtosis above the absolute value of one which suggests a violation in the 
assumption of normality (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007) are reported in Appendix B. All 
items for burden were normally distributed. Risk awareness and feature awareness, for 
the most part, were normally distributed. Desired privacy level tended to be skewed left 
with a large kurtosis, suggesting that the participants tended to desire high levels of 
privacy. Privacy behaviors were generally not normally distributed. Due to these 
assumption violations, I referenced MPlus technical documentation and found that using 
the MLM estimator was appropriate for the analysis of non-normal data.  However, a 
trade off was that this estimator performed listwise deletion of missing data (Muthen and 
Muthen 2010; Byrne 2012).  Because I made survey questions optional, this posed a 
problem.  As a compromise, this analysis is presented using the default estimator (ML), 
but I performed post hoc analysis using the MLM estimator.  I did find that some 
goodness-of-fit statistics increased as well as the significance of some relationships in the 
model.  Overall, however, I wanted to avoid Type 1 errors and chose to conservatively 
report the results using the default ML estimator. For categorical data, I note that MPlus 
is the only software package that handles SEM analyses using categorical data with the 
WLSMV estimator.  However, according to the literature, ordinal, categorical data with 
four or more categories can be modeled as continuous with factor loadings and 
correlations ―only modestly underestimated‖ (Muthen and Muthen 2010). Therefore, I 
chose to treat the data for this analysis as continuous.  Further in-depth analysis was 
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performed as a post hoc analysis for models that performed poorly, possibly due to 
categorical indicator variables and highly skewed data. 
6.7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample included 119 males and 189 females. The average age of the 
participants was 35.74 years old with a standard deviation of 12 years, ranging from 18 to 
75 years old. Sample distributions for ethnicity and education level are provided in 
TABLE 11 and TABLE 12. 
 
TABLE 11: Ethnicity 
 Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
-1 (Missing) 1 0.3% 
 White/Caucasian 240 77.9% 
 Black/African American 15 4.9% 
 Hispanic/Latino 9 2.9% 
 Asian/Pacific Islander 33 10.7% 
 American Indian/Alaskan Native 1 0.3% 
 Other 9 2.9% 
 Total 308 100.0% 
 
 
 
TABLE 12: Education Level 
 Education Level Frequency Percent 
Less than high school 2 .6% 
 High school diploma 6 1.9% 
 Some college 50 16.2% 
 2 year college degree 19 6.2% 
 4 year college degree 54 17.5% 
 Some graduate school 55 17.9% 
 Master's degree 77 25.0% 
 Doctoral degree 37 12.0% 
 Professional degree (MD, JD, etc.) 8 2.6% 
 Total 308 100.0% 
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Only 30.7% of the sample identified themselves as UNC Charlotte students. The 
majority (91.6%) of the sample reported having a Facebook account for over 2 years with 
19.2% having an active Facebook account over six years. Based on the descriptive 
statistics of this sample, the data is skewed toward a predominantly white and well-
educated, adult population who is not new to Facebook.  Therefore, generalizability of 
the results may be constrained by the sample statistics.  
Self-awareness was captured at the individual level using a pre-validated measure 
from previous psychology literature (Fenigstein, Scheier et al. 1975). Unfortunately, I 
found that the second order construct of self-awareness presented in the literature did not 
fit well with the data.  The original measures produced a poor CFA with 
2
 (227) = 
584.33, p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.089 (with a CI from 0.08 to 0.098), p=0.00, CFI=0.71, 
TLI=0.68, and SRMR=0.086. Subsequently, I found out that other researchers (Bernstein, 
Teng et al. 1986) had found similar construct validity issues with this measure. Therefore, 
I was forced to adjust the operationalization of self-awareness so that I could produce 
adequate enough construct validity to add the construct to the model. After dropping 13 
of the 23 indicator variables, I achieved an adequate CFA with 
2
 (31) = 48.55, 
p=<0.0233, RMSEA=0.053 (with a CI from 0.02 to 0.08), p=0.399, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.94, 
and SRMR=0.047. I admit that the CFA for self-awareness was over-fitted, but since the 
primary purpose of this study is not to create a stable construct of self-awareness, I 
believe this methodology was appropriate for the analysis. The descriptive statistics for 
all items for self-awareness are included in Appendix B with an asterisk for the items that 
remained in the analysis. 
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6.7.3 Inward-Facing Territorial Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RIN1, RIN2) and 
desired privacy level (IN1, IN2, IN3) are presented in TABLE 13. Both were measured 
on 7-point Likert scales ranging from lowest (1) to highest (7). Risk awareness tended to 
be lower than desired privacy level, and individuals tended to desire fairly high levels of 
inward-facing territorial privacy. 
 
TABLE 13: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RIN1 306 3.86 1.766 
RIN2 305 3.08 1.612 
IN1 307 5.15 1.529 
IN2 308 5.92 1.163 
IN3 305 5.68 1.286 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
300     
 
 
 
Technology-supported privacy behaviors I identified in the taxonomy as relevant 
to inward-facing territorial boundaries for Facebook include altering one‘s News Feed 
and blocking applications (BLAP) so that they do not post automatically to one‘s News 
Feed. News Feed modifications include hiding a story (NFHID), changing subscription 
settings for a friend (NFS), unsubscribing from a Facebook friend (NFUN), 
unsubscribing from status updates from a friend (NFUNP), and reporting story or spam 
(NFSP). I measured both feature awareness (NF1, BLAP1) and the burden (NF2, 
BLAP2) of implementing these technology-supported privacy behaviors. The descriptive 
statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden are below (TABLE 14, 
FIGURE 5).  
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TABLE 14: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
NFHID 305 2.85 1.623 
NFSP 301 1.96 1.321 
NFS 304 2.81 1.664 
NFUN 305 2.64 1.472 
NFUNP 306 2.65 1.490 
NF1 303 2.40 .790 
NF2 307 3.28 1.657 
BLAP 305 2.52 1.533 
BLAP1 304 1.94 .910 
BLAP2 305 3.48 1.728 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
283     
 
 
 
In order to compare reported values for behavior, feature awareness, and burden, I 
standardized the scales by multiplying each mean by the lowest common denominator 
(FIGURE 5).  
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FIGURE 5: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
As shown in FIGURE 5, overall usage of inward-facing territorial boundary 
mechanisms is low. The means across all privacy behaviors remain lower than 3 on a 7-
point Likert scale. However, feature awareness was relatively high for News Feed 
modifications and somewhat lower for blocking applications.  
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Based on the initial CFA, hiding a story (NFHID) was 
removed as a privacy behavior due to problems with internal consistency. This may be 
because hiding a story represents a temporary, one-time fix that serves to ignore instead 
of create a permanent boundary. It is also important to note that blocking an application 
(BLAP) was actually inversely related to moderating one‘s News Feed. Though I 
originally coded these variables to be in the same direction, it makes sense that if an 
individual blocks applications often, they are less likely to have to modify their News 
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Feed directly.  This is consistent with the qualitative findings that cited removing 
annoying posts from one‘s News Feed as the most common need for inward-facing 
territorial boundaries. In addition, one measure for desired privacy level (IN1) was 
removed due to internal consistency problems.  Since I recently developed the measures 
for desired privacy, I expected that some adjustments would need to be made to the scale. 
The MPlus modification indices identified covarying relationships such as allowing the 
feature awareness of blocking an application (BLAP) to vary with the perceived burden 
of blocking an application (BLAP2). In cases where modification indices were greater 
than 25 and were theoretically sound, I allowed feature awareness, burden, and use of a 
feature or setting to covary. In addition, the CFA reported that feature awareness covaries 
and correlates (TABLE 15) so highly with privacy behavior that MPlus views them as 
virtually the same construct as the dependent variable; thus, required us to remove it 
before running the structural model.  
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TABLE 15: Covariance and Correlation Matrices for Inward-Facing Territories 
ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
 RISKAWR DESPRIV FEATAWR BURDEN PRIVBEH 
RISKAWR 0.944     
DESPRIV 0.364 0.638    
FEATAWR 0.309 0.557 1.316   
BURDEN -0.003 0.098 0.545 0.379  
PRIVBEH 0.357 0.383 1.392 0.511 1.511 
      
      
ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
 RISKAWR DESPRIV FEATAWR BURDEN PRIVBEH 
RISKAWR 1     
DESPRIV 0.469 1    
FEATAWR 0.277 0.608 1   
BURDEN -0.005 0.2 0.772 1  
PRIVBEH 0.299 0.39 0.987 0.676 1 
 
 
 
After these adjustments, the CFA for the final research model specific to inward-
facing territories indicates that the measures have appropriate convergent and 
discriminant validity with 
2
 (174) = 234.3, p=<0.0002, RMSEA=0.04 (with a CI from 
0.03 to 0.06), p=0.85, CFI=0.94, TLI=0.93, and SRMR=0.06. Next, I ran a SEM for 
inward-facing territorial boundaries for direct effects and the results are presented in 
FIGURE 6.  
 
107 
 
* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 6: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Inward-Facing Territorial Boundaries 
 
 
Desired privacy level did represent a significant path for privacy behavior; 
therefore, hypotheses 1 was accepted. (Hypotheses 2 and 3 were specific to disclosure 
boundaries thus were not applicable to this model.) Risk awareness was significantly and 
positively associated with desired privacy level (H5) and explained 30.2% of the variance 
in desired privacy level for inward-facing territories. I also observed a direct relationship 
between self-awareness and risk awareness that was not previously hypothesized. Also 
unhypothesized, burden (the perceived effort level it takes to use a feature or setting 
effectively) was positively associated with privacy behavior.  Interestingly enough, the 
direction of the relationship is counterintuitive to the original thinking. Essentially, the 
higher the perceived effort of using a privacy feature or setting, the more likely 
participants were to use it. I believe a possible explanation to this occurrence is that 
individuals who used News Feed modifications and app blocking to manage their inward-
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facing territorial boundaries realize the cognitive load required for use. In contrast, 
individuals who do not use these features are rating burden solely based on the simplicity 
of the control itself. 
The CFA supported that feature awareness was significantly and positively 
associated with privacy behavior, but it was so highly correlated that it had to be removed 
from the model as MPlus found it indistinguishable from privacy behavior. Theoretically, 
however, feature awareness and privacy behavior were operationalized as distinctly 
different constructs. For instance, for News Feed privacy behaviors I asked, ―How often 
have you done the following to modify posts on your News Feed? Unsubscribed from a 
Facebook friend.‖ This question was answered on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
Never to Always. On the other hand, feature awareness was queried as ―For the feature or 
setting shown above, please indicate whether you remember noticing it prior to 
participating in this survey.‖ Therefore, hypothesis 7 was accepted with a caveat. I 
believe that there could have been a method effect causing an inflated correlation because 
metrics for feature awareness were collected right after asking about one‘s privacy 
behavior. Even so, I believe that feature awareness represents a key factor in privacy 
behavior even though it had to be removed as a construct in the SEM. Overall, I was able 
to explain a substantial amount of the variance of privacy behavior in the model. Even 
without feature awareness in the model, I observed an R
2
 = 61.7%. The goodness-of-fit 
statistics for the structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (177) = 245.11, p=<0.0005, 
RMSEA=0.04 (with a CI from 0.03 to 0.06), p=0.78, CFI=0.93, TLI=0.92, and 
SRMR=0.06. 
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Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=0.07, p=0.62) and risk awareness (=0.108, p=0.32) were not significant moderators 
of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. Therefore, hypotheses 4 and 6 were 
rejected. Since feature awareness had to be removed from the SEM, I could not test for 
hypotheses 8 and 9. Thus, none of the hypotheses that predicted moderation effects (H4, 
H6, H8, H9) were supported. However, I did find a moderating effect of burden 
(=0.472, p=0.01) on the relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior 
(FIGURE 7).  
 
 
FIGURE 7: Interaction Effect of Burden x Desired Privacy Level 
 
 
I observed a main effect of burden such that high levels of burden resulted in a 
positive association between desired privacy level and privacy behavior across all levels 
of desired privacy level. Again, I believe that a possible explanation for this outcome is 
that individuals who do not already use News Feed moderation and app blocking as 
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privacy behaviors for inward-facing territories may have rated burden of use low, 
whereas individuals who practice these behaviors better understand the nuances of use. 
Therefore, it is when desired privacy level is high that we see overall mechanism use 
increase. TABLE 16 summarizes the findings for this model. 
 
TABLE 16: Result Summary for Inward-Facing Territorial Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT (Caveat) 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT (Caveat) 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT (Caveat) 
 
 
 
6.7.4 Outward-Facing Territorial Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (ROUT1, ROUT2) 
and desired privacy level (OUT1, OUT2, OUT3) for outward-facing territorial 
boundaries are presented in TABLE 17. Risk awareness tended to be lower than desired 
privacy level, and individuals tended to desire fairly high levels of outward-facing 
territorial privacy. Relative to inward-facing territories, individuals tended to perceive 
somewhat higher risk of privacy loss for outward versus inward-facing territories.  This 
makes sense because inward-facing territories are private whereas outward are public in 
nature. 
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TABLE 17: Descriptive Statistics Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
ROUT1 302 4.34 1.624 
ROUT2 305 3.14 1.653 
OUT1 308 6.22 1.058 
OUT2 307 5.79 1.386 
OUT3 306 5.50 1.492 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
299     
 
 
 
I operationalized outward-facing territorial privacy behaviors on Facebook as a 
second order construct comprised of Timeline/Wall moderation behaviors and 
Timeline/Wall settings. Wall moderation behaviors include deleting a post (CWALD), 
reporting/marking as spam (CWALS), hiding a post from one‘s Timeline (CWALH), and 
asking a friend to take down (TAKED) or untag (UNTAG) a  photo or post. Facebook 
settings related to outward-facing territorial boundaries included, ―who can see what 
others post on your timeline‖ (SEE), ―who can see posts that appear on your timeline 
because you've been tagged,‖ (TAG), and default privacy level (DEFAULT). Wall 
moderation behaviors (CWALH, CWALD, CWALS, UNTAG, and TAKED) were 
measured on 7-point Likert scales based on frequency of use. Wall settings (SEE, TAG, 
DEFAULT) were captured based on participants‘ self report of their current settings and 
recoded from most open (1) to most closed (n) based on the n number of options 
available. For instance default privacy (DEFAULT) level on Facebook can be set as 
public (n=1), friends of friends (n=2), friends (n=3), specific people or lists (n=4), or only 
me (n=5). The descriptive statistics are below (TABLE 18, FIGURE 8). 
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TABLE 18: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
CWALH 304 2.35 1.534 
CWALD 300 2.69 1.384 
CWALS 299 1.75 1.204 
CWAL1 304 2.42 .775 
CWAL2 302 3.04 1.585 
UNTAG 300 2.27 1.323 
UNTAG1 300 2.18 .839 
UNTAG2 298 3.33 1.649 
TAKED 302 1.62 1.098 
TAKED1 300 1.82 .843 
TAKED2 304 3.45 1.721 
TAG 304 2.99 .711 
TAG1 299 2.20 .846 
TAG2 300 3.33 1.626 
SEE 305 3.01 .801 
SEE1 302 2.27 .839 
SEE2 301 3.26 1.607 
DEFAULT 307 2.99 .782 
DEFAULT1 304 2.63 .636 
DEFAULT2 304 3.59 1.647 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
244     
 
 
 
In FIGURE 8 below, I standardized the scales for privacy behavior, feature 
awareness, and burden by multiplying each mean by the lowest common denominator to 
allow comparison. Individuals tended to delete Wall posts more often than hiding or 
reporting them as spam. They also preferred untagging photos of themselves instead of 
using the privacy mechanism to ask friends to take down a photo. Feature awareness for 
being able to modify content on one‘s Wall was fairly high. The lowest feature awareness 
was for asking a friend to take down a post which was functionality recently added to 
Facebook. Similar to inward-facing territories, burden using a mechanism was reported to 
be higher than reported privacy behavior. In the case of reported privacy settings (TAG, 
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SEE, DEFAULT), feature awareness was high. What I found most interesting was that 
the default values for these settings were changed 82.2%, 80.3%, 92.2% of the time, 
respectively, and to be more restrictive than the Facebook default setting. This is contrary 
to past research that suggests that default settings are rarely changed. 
 
 
FIGURE 8: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Based on the initial CFA, reporting or marking a post 
as spam (CWALS) was removed due to internal consistency problems.  The descriptive 
statistics already suggested that this privacy mechanism was used less frequently than 
other types of Wall moderation behaviors. This may also be because the other types of 
Wall moderation are interpersonal in nature while marking spam usually occurs because a 
friend unintentionally allowed a third-party malicious app. Deleting a Wall post 
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(CWALD) cross loaded too highly with feature awareness and had to be removed from 
the model.  One interpretation is that if participants knew that they could delete content 
from their Wall, they took advantage of doing so. 
I also found that the construct validity of the second order model was a poor fit.  
Wall settings did not load similarly to Wall moderation behaviors and were characterized 
more accurately as a completely separate construct. In retrospect, this makes sense 
because if individuals changed their Wall settings, they are less likely to have to use the 
Wall moderation behaviors to maintain their boundaries. For instance, if an individual set 
―who can see what others post on your timeline‖ (SEE) to ―only me,‖ it is less likely they 
will ever have to hide or delete content from their Wall.  Therefore, in order to test the 
hypotheses, I chose to exclude Wall settings and only examine Wall moderation 
behaviors. In my future research, I will analyze outward-facing territory privacy settings 
and its relationship to privacy behaviors more closely. For the final model, outward-
facing territorial privacy behaviors included hiding Wall posts (CWALH), untagging 
(UNTAG), and asking friends to take down (TAKED) a picture or post. Also, UNTAG2 
was allowed to covary with UNTAG1. After these adjustments, the CFA for the final 
research model specific to outward-facing territories indicates that the measures have 
appropriate convergent and discriminant validity with 
2
 (232) = 335.74, p=<0.0000, 
RMSEA=0.05 (with a CI from 0.04 to 0.06), p=0.65, CFI=0.93, TLI=0.91, and 
SRMR=0.06. 
Next, I ran a SEM for outward-facing territorial boundaries for direct effects 
(FIGURE 9). Desired privacy level did not represent a significant path for privacy 
behavior; therefore, hypothesis 1 was rejected. Risk awareness was significantly and 
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positively associated with desired privacy level (H5) but only explained 11.4% of the 
variance in desired privacy level for outward-facing territories. It is possible that other 
factors such as self-presentation play a role in desired privacy level for outward-facing 
territories. Feature awareness was directly related to privacy behavior which supported 
hypothesis 7. I also noted additional significant direct effects that were not hypothesized 
between risk awareness and feature awareness, burden and feature awareness, and burden 
and privacy behavior. In these cases, most of these relationships are not surprising.  An 
individual with heightened risk awareness may seek out a feature in order to maintain his 
or her boundaries. A relationship that was not hypothesized but possibly implied by 
moderating effects was observed between burden and privacy behavior. The higher the 
burden of using privacy behaviors, the less likely those privacy behaviors were exhibited.  
The positive relationship between burden and feature awareness is a little less logical.  
However, it can probably be explained by the fact that people who are more aware of a 
feature can more accurately assess the level of effort it takes to effectively use the privacy 
feature. Overall, the model was able to explain a moderate amount of the variance of 
privacy behavior with an observed R
2
 = 28.3%. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the 
structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (236) = 344.94, p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.05 (with a 
CI from 0.04 to 0.06), p=0.61, CFI=0.92, TLI=0.91, and SRMR=0.06. 
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 9: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Outward-Facing Territorial 
Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=0.25, p=0.35) was not a significant moderator of desired privacy level and privacy 
behavior (H4).  However, risk awareness was a significant moderator (=0.69, p=0.007) 
of desired privacy level and privacy behavior (FIGURE 10).  For high levels of desired 
privacy and high levels of risk awareness, privacy behaviors were more consistent with 
desired privacy level. However, the main effect of low risk awareness reduced the 
relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior. For low levels of risk 
awareness coupled with high levels of desired privacy level, the relationship between 
desired privacy level and privacy behavior became negative.   
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FIGURE 10: Interaction Effect of Risk Awareness x Desired Privacy Level 
 
 
Feature awareness (=0.11, p=0.62) did not moderate desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior (H8), and burden (=-0.42, p=0.53) did not moderate feature awareness 
and privacy behavior (H9). However, I did find a nearly significant (unhypothesized) 
moderation effect of burden (=-0.868, p=0.066) on the relationship between desired 
privacy level and privacy behavior (FIGURE 11).  
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FIGURE 11: Interaction Effect of Burden x Desired Privacy Level 
 
 
I saw a main effect of high burden which reduced the relationship between 
outward-facing territorial Wall modification privacy behaviors with desired privacy 
levels. However, for low burden, the relationship between desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior was more consistent with my hypotheses. Based on the latent 
interaction analysis, high levels of risk awareness and low levels of burden aid in making 
privacy behaviors more consistent with desired privacy level (adding a caveat to H1). I 
went back to the interviews to help explain the low explained variance of risk awareness 
to desired privacy level and the lack of significance between desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior. I found a quote by Allen regarding why he deleted content from his 
Facebook Wall: 
―I often delete comments to fix spelling mistakes.  I have deleted a couple 
comments when I reread it and saw it might be taken the wrong way.  I 
also have deleted comments from women who were flirting excessively 
much, and I did not want my wife or others to take it the wrong way.  I do 
my best to monitor comments made and received for everyone‘s sake.‖–
Allen, Technical Services, 31 
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Here, his motivation for making adjustments to his outward-facing territories was 
not due to personal privacy preferences.  Instead, he was worried about the correctness of 
his own posts and the well-being of others.  Therefore, I can infer that others may also 
have additional motivations beyond one‘s privacy to execute these behaviors. TABLE 19 
summarizes the outcomes for the hypotheses. 
 
TABLE 19: Result Summary for Outward-Facing Territorial Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT (Caveat) 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
 
 
 
6.7.5 Network Discovery Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RDISC1, 
RDISC2) and desired privacy level (DISC1, DISC2, DISC3) for network discovery 
boundaries are presented in TABLE 20. Risk awareness tended to be lower than desired 
privacy level, and both risk awareness and desired privacy level for network discovery 
boundaries tend to be lower than previous boundaries. A possible explanation from the 
qualitative findings was that individuals found benefit in the serendipity of finding 
unknown degrees of separation between friends and also felt that it was outside their 
locus of control for how friends used their network to connect with others. 
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TABLE 20: Descriptive Statistics Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RDISC1 301 3.92 1.665 
RDISC2 306 2.74 1.442 
DISC1 307 4.92 1.486 
DISC2 308 4.44 1.590 
DISC3 307 4.40 1.538 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
299     
 
 
 
Currently, Facebook only provides one technology-supported privacy mechanism 
for protecting one‘s network discovery boundaries. It is the ability to view one‘s friend 
list from his or her profile based on a well hidden privacy setting. The options are to set 
one‘s friend list as public (n=1), friends (n=2), custom friends or lists (n=3), or only me 
(n=4). The descriptive statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden are 
below (TABLE 21). Only 25% of the sample had left this setting at the Facebook default 
of public while 57.5% chose to set their network discovery boundary to friends, 9.1% as 
custom, and 6.5% as only me. Given that the majority of individuals chose to adjust this 
setting from the default, it makes sense that feature awareness for network discovery 
boundaries is relatively high at 42.9% of participants having definitely seen this feature, 
20.6% vaguely aware of the feature, and 36.5% having never seen the feature before. 
 
TABLE 21: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
FRLIST 302 1.97 .783 
FRLIST1 301 2.06 .890 
FRLIST2 300 3.34 1.691 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
297     
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Due to the lack of additional mechanisms, privacy behavior, feature awareness, 
and burden could only be measured by one indicator variable. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to test these variables for internal consistency or convergent and discriminant 
validity. All other latent variables in the model were added to a CFA. Based on the MPlus 
modification indices, feature awareness and risk awareness were allowed to covary. The 
CFA for the initial research model specific to network discovery boundaries indicates that 
the measures have appropriate convergent and discriminant validity with 
2
 (83) = 
121.24, p=<0.004, RMSEA=.05 (with a CI from 0.03 to 0.07), p=0.55, CFI=0.95, 
TLI=0.93, and SRMR=0.05. Next, I ran a SEM for network discovery boundaries for 
direct effects (FIGURE 12).  
Desired privacy level represented a significant path for privacy behavior. 
However, it was in the opposite direction than hypothesized and exhibited a relatively 
small coefficient (=-0.12). Therefore, hypothesis 1 was rejected. Risk awareness was 
significantly and positively associated with desired privacy level (H5) and explained 
27.7% of the variance in desired privacy level for network discovery boundaries. Feature 
awareness was a significant path in the model but in the opposite direction than 
hypothesized (H7).  While individuals exhibited a high level of feature awareness (as the 
majority of participants had changed their default setting from public to friends), the 
privacy behavior was characterized as more ―open‖ than ―closed.‖ As shown in the 
descriptive statistics, the majority of the participants chose to set their privacy level as 
―friends‖ (n=2) instead of being more restrictive. Because of how I coded data, this 
setting falls relatively low on the scale for privacy behavior (range from 1-4) whereas 
desired privacy level was centered at a higher mean using a 7-point Likert scale. This 
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may account for some of the counterintuitive relationships I observed in this model. It is 
possible that the scale for privacy behavior in this model needs to be revisited. For this 
model, I treated privacy behavior as continuous when it was truly ordinal on a 4-point 
scale.  The data was also far from normally distributed and almost resembled a 
dichotomous distribution. 
 
 
* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 12: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Network Discovery Boundaries 
 
 
A significant relationship was observed between burden and privacy behavior. 
Here, the direction of the relationship is as expected.  Higher levels of burden are 
associated with reduced privacy behavior. Similar to the previous model, there was an 
unhypothesized positive and significant relationship between risk awareness and feature 
awareness.  Overall, I observed an R
2
 = 52.4% for explaining privacy behaviors for 
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network discovery boundaries with the majority of this variance being explained by 
feature awareness. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the structural model were adequate 
at: 
2
 (127) = 177.74, p=<0.002, RMSEA=0.05 (with a CI from 0.03 to 0.06), p=0.69, 
CFI=0.94, TLI=0.93, and SRMR=0.07. 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=-0.003, p=0.93) was not a significant moderator of desired privacy level and privacy 
behavior. Therefore, hypotheses 4 was rejected. Risk awareness was a significant 
(=0.073, p=0.025) moderator between desired privacy level and privacy behavior 
(FIGURE 13).  
 
 
FIGURE 13: Interaction Effect of Risk Awareness x Desired Privacy Level 
 
 
Again, the interaction analysis is counterintuitive.  There appears to be a main 
effect of risk awareness such that low levels of risk awareness result in a stronger 
relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behaviors. I feel that this result 
might also be due to the coding logic of the scale for privacy behavior. The interaction 
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model for feature awareness as a moderator between desired privacy level and privacy 
behavior did not converge using MPlus. Therefore, I re-evaluated this model through a 
post-hoc analysis given the lack of convergence and the counter-intuitive findings 
presented here.  
For this model and subsequent models that proved problematic using MPlus SEM 
(most likely due to highly skewed or dichotomous data), I did a post hoc analysis using 
SmartPLS which is a software package that uses partial least squares and bootstrapping to 
calculate the SEM (Chin 1998; Gefen, Rigdon et al. 2011). I also used SmartPLS to test 
the moderating effects that I was not able to compute using MPlus. While SmartPLS is 
not as robust as MPlus, its strength is in exploratory, predictive models and the fact that it 
has more relaxed requirements for data normality and other assumptions than covariance 
based SEM used in MPlus. I first reran the model for network discovery boundaries 
because I felt that skewed data and logic used for coding the dependent variable 
contributed into the counterintuitive negative coefficients in the MPlus model. I was also 
unable to test for the moderating effect of feature awareness on desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior. The SmartPLS model (FIGURE 14) found significant and positive 
paths for desired privacy level and feature awareness to privacy behavior. Therefore, 
instead of rejecting H1 and H7 as I did in the previous model, this model suggests that I 
would accept them. I also retested H8 for moderating effects of feature awareness on 
desired privacy level because the MPlus model did not converge. I found that hypothesis 
8 was not supported. 
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 14: SmartPLS model for Network Discovery 
 
 
Based on the post-hoc findings, I revised the final results for the hypotheses. 
TABLE 22 summarizes the findings for this model.  
 
TABLE 22: Result Summary for Network Discovery Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
 
 
 
6.7.6 Network Intersection Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RINTER1, 
RINTER2) and desired privacy level (INTER1, INTER2, INTER3) for network 
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intersection boundaries are presented in TABLE 23. The descriptive statistics suggest that 
individuals are fairly laissez-faire when it comes to how their social circles overlap on 
Facebook with both risk awareness and desired privacy level being relatively low.  
 
TABLE 23: Descriptive Statistics Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RINTER1 305 3.86 1.636 
RINTER2 304 2.92 1.557 
INTER1 307 3.79 1.665 
INTER2 306 3.99 1.560 
INTER3 308 4.19 1.523 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
299     
 
 
 
Network intersection boundaries are maintained through the creation and use of 
friend lists, such as categorizing new friends into lists (LISTN), categorizing old or 
existing friends into lists (LISTO), posting content to a specific friend list (POSTL), or 
posting a picture to a specific friend list (PICL). A large percentage of the participants 
(45.8%) had not created any Facebook friend lists while only 5.5% had created more than 
10 custom friend lists. Overall feature awareness of friend lists, however, was high with 
48.4% of the sample definitely aware of the functionality, 21.7% vaguely aware, and 
29.9% unaware. Because the majority of participants did not create friend lists, they 
subsequently did not categorize friends by these lists or use them to post pictures or 
content. 
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TABLE 24: Friend List Creation 
 Friend Lists 
(LIST) 
Frequency Percent 
0 141 45.8% 
 1-3 65 21.1% 
 4-6 47 15.3% 
 7-10 38 12.3% 
 > 10 17 5.5% 
Total 308 100.0% 
 
 
 
Feature awareness of being able to post a status update or a picture to a specific 
friend list was low. Almost half of the participants (45.5% for status update, 48.7% for 
pictures) were not aware that they could do this at all. In addition, burden for using friend 
lists (LIST2, POSTL2, PICL2) were all rated relatively high on a 7-point Likert scale. 
The descriptive statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden are below 
(TABLE 25, FIGURE 15). 
 
TABLE 25: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
LIST1 304 2.18 .867 
LIST2 303 3.87 1.803 
LISTN 302 2.63 2.032 
LISTO 301 2.34 1.726 
POSTL 302 1.89 1.453 
POSTL1 301 1.89 .887 
POSTL2 299 3.52 1.713 
PICL 306 1.84 1.545 
PICL1 304 1.82 .871 
PICL2 303 3.52 1.751 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
265     
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Consistent with the qualitative findings, individuals created friend lists and 
categorized friends more often than they actually used these lists to interact with those 
groups of friends (FIGURE 15). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 15: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Posting a picture to a specific friend list (PICL) 
correlated too highly with categorizing new friends into friend lists (LISTN); therefore, it 
was removed as an indicator for privacy behavior.  This may suggest that people who 
categorize new friends into friend lists do so primarily so that they can post pictures to 
specific lists. Or, it could suggest that individuals who post pictures based on friend lists 
are more likely to categorize new friends into lists so that they can continue to leverage 
this privacy mechanism. I also found a strong relationship between the feature awareness 
of creating friend lists and overall privacy behavior.  This makes sense because 
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awareness is a prerequisite to use. However, because this cross loading was so high, I had 
to remove feature awareness for friend list creation (LIST1) from the model. After these 
adjustments, the CFA for the final research model specific to network intersection 
boundaries indicates that the measures have appropriate convergent and discriminant 
validity with 
2
 (210) = 330.75, p=<0.0002, RMSEA=0.05 (with a CI from 0.04 to 0.06), 
p=0.28, CFI=0.93, TLI=0.92, and SRMR=0.055. 
Next, I ran a SEM for network intersection boundaries for direct effects (FIGURE 
16). Desired privacy level was not a significant path for privacy behavior; therefore, 
hypothesis 1 was rejected. Yet, risk awareness was a significantly and positively 
associated with desired privacy level (H5) and explained 60.2% of the variance in desired 
privacy level for network intersection boundaries. Feature awareness had a significant 
path to privacy behavior (H7). This path was strong with a =0.73 suggesting that feature 
awareness has a great impact on privacy behavior in this model. Unhypothesized direct 
effects that were also significant are included in FIGURE 16. Overall, I observed a high 
R
2
 = 50.5% for explaining privacy behaviors for network intersection boundaries. The 
goodness-of-fit statistics for the structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (214) = 335.2, 
p=<0.000, RMSEA=0.05 (with a CI from 0.04 to 0.06), p=0.31, CFI=0.93, TLI=0.92, and 
SRMR=0.056. 
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 16: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Network Intersection Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=-0.045, p=0.39), risk awareness (=0.00, p=0.995), and feature awareness (=0.01, 
p=0.78) were not significant moderators of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. 
Therefore, hypotheses 4, 6, and 8 were rejected. Burden (=0.03, p=0.47) was also not 
identified as a significant moderator between feature awareness and privacy behavior 
(H9). Overall, the main effect of feature awareness has a large impact on privacy 
behaviors when it comes to network intersection boundaries of using friend lists to 
manage one‘s different social circles. TABLE 26 summarizes the findings for this model. 
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TABLE 26: Result Summary for Network Intersection Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
 
 
 
6.7.7 Relationship Context Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RCONT1, 
RCONT2) and desired privacy level (CONT1, CONT2, CONT3) for relationship context 
boundaries are presented in TABLE 27. While individuals felt that ―the way Facebook 
treats all of my connections as 'friends' with equal footing creates a high potential for 
privacy loss,‖ (RCONT1), they reported significantly lower levels of this having 
negatively affected them personally in the past (RCONT2). In addition, desired privacy 
level for relationship context was high. 
 
TABLE 27: Descriptive Statistics Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RCONT1 304 4.41 1.564 
RCONT2 305 2.87 1.482 
CONT1 305 5.88 1.172 
CONT2 305 5.69 1.235 
CONT3 307 5.29 1.382 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
296     
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Unfortunately, the only mechanism Facebook has to manage relationship context 
is the same mechanism used for managing network intersection boundaries – list creation 
and management. Therefore, refer to TABLE 25 and FIGURE 15 for the descriptive 
statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden. I performed a CFA to 
confirm construct validity of the measures. The CFA adjustments for the dependent 
variable (privacy behavior for list creation and management) was the same as the 
previous analysis in network intersection boundaries. The CFA for the final research 
model specific to relationship context boundaries indicates that the measures have 
appropriate convergent and discriminant validity with 
2
 (209) = 357.62, p=<0.0000, 
RMSEA=0.06 (with a CI from 0.05 to 0.07), p=0.07, CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, and 
SRMR=0.058.  
Next, I ran a SEM for relationship context boundaries for direct effects (FIGURE 
17). Desired privacy level did not represent a significant path for privacy behavior; 
therefore, hypothesis 1 was rejected. Risk awareness was a significantly and positively 
associated with desired privacy level (H5) and explained 16.8% of the variance in desired 
privacy level for relationship context boundaries. Feature awareness had a significant 
path to privacy behavior (H7). This path was strong with a =0.70 suggesting that feature 
awareness has a great impact on privacy behavior in this model. Unhypothesized direct 
effects that were also significant are included in (FIGURE 17). Overall, I observed an R
2
 
= 52.7% for explaining privacy behaviors for relationship context boundaries. The 
goodness-of-fit statistics for the structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (213) = 360.41, 
p=<0.000, RMSEA=0.06 (with a CI from 0.05 to 0.07), p=0.084, CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, 
and SRMR=0.06. 
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 17: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Relationship Context Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=-0.021, p=0.78), risk awareness (=-0.06, p=0.23), and feature awareness (=0.034, 
p=0.47) were not significant moderators of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. 
Therefore, hypotheses 4, 6, and 8 were rejected. Burden (=0.02, p=0.67) was also not 
identified as a significant moderator between feature awareness and privacy behavior 
(H9). Overall, the main effect of feature awareness, again, has the biggest impact on 
privacy behaviors of using friend lists to manage one‘s relationship contexts. This finding 
is consistent with qualitative observations that many SNS users had no idea they could 
post content to specific friend lists on Facebook.  In fact, many SNS users believed that 
Google+ was the first to allow this ability. This suggests that Facebook designers failed 
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to provide adequate visual cues to let their users know that this capability existed. 
TABLE 28 summarizes the findings for this model.  
 
TABLE 28: Result Summary for Relationship Context Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
 
 
 
6.7.8 Relationship Connection Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RCONN1, 
RCONN2) and desired privacy level (CONN1, CONN2, CONN3) are presented in 
TABLE 29. Similar to network intersection boundaries, individuals felt a higher potential 
for privacy loss (RCONN1) than what they had personally experienced (RCONN2). 
Overall, desired privacy for relationship connection was moderate to fairly high. 
 
TABLE 29: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RCONN1 305 4.06 1.707 
RCONN2 305 3.00 1.624 
CONN1 308 3.34 1.549 
CONN2 308 4.37 1.598 
CONN3 308 3.40 1.660 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
305     
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Relationship connection boundaries are measured by whom one allows to be a 
part of one‘s network and whom one decides to exclude from one‘s network. Therefore, I 
operationalized privacy behavior for relationship connection by how often they hid friend 
requests instead of approving them (HIDO), the number of pending friend requests 
(PEND) and how often an individual unfriended (UNFRIEND). I measured both feature 
awareness (HIDO1, PEND1, UNFRIEND1) and the burden (HIDO2, PEND2, 
UNFRIEND2) of implementing these technology-supported privacy behaviors. The 
descriptive statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden are below 
(TABLE 30, FIGURE 18).  
 
TABLE 30: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
HIDO 291 2.92 1.443 
HIDO1 302 2.38 .788 
HIDO2 300 2.90 1.590 
PEND 308 1.88 1.256 
PEND1 305 2.65 .682 
PEND2 306 2.76 1.542 
UNFRIEND 304 2.55 1.236 
UNFRIEND1 303 2.49 .754 
UNFRIEND2 306 2.99 1.622 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
278     
 
 
 
In FIGURE 18 below, I standardized the scales for privacy behavior, feature 
awareness, and burden by multiplying each mean by the lowest common denominator. 
Hiding friend requests, number of pending friend requests, and unfriending was generally 
infrequent though feature awareness of these mechanisms was high and burden was 
generally low. 
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FIGURE 18: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Based on the initial CFA, the feature awareness of 
number of pending requests (PEND1) was removed due to problems with internal 
consistency. Retrospectively, the number of pending friend requests may not be related to 
one‘s relationship connection boundaries. Feature awareness of unfriending 
(UNFRIEND1) was allowed to covary with the privacy behavior of unfriending 
(UNFRIEND). It was interesting to note that number of friends was significantly and 
positively associated with the privacy behaviors of hiding, pending, and unfriending.  It is 
possible that individuals with larger networks are confronted with these types of 
relationship connection decisions more frequently.  However, this was contrary to the 
belief that relationship connection privacy behaviors would work to keep one‘s number 
of friends lower. After these adjustments, the CFA for the final research model specific to 
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relationship connection indicates that the measures have appropriate convergent and 
discriminant validity with 
2
 (232) = 292.01, p=<0.0045, RMSEA=0.04 (with a CI from 
0.02 to 0.05), p=0.97, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.95, and SRMR=0.06. 
Next, I ran a SEM for relationship connection boundaries for direct effects 
(FIGURE 19). Desired privacy level (H1) did not represent a significant path for privacy 
behavior. The relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior was 
negative with a very small effect size. Although the hypothesis for the general research 
model predicted a positive and significant relationship between desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior, this result is actually more consistent with the qualitative findings for 
this particular privacy boundary.  While some of the participants had high levels of 
desired relationship connection privacy, they often did not act on this desire due to peer 
pressure and other relational complexities. For instance, Nelson felt that he had to friend 
his sister even though he did not want to: 
―I ended up having to friend my sister so that--she wanted my mom who 
was right next to me, to see this picture she posted on Facebook. I didn't 
have a good excuse to not friend her, and so I did this, and once I did I, 
didn't have a good excuse to unfriend her.‖ –Nelson, Office Manager, 53  
Unfriending was also a privacy behavior that required a high bar for SNS users 
and, therefore, was rarely implemented: 
―Basically, somebody has to do something pretty egregious to actually be 
unfriended.‖ –Kurt, Dating Coach, 32 
Risk awareness was significantly and positively associated with desired privacy 
level (H5) and explained 11.1% of the variance in desired privacy level for relationship 
connection boundaries. Feature awareness (H7) was significantly and positively related to 
privacy behavior, and burden was significantly and negatively associated with privacy 
behavior. Other significant direct effects that were not hypothesized are included in 
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FIGURE 19. The relationship between risk awareness and feature awareness as well as 
the relationship between feature awareness and burden are consistent with previous 
models. Overall, I was able to explain only a moderate amount of the variance of privacy 
behavior in the model. I observed an R
2
 = 21.4%. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the 
structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (236) = 294.14, p=<0.006, RMSEA=0.035 (with a 
CI from 0.02 to 0.05), p=0.78, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.96, and SRMR=0.06. 
 
 
* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 19: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Relationship Connection Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. In contrast to 
previous models, self awareness (=1.073, p=0.021) was a significant moderator between 
desired privacy level and privacy behavior (H4). FIGURE 20 shows that for high levels 
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of desired privacy and high levels of self awareness, relationship connection privacy 
behaviors are more consistent with desired privacy level. Due to this interaction, I will 
add a caveat to hypotheses 1. I find this interesting as self awareness has not been a very 
impactful construct in the model thus far.  However, I interpret this to mean that self 
awareness plays a more important role when privacy boundaries are more relational in 
nature.  
 
 
FIGURE 20: Moderation Effect of Self Awareness on Desired Privacy Level and Privacy 
Behavior 
 
 
Risk awareness (=0.372) was significant at the p=0.063 level as a moderator of 
desired privacy level and privacy behavior (H6). Therefore, I accepted the hypothesis 
with a caveat regarding the significance level. FIGURE 21 shows the interpretation of the 
moderation. Low levels of risk awareness cause a big shift in the relationship between 
desired privacy levels and behavior.  Low levels of desired privacy and low levels of risk 
awareness are consistent with one‘s privacy behaviors.  However, when desired privacy 
is high with low risk awareness, there is a very large discrepancy between desired privacy 
 
140 
level and privacy behaviors. A possible explanation for this is that these individuals do 
not equate relationship connection with general privacy protection. 
 
 
FIGURE 21: Moderation Effect of Risk Awareness on Desired Privacy Level and Privacy 
Behavior 
 
 
Feature awareness (=0.552) moderated desired privacy level and privacy 
behavior at p=0.099. As such, H8 was accepted with a caveat for significance level. 
FIGURE 22 shows that for high levels of feature awareness and high levels of desired 
privacy, privacy behavior is more consistent with desired privacy.  This also supports the 
caveat added to H1. 
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FIGURE 22: Moderation Effect of Feature Awareness on Desired Privacy Level and 
Privacy Behavior 
 
 
Burden (=-0.176, p=0.48) did not moderate the relationship between feature 
awareness and privacy behavior (H9). Overall, relationship connection boundary 
negotiation has a number of contingencies and complexities. While desired privacy was 
not directly related to one‘s privacy behaviors for relationship connection, higher levels 
of self awareness, risk awareness, and feature awareness helped remedy this rift. TABLE 
31 summarizes the findings for this model. 
 
TABLE 31: Result Summary for Relationship Connection Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT (CAVEAT) 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT (CAVEAT) 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT (CAVEAT) 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
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6.7.9 Interactional Blocking Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RBLOCK1, 
RBLOCK2) and desired privacy level (BLOCK1, BLOCK2, BLOCK3) are presented in  
 
TABLE 32. While the risk awareness for potential privacy loss (RBLOCK1) was 
quite high, negative personal, past experiences with interactional blocking boundary 
violations were generally low. Overall, desired privacy level for blocking was also high. 
 
TABLE 32: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RBLOCK1 303 4.59 1.534 
RBLOCK2 305 2.85 1.513 
BLOCK1 307 5.81 1.384 
BLOCK2 306 5.43 1.586 
BLOCK3 307 5.32 1.427 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
298     
 
 
 
Originally, I had identified blocking a user (BLUS) as the only technology 
supported mechanism for interactional blocking.  However, through an exploratory factor 
analysis of privacy behaviors, I found that restricting users (RESTR) loaded highly on the 
same factor.  Therefore, individuals tended to view blocking and restricting users 
similarly. Therefore, I chose to include both blocking and restricting users as indicator 
items for the dependent variable.  The difference between the two is that restricted users 
are Facebook friends whom one wants to exclude from any status updates, and blocking 
is done for individuals who are not Facebook friends. Blocking prevents an individual 
from searching for or friending an individual on Facebook. The descriptive statistics for 
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privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden are below (TABLE 33). The privacy 
behavior of blocking and restricting users (BLUS, RESTR) were both low. For blocking, 
62.2% of the participants had zero Facebook users blocked with 24.8% reporting having 
1-3 users blocked. Only 2.6% of the participants had more than ten people blocked. 
Similarly, 70.7% of the participants had no Facebook friends added to their restricted list 
with 17.6% having 1-3 people restricted. Again, only 2% of the participants had more 
than 10 Facebook friends added to their restricted list. 
 
TABLE 33: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
BLUS 307 1.59 .946 
BLUS1 305 2.03 .919 
BLUS2 302 3.46 1.623 
RESTR 307 1.49 .909 
RESTR1 307 1.93 .908 
RESTR2 304 3.48 1.649 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
297     
 
 
 
In FIGURE 23 below, I standardized the scales for privacy behavior, feature 
awareness, and burden by multiplying each mean by the lowest common denominator. 
Again, overall usage of interactional blocking boundary mechanisms is low. However, 
feature awareness was relatively high. On average, the participants were more aware of 
blocking than they were restricting users.  
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FIGURE 23: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Based on the initial CFA, the burden of blocking a 
user (BLUS2) was too similar to the burden of restricting a user (RESTR2) and was, 
therefore, removed as an indicator variable of burden. Feature awareness of blocking 
(BLUS1) and restricting (RESTR1) users was allowed to covary with number of blocked 
users (BLUS) and number of restricted users (RESTR), respectively. After these 
adjustments, the CFA for the final research model specific to interactional blocking 
indicates that the measures have appropriate convergent and discriminant validity with 
2
 
(136) = 203.53, p=<0.0002, RMSEA=0.05 (with a CI from 0.035 to 0.06), p=0.49, 
CFI=0.95, TLI=0.93, and SRMR=0.06. 
Next, I ran a SEM for interactional blocking boundaries for direct effects 
(FIGURE 24). After running the initial SEM, MPlus identified the burden of blocking 
(BLUS1) and restricting (RESTR1) as too similar, having a correlation greater than one.  
Therefore, BLUS1 was removed as an indicator variable for feature awareness. Due to 
0
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this adjustment, all covary relationships were removed that were added earlier in the 
CFA. Desired privacy level did not represent a significant path for privacy behavior (H1); 
in fact, the coefficient was negative. Similar to relationship connection boundaries, even 
though this finding negates the hypotheses from the general research model, it is more 
consistent with the qualitative findings. In general, SNS users reserved blocking for 
extreme cases and rarely blocked because an implied social stigma that it was rude to do 
so.  
―Blocking is major.  That is why there are only so many people that I've 
blocked.  Those are the people that I don't want them to be able to find me 
even if they are on your friend's list and I am on your friend's list they still 
can't see my information.  They can't track me, they can't follow me, 
nothing.  They don't have any rights to me whatsoever.‖ –Dollie, Mother, 
34 
Risk awareness was a significantly and positively associated with desired privacy 
level (H5) and explained 46.8% of the variance in desired privacy level for interactional 
blocking boundaries. Feature awareness (H7) was a significant path for the dependent 
variable. However, it was in the opposite direction than I hypothesized. As suggested by 
the descriptive statistics, for high levels of feature awareness, use was low. Therefore, 
individuals who were aware of blocking and restricting still chose not to.  A significant, 
yet unhypothesized, relationship was observed between burden and privacy behavior.  
For higher levels of burden, privacy behavior was reduced. Overall, the model explained 
a substantial amount of the variance of privacy behavior with an R
2
 = 85.9%. However, 
this variance was predominantly explained through the negative relationship between 
feature awareness and privacy behavior. I believe that this result was due to the extremely 
skewed (right) nature of the dependent variable as both blocked and restricted users were 
rare. The goodness-of-fit statistics for this structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (143) = 
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212.36, p=<0.0001, RMSEA=0.049 (with a CI from 0.035 to 0.06), p=0.52, CFI=0.93, 
TLI=0.91, and SRMR=0.066. 
 
 
* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 24: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Interactional Blocking Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=-0.036, p=0.34) and risk awareness (=-0.02, p=0.6) were not significant moderators 
of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. Therefore, hypotheses 4 and 6 were 
rejected. The SEM in MPlus for hypotheses 8 did not converge.  Therefore, it will also be 
addressed later in the post-hoc analysis. Burden (=0.093, p=0.001) was found to be a 
significant moderator of feature awareness and privacy behavior (H9).  I saw a main 
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effect of low burden that strengthened the relationship between feature awareness and 
privacy behavior across all levels of feature awareness.  
 
 
FIGURE 25: Moderation Effect of Burden on Feature Awareness and Privacy Behavior 
 
 
Due to the counter-intuitive relationship between feature awareness and privacy 
behavior and also due to the non-normal distribution of the dependent variable, I re-
analyzed this model through post-hoc analysis (FIGURE 26). In this model, the 
relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior is positive and 
significant (H1). In addition, the relationship between feature awareness and privacy 
behavior is also positive and significant (H7). 
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 26: SmartPLS Model for Interactional Blocking 
 
 
I also identified a significant moderating effect of feature awareness (=611, 
p<=0.05) on desired privacy level and privacy behavior. I was unable, however, to graph 
the interaction because SmartPLS does not provide standard deviation values. I believe 
that the correct interpretation is that high levels of desired privacy coupled with high 
levels of feature awareness strengthen the relationship between desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior which would support the hypothesis. However, I will add this as a 
caveat as I was unable to graph the interaction. TABLE 34 summarizes the findings for 
this model. 
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TABLE 34: Result Summary for Interactional Blocking Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT (CAVEAT) 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
 
 
 
6.7.10 Interactional Disabling Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RDIS1, RDIS2) 
and desired privacy level (DIS1, DIS2, DIS3) are presented in TABLE 35. While the risk 
awareness for potential privacy loss (RDIS1) was quite high, negative personal, past 
experiences (RDIS2) with interactional disabling boundary violations were generally 
lower. Overall, desired privacy level for disabling was also high. 
 
TABLE 35: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RDIS1 302 3.61 1.599 
RDIS2 305 2.88 1.519 
DIS1 306 5.20 1.624 
DIS2 305 4.90 1.637 
DIS3 308 4.62 1.471 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
296     
 
 
 
I categorized one‘s chat settings (SCHAT) and frequency of going offline for chat 
(SCHATF) as interactional disabling behaviors.  I also identified blocking application 
invites (BLAPI) and blocking event invitations as interactional disabling privacy 
 
150 
behaviors. The descriptive statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden 
are below (TABLE 36).  
 
TABLE 36: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
SCHAT 307 2.00 1.291 
SCHAT1 305 2.07 .899 
SCHAT2 303 3.22 1.686 
SCHATF 305 3.74 2.303 
BLAPI 304 1.67 1.137 
BLAPI1 305 1.82 .904 
BLAPI2 301 3.43 1.667 
BLEV 306 1.26 .666 
BLEV1 300 1.74 .869 
BLEV2 298 3.47 1.658 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
279     
 
 
 
Chat settings presented themselves fairly dichotomously with 57.3% of the 
participants using the default of being visible to all friends when logged in and 25.7% 
going offline completely. It was rarer (17%) that participants fine tuned this setting 
(TABLE 37).  
 
TABLE 37: SCHAT Settings 
 SCHAT Settings Frequency Valid Percent 
All your friends see you except... (with no one listed)* 176 57.3% 
All your friends see you except... (with one or more friends 
listed) 
34 11.1% 
Only some friends see you... 18 5.9% 
No one sees you (go offline) 79 25.7% 
* Default setting 
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Feature awareness followed a similar pattern with 43.9% definitely aware of the 
setting, 37% unaware, and 19% vaguely aware. Overall, blocking app (BLAPI) and event 
(BLEV) invites was rare (TABLE 38) though participants tended to block app invites 
more frequently than event invites. Practically, this makes sense because app invites tend 
to be more frequent making them more annoying to receive. 
 
TABLE 38: Percentages for Blocking App Invites and Event Invites 
Number of Users Blocked BLAPI Percent BLEV Percent 
0 64.47 81.70 
 1-3 20.07 13.73 
 4-6 5.92 2.61 
 7-10 3.29 0.65 
10 or More 6.25 1.31 
 
 
 
In FIGURE 27 below, I standardized the scales for privacy behavior, feature 
awareness, and burden by multiplying each mean by the lowest common denominator. 
Using interactional disabling privacy behaviors was more common for managing chat 
boundaries than for invites. Overall, both feature awareness and burden were rated high. 
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FIGURE 27: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Based on the initial CFA, I found that the chat 
variables (SCHAT, SCHATF) were not well suited for the model.  This is probably due 
to the fact that they drastically depart from the assumption of normality and continuity 
due to their dichotomous nature. Therefore, all chat variables (including feature 
awareness and burden) were removed. RDIS2 and BLEV2 were also removed as 
indicator variables due to internal consistency problems.  They both had standard 
coefficients greater than one, which suggested redundancy in their measurement. Finally, 
feature awareness had to be removed as a construct in the model because it shared a 
correlation greater than the absolute value of one with the dependent variable.  However, 
this coefficient was negative, suggesting an inverse relationship between feature 
awareness and privacy behavior.  A possible explanation is the fact that I saw a high level 
of feature awareness of these mechanisms but very low usage. After these adjustments, 
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the CFA for the final research model specific to interactional disabling indicates that the 
measures have appropriate convergent and discriminant validity with 
2
 (83) = 108.58, 
p=<0.03, RMSEA=0.04 (with a CI from 0.013 to 0.058), p=0.80, CFI=0.95, TLI=0.94, 
and SRMR=0.05. However, because I had to perform quite a bit of fitting to make this 
model suited for the data, this implies that post-hoc analysis will be necessary. 
I ran a SEM for interactional disabling boundaries for direct effects (FIGURE 28). 
The initial SEM identified too much overlap in the indicator variables for privacy 
behavior (BLAPI, BLEV), and BLAPI was removed. Therefore, for the final analysis, 
only use (BLEV) and burden (BLEV2) of blocking event invites was examined. 
Consistent with the poor fit of the data based on the CFA, the overall model proved to be 
a bad fit for the data. Desired privacy level did not represent a significant path for privacy 
behavior (H1); in fact, the coefficient was negative. Risk awareness was not a significant 
mediator of desired privacy level (H5). Feature awareness (H7) was removed due to a 
high, negative correlation with privacy behavior. I interpret this to mean that even though 
participants were aware they could use these mechanisms, they actively chose not to. A 
significant, yet unhypothesized, relationship was observed between burden and privacy 
behavior.  For higher levels of burden, privacy behavior was reduced. Overall, the model 
explained little of the variance of privacy behavior with an R
2
 = 12.3%. The goodness-of-
fit statistics for the structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (98) = 117.63, p=<0.0861, 
RMSEA=0.032 (with a CI from 0.000 to 0.052), p=0.93, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.95, and 
SRMR=0.055.  
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 28: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Interactional Disabling Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(=-0.019, p=0.87) and risk awareness (=0.031, p=0.5) were not significant moderators 
of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. Therefore, hypotheses 4 and 6 were 
rejected. Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 were rejected with a caveat because feature awareness 
was removed from the model. Thus, none of the hypotheses for this model were 
supported. Yet, burden was found to be a significant moderator (=-0.177, p=0.08) of 
desired privacy level and privacy behavior (not hypothesized).  I saw a main effect of low 
burden that increased the relationship with privacy behavior across all levels of desired 
privacy level (FIGURE 29). 
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FIGURE 29: Moderation Effect of Burden on Desired Privacy Level and Privacy 
Behavior 
 
 
Overall, I believe that this model was problematic due to highly skewed data. 
Therefore, I performed a post-hoc analysis using SmartPLS (FIGURE 30). In this model, 
the relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior was positive and 
significant at the p = 0.10 level. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was accepted with a caveat. Risk 
awareness was significantly and positively related to desired privacy level (H5). Also, 
feature awareness was significantly and positively related to privacy behavior, supporting 
hypothesis 7. I was able to test hypotheses 8, a moderating effect of feature awareness on 
desired privacy level, and the relationship was not significant. Hypothesis 9 was also not 
supported. TABLE 39 summarizes the updated findings for this model. 
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p <= 0.1 * p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 30: SmartPLS Model for Interactional Disabling 
 
 
TABLE 39: Result Summary for Interactional Disabling Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT (Caveat) 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
 
 
 
6.7.11 Confidant Disclosure Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RCONF1, 
RCONF2) and desired privacy level (CONF1, CONF2, CONF3) are presented in TABLE 
40. The potential of privacy loss through confidant disclosures (RCONF1) was high 
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while actual past negative experiences (RCONF2) was rated lower. Overall, desired 
privacy level over confidant disclosures was quite high. 
 
TABLE 40: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RCONF1 304 5.06 1.444 
RCONF2 304 2.98 1.552 
CONF1 305 6.20 1.040 
CONF2 307 5.02 1.689 
CONF3 308 5.68 1.157 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
297     
 
 
 
I operationalized mechanisms to support confidant disclosure boundaries on 
Facebook as the same as the mechanisms that support outward-facing territorial 
boundaries. Therefore, Wall/Timeline modifications (CWAL), untagging (UNTAG), and 
asking a friend to take down a photo or post (TAKED) all represent confidant disclosure 
boundary mechanisms. Please refer to outward-facing territorial boundaries for 
descriptive statistics (TABLE 18). I performed a CFA to confirm construct validity of the 
measures. The same adjustments were made to the model as described for outward-facing 
territorial boundaries. After these adjustments, the CFA for the final research model 
specific to confidant disclosure boundaries indicates adequate convergent and 
discriminant validity with 
2
 (231) = 351.77, p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.051 (with a CI from 
0.04 to 0.06), p=0.42, CFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, and SRMR=0.066.  
Next, I ran a SEM for confidant disclosure boundaries for direct effects (FIGURE 
28). Desired privacy level did not represent a significant path for privacy behavior; 
therefore, hypothesis 1 was rejected. Similar to outward-facing territories, an explanation 
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for this lack of relationship may be that individuals modify their Walls and untag content 
due to various other reasons that privacy. For instance, Lynn is okay with friends tagging 
pictures of her that are flattering, but she does not like pictures posted that she does not 
like.  This may be an issue of self presentation more so than privacy. 
―Yes, a lot, I hate my pictures.  The one‘s when I was little, I‘m beginning 
to deal with those, but just about… I do not have good facial expressions.  
If I think I am ugly, ugly, ugly in a picture, I will untag myself or beg that 
person to delete it.‖ –Lynn, Photographer, 30 
Unfortunately, it is difficult for us to tease out one‘s motivation for performing 
actions that can be congruent with confidant disclosure privacy behaviors. Risk 
awareness was significantly and positively associated with desired privacy level (H5) and 
explained 68.4% of the variance in desired privacy level. Feature awareness (H7) was 
strongly associated with privacy behavior with a  = 0.52. Overall, I was able to explain a 
decent amount of the variance of privacy behavior in the model. I observed an R
2
 = 
25.6%. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the structural model were adequate at: 
2
 (235) = 
356.55, p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.05 (with a CI from 0.04 to 0.06), p=0.44, CFI=0.92, 
TLI=0.90, and SRMR=0.067. 
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* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 31: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Confidant Disclosure Boundaries 
 
 
Next, I tested for latent interactions using a step-wise analysis. Self awareness 
(H4, =0.34, p=0.34) and feature awareness (H8, =0.537, p=0.154) were not significant 
moderator of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. I also found that burden (H9, 
=-0.365, p=0.546) was not a significant moderator of feature awareness and privacy 
behavior. At the p=0.085 level, risk awareness moderated (=1.174) desired privacy level 
and privacy behavior. FIGURE 32 shows a main effect of risk awareness such that 
heightened levels of risk awareness strengthen the relationship between desired privacy 
level and privacy behavior.  Therefore, I feel this is an appropriate caveat to add for H1. I 
also tested for hypotheses 2 and 3 which suggested that low levels of public self-
awareness coupled with high levels of private self-awareness were negatively associated 
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with both desired privacy level and privacy behavior for confidant disclosure. As it turns 
out public and private self-awareness have neither significant direct or moderating effects 
on desired privacy level or privacy behavior.  Therefore, I rejected the hypotheses. 
However, I believe that this result might be related to the poor construct validity in the 
operationalization of self-awareness. The overall results are summarized in TABLE 41. 
 
 
FIGURE 32: Interaction Effect of Risk Awareness x Desired Privacy Level 
 
 
TABLE 41: Result Summary for Confidant Disclosure Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT (Caveat) 
H2: Public Self-Awareness X Private Self-Awareness  Desired Privacy 
Level 
REJECT 
H3: Public Self-Awareness X Private Self-Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
(Caveat) 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
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6.7.12 Self-Disclosure Boundaries 
The descriptive statistics for the scale items for risk awareness (RSELF1, 
RSELF2) and desired privacy level (SELF1, SELF2, SELF3) for self disclosure 
boundaries are presented in TABLE 42. Participants reported the potential for privacy 
loss from self disclosure (RSELF1) to be high while actual past negative experiences 
(RSELF2) were reportedly lower. Overall, desired privacy level for self disclosure 
boundaries was high. 
 
TABLE 42: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RSELF1 304 5.62 1.374 
RSELF2 305 3.08 1.602 
SELF1 307 6.31 1.143 
SELF2 305 6.54 .823 
SELF3 308 5.23 1.402 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
299     
 
 
 
I operationalized mechanisms to support self disclosure boundaries on Facebook 
as an individual‘s privacy settings for ―Basic Info‖ and ―Contact Info‖ from his or her 
Facebook profile. Basic information included Interested In (BADIN), Religion (BARE), 
Political Views (BARPO), Birthday (BASBD), and Relationship Status (BAST). Contact 
information included email address (CIEM), street address (CIAD), IM screen name 
(CIIM), mobile phone (CIMOB), and other phone (CIOP). I was surprised to see that 
most participants had changed their default privacy settings. With the exception of email 
address, the majority of Facebook users reported privacy settings more restrictive than 
Facebook‘s privacy defaults (TABLE 43).  
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TABLE 43: Default versus Customized Behaviors for Self Disclosure Boundaries 
  Customized Default 
BASBD 89.90% 10.10% 
BADIN 91.40% 8.60% 
BAST 84.90% 15.10% 
BARE 91.40% 8.60% 
BARPO 93.30% 6.70% 
CIEM 34% 66% 
CIMOB 74.90% 25.10% 
CIOP 87.80% 12.20% 
CIIM 75.70% 24.30% 
CIAD 87.20% 12.80% 
 
 
 
In many cases, participants chose to not even provide the information on 
Facebook. For instance, 45.7% did not provide Interested In (BADIN), 21.3% 
Relationship Status (BAST), 45.4% Religion (BARE), 46.8% Political Views (BARPO), 
54.1% mobile (CIMOB), 77.6% other phone (CIOP), 67.2% IM screen name (CIIM), and 
78.4% street address (CIAD). The data distributed itself fairly dichotomously with 
participants more frequently setting their privacy settings to ―Friends‖ or not providing 
the information at all. Based on these descriptive statistics, it suggests that participants‘ 
high desired privacy level for self disclosure is represented in their privacy behaviors.  
However, due to highly skewed, dichotomous data, I expect the SEM model will have a 
difficult time fitting this data based on assumptions of normal, continuous data. The 
descriptive statistics for privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden are below 
(TABLE 44).  However, due to the dichotomous distributions of many of the indicator 
items for the dependent variable, mean and standard deviation poorly describe the data. 
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TABLE 44: Descriptive Statistics for Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
BASBD 307 2.47 1.112 
BADIN 304 3.41 1.554 
BAST 305 2.61 1.368 
BARE 302 3.39 1.555 
BARPO 299 3.47 1.524 
BA1 303 2.66 .647 
BA2 304 3.26 1.658 
CIEM 306 2.45 1.110 
CIMOB 303 3.97 1.294 
CIOP 303 4.49 1.045 
CIIM 305 4.13 1.305 
CIAD 305 4.48 1.076 
CI1 303 2.65 .648 
C12 306 3.19 1.641 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
281     
 
 
 
In FIGURE 33 below, I standardized the scales for privacy behavior, feature 
awareness, and burden by multiplying each mean by the lowest common denominator. 
Self disclosure behaviors are fairly high as well as the feature awareness of these 
mechanisms. Overall, burden of mechanism use was rated fairly low. 
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FIGURE 33: Privacy Behavior, Feature Awareness, and Burden 
 
 
After interpreting the descriptive statistics, I performed a CFA to confirm 
construct validity of the measures. Due to errors in MPlus output, I had to use the MLM 
estimator for MPlus due to the dichotomous nature of the data.  Birthday (BASBD) and 
email address (CIEM) were removed due to low internal consistency with the other 
indicator variables. This makes sense because Facebook requires users to enter in a 
birthday and email address in order to create an account.  Therefore, these two indicator 
variables do not truly represent an individual‘s chosen privacy behaviors. Interested in 
(BADIN) was also removed for loading too high with street address (BAST). Finally, I 
had to model privacy behavior, feature awareness, and burden for basic information and 
contact information as two completely separate constructs. Modeling indicator variables 
for basic info and contact info on the same first order construct was a poor fit to the data.  
Modeling basic info and contact info as second order constructs for privacy behavior, 
feature awareness, and burden resulted in a model that failed to converge. While it is 
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plausible that self-disclosure is theoretically a multi-dimensional construct, it is 
interesting to note that Facebook‘s explicit groupings for privacy settings trumps 
theoretical meaning for this model. Therefore, future research should examine the impact 
of how SNSs group various privacy settings and their impact on overall behavior. The 
initial findings suggest that privacy settings grouped on the same web page evoke more 
similar privacy behaviors even though they may be very theoretically divergent. After 
these adjustments, the CFA for the final research model specific to self disclosure 
boundaries indicates that the measures have appropriate convergent and discriminant 
validity with 
2
 (195) =232.28 , p=<0.035, RMSEA=0.034 (with a CI from 0.01 to 
0.049), p=0.96, CFI=0.96, TLI=0.95, and SRMR=0.06. 
Next, I ran two SEMs for self-disclosure boundaries for direct effects specific to 
basic info and contact info (FIGURE 34). Based on the initial SEM for basic info, I had 
to remove Political Views (BARPO) and Religious Views (BARE) because all the 
indicator variables for basic info were too similar. Therefore street address (BAST) was 
the only indicator variable left in the analysis for basic info privacy behavior. While this 
model (FIGURE 34) produced a good fit with 
2
 (127) =148.8, p=<0.091, 
RMSEA=0.031 (with a CI from 0.00 to 0.05), p=0.95, CFI=0.95, TLI=0.94, and 
SRMR=0.06, it had very low predictive power for the dependent variable (R
2
 = 6.4%). 
Risk awareness was a significant path to desired privacy level which supported 
hypothesis 5, but none of the other hypotheses were supported in this model. In fact, the 
relationship between feature awareness and privacy behavior was significantly negative. I 
believe the reason for this finding is that individuals who were previously unaware of the 
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feature simply did not provide the information. Yet, I coded this behavior as the most 
restrictive type of privacy behavior. 
 
 
* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 
 
FIGURE 34: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Self Disclosure, Basic Info 
Boundaries 
 
 
The analysis of interaction effects for basic info self disclosure did not find self 
awareness (=-0.109, p=0.4) and risk awareness (=-0.10, p=0.88) to be significant 
moderators of desired privacy level and privacy behavior. However, feature awareness 
(=-0.077, p=0.006) significantly moderated the relationship between desired privacy 
level and privacy behavior (FIGURE 35). For low levels of desired privacy, across all 
levels of feature awareness, privacy behavior was more strongly associated with desired 
privacy level.  However, there was a negative relationship between desired privacy level 
and privacy behavior for high levels of desired privacy. While this is an interesting 
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interaction, I still rejected hypothesis 8 because increased feature awareness did not lead 
to a stronger relationship between desire and behavior.  
 
 
FIGURE 35: Interaction Effect of Feature Awareness x Desired Privacy Level 
 
 
Burden (=0.018, p=0.65)  was not a significant moderator of feature awareness 
and privacy behavior (H9). Finally, I tested for the relationship of public and private self 
awareness on desired privacy level and privacy behavior (H2 & H3). I did not find any 
direct or moderating effects of either type of self awareness on either of these constructs.  
Next, I performed the same analysis for contact info self disclosure boundaries 
(FIGURE 36). For this model, I had the opposite results.  While the model was able to 
explain a large amount of the variance in the dependent variable (R
2
 = 86.1%), the fit of 
the model was not very good at 
2
 (180) =286.38 , p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.058 (with a CI 
from 0.045 to 0.071), p=0.14, CFI=0.90, TLI=0.88, and SRMR=0.074. No modification 
indices were reported greater than 25, so I chose to leave the model as is. Although weak, 
I did find a significant, positive path from desired privacy level to privacy behavior (H1) 
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for contact info. The different outcomes between basic info and contact info may be due 
to Facebook signaling users that basic info is a social norm for sharing whereas 
individuals may feel more at liberty to protect contact info. Risk awareness explained a 
significant (R
2
 = 54.5%) amount of the variance of desired privacy level (H5). I saw a 
strong negative influence of feature awareness on privacy behavior which was contrary to 
the relationship I hypothesized (H7). Similar to basic info, I believe the reason for the 
negative relationship is due to the coding of missing profile information as privacy 
restrictive. 
For the analysis of interaction effects, I was unable to use the MLM estimator for 
non-normal data with the requirements necessary to test interaction effects 
(TYPE=RANDOM). Therefore, I was unable to test hypotheses 4, 6, and 8 as the data 
could not be estimated under the assumptions of normality. I was able to successfully run 
an interaction analysis for burden as a moderator of feature awareness and privacy 
behavior (H9). However, the effect was not significant (=-0.01, p=0.24). Finally, I 
tested for the relationship of public and private self awareness on desired privacy level 
and privacy behavior (H2 & H3). Similar to basic info, I did not find any direct or 
moderating effects of either type of self awareness on either of these constructs. TABLE 
45 summarizes the findings for this model. 
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FIGURE 36: Structural Model for Direct Effects for Self Disclosure, Contact Info 
Boundaries 
 
 
Due to all the difficulties I had in the MPlus analysis, I did a post-hoc analysis 
using Smart PLS. For the SmartPLS model, I was able to combine the analysis for basic 
info and contact info (FIGURE 37). Based on this model, desired privacy level to privacy 
behavior was a significant path, supporting hypothesis 1. I also retested all moderating 
effects and found no significant moderators. TABLE 45 summarizes the findings for this 
model based on the SmartPLS results.  
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FIGURE 37: SmartPLS model for Self Disclosure 
 
 
I believe the lack of relationship between feature awareness and privacy behavior 
is because SNS users are well aware of these privacy settings. Therefore, it has little 
overall impact on use. 
 
TABLE 45: Result Summary for Self Disclosure Boundaries 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior ACCEPT 
H2: Public Self-Awareness X Private Self-Awareness  Desired Privacy Level REJECT 
H3: Public Self-Awareness X Private Self-Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H4: Self Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H5: Risk Awareness  Desired Privacy Level ACCEPT 
H6: Risk Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H7: Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H8: Feature Awareness X Desired Privacy Level  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
H9: Burden X Feature Awareness  Privacy Behavior REJECT 
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6.8 Summary Results 
I tested the general research model across each of ten theoretically derived 
boundary types: inward-facing territorial (IN), outward-facing territorial (OUT), network 
discovery (DISC), network intersection (INTER), relationship context (CONT), 
relationship connection (CONN), interactional blocking (BLOCK), interactional 
disabling (DIS), confidant disclosures (CONF), and self disclosure (SELF). Theory 
surrounding the research model is still new, so I will present both the confirmatory results 
from the research model as well as some interesting exploratory results. First, TABLE 46 
summarizes the confirmatory analysis based on the model hypotheses. 
 
TABLE 46: Hypotheses Testing Summary Results 
 IN OUT DISC INTER CONT CONN BLOCK DIS CONF SELF 
H1 A (R) A R R (R) A (A) (R) A 
H2  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- R R 
H3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- R R 
H4 R R R R R A R R R R 
H5 A A A A A A A A A A 
H6 R A R R R (A) R R (A) R 
H7 (A) A A A A A A A A R 
H8 (R) R R R R (A) (A) R R R 
H9 (R) R R R R R A R R R 
A=Accept, R=Reject, ()=Caveat 
 
 
 
TABLE 47 summarizes the standardized beta coefficients for privacy behavior 
regressed on desired privacy level, feature awareness, and burden. Overall the models 
were able to explain a good deal of the variability in technology-supported privacy 
behaviors.  
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TABLE 47: Path Coefficients and R
2 
 for Privacy Behavior 
Boundary Type  (Desired Privacy 
Level) 
 (Feature 
Awareness) 
 
(Burden) 
R
2  
(Privacy 
Behavior) 
Inward-Facing 
Territorial 
0.38*** >1 0.668*** 61.6% 
Outward-Facing 
Territorial 
--- 0.56*** -0.44*** 28.3% 
Network Discovery^ 0.24* 0.31*** --- 17.3% 
Network Intersection --- 0.73*** --- 50.5% 
Relationship Context --- 0.70*** --- 52.7% 
Relationship 
Connection 
--- 0.52*** --- 21.4% 
Interactional 
Blocking^ 
0.18* 0.42*** --- 22.7% 
Interactional 
Disabling^ 
(0.19) 0.44*** --- 27.5% 
Confidant Disclosure --- 0.52*** -0.397*** 25.6% 
Self Disclosure 0.27* --- --- 8.3% 
( ) p <= 0.10 * p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 ^ Results from post-hoc using 
SmartPLS 
 
 
 
6.8.1 Desired Privacy Level and Privacy Behavior 
For hypothesis 1, which predicted a positive association between desired privacy 
level and technology-supported negotiation behaviors, I had mixed results. For about half 
of the boundary types (inward-facing territories, network discovery, interactional 
blocking, interactional disabling, and self disclosure) I found some significant 
relationship between one‘s desired privacy level and one‘s privacy behaviors. For three 
of the models (outward-facing territories, relationship connection, and confidant 
disclosures), the relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behaviors was 
contingent on various moderating factors. For outward-facing territories, high levels of 
perceived risk and low perceived burden strengthened the relationship between desire and 
behavior. For relationship connection, self awareness, risk awareness, and feature 
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awareness all had an impact on the relationship. Finally, for confidant disclosures, high 
levels of risk awareness strengthened the relationship between desire and behavior.  
For the remainder of the boundary types (network intersection and relationship 
context), I did not find any relationship between desired privacy level and privacy 
behaviors. I can interpret this result in various ways.  First, I could say that this finding 
supports past ―Privacy Paradox‖ research that found no relationship between privacy 
attitudes and behavior. It is possible that people are simply throwing out reason and no 
longer letting their actions be a reflection of their beliefs or intentions. Possibly, sharing 
has truly become the new social norm regardless of what people say they want. Second, I 
could suggest that additional moderating factors need to be examined as I saw significant 
latent interactions from risk awareness, self awareness, feature awareness, and burden in 
some of the other models.  Third, and what I believe to be true, a disconnect between 
desired privacy level and technology-supported privacy behaviors may signal the need 
for improved interface design.  In this specific case, the creation and use of friend lists to 
manage relationship context and network intersection boundaries may not be adequate 
controls for meeting one‘s privacy needs.  
6.8.2 Self-Awareness, Desired Privacy Level, and Privacy Behavior 
Hypothesis 4, which predicted self awareness as a moderator to desired privacy 
and behavior, was only significant in the case of relationship connection boundaries. This 
is an interesting result if related back to the qualitative findings.  Relationship connection 
boundaries tended to get complicated by peer pressure and participants ended up 
accepting more ―friends‖ into their networks than they really wanted.  It makes sense that 
only individuals who have a high level of self-awareness would be able to successfully 
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combat this peer pressure and act in their own interests. I also found no support for 
hypotheses 2 and 3 which predicted a direct influence of public and private self-
awareness on desired privacy level and privacy behavior specific to disclosure 
boundaries. As for the majority of non-significant results of self-awareness, I believe a 
contributing factor was the lack of construct validity observed in the latent variable.  
Although I used a pre-validated measure, the CFA suggested that it was not stable within 
this context. Future research may want to pursue a more robust operationalization for 
self-awareness in respect to SNSs. 
6.8.3 Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
Hypothesis 5, a positive association between risk awareness and desired privacy 
level, found the most consistent support and was accepted across all ten of the boundary 
types (TABLE 48). Risk awareness explained over fifty percent of the variance in desired 
privacy level for network intersection and confidant disclosure boundaries. These results 
confirm that risk awareness is a significant factor of an individual‘s desired privacy level, 
but they also suggest that other untested factors also contribute to one‘s desired privacy 
level. 
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TABLE 48: Path Coefficients and R
2 
 for Risk Awareness and Desired Privacy Level 
Boundary Type Standardized Beta () R
2  
(Desired Privacy 
Level) 
Inward-Facing Territorial 0.532*** 28.3% 
Outward-Facing 
Territorial 
0.34** 11.4% 
Network Discovery^ 0.51*** 25.5% 
Network Intersection 0.78*** 60.2% 
Relationship Context 0.41*** 16.8% 
Relationship Connection 0.33*** 11.1% 
Interactional Blocking^ 0.33*** 10.7% 
Interactional Disabling^ 0.29** 8.2% 
Confidant Disclosure 0.83*** 68.4% 
Self Disclosure^ 0.35*** 11.9% 
* p <= 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <= 0.001 ^ Results from post-hoc using SmartPLS 
 
 
 
In addition to having a direct effect on desired privacy level, there were also cases 
where risk awareness moderated the relationship between desired privacy level and 
privacy behavior (H6). For outward-territorial, relationship connection, and confidant 
disclosure boundaries, heightened levels of risk awareness tended to strengthen the 
relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior. In these cases, I believe 
that risk awareness acts as an additional motivator for individuals to find ways to act in 
support of their privacy desires. 
6.8.4 Feature Awareness and Privacy Behavior 
Overall, feature awareness was the most significant contributor to individual‘s 
SNS privacy behaviors (H7).  The relationship between feature awareness and privacy 
behavior was both significant and positive across the majority of the boundary types. In 
the case of inward-facing territorial boundaries, it was so related to privacy behavior that 
MPlus characterized the two as the same construct. In most cases, the unstandardized 
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beta coefficients of feature awareness regressed on privacy behavior were greater than 
0.50, suggesting a very strong effect size (TABLE 47).  
Feature awareness was only insignificant in the case of self disclosure boundaries.  
I believe that this is the case because I operationalized technology-supported privacy 
behaviors by one‘s privacy settings for contact info and basic info.  Because self 
disclosure has been framed by past research as synonymous to SNS privacy and because 
these features are so well known, it makes sense that feature awareness plays little role in 
privacy behaviors. While feature awareness had a strong direct effect on privacy 
behaviors for the majority of the boundary types, it only had one moderating effect on the 
relationship between desired privacy level and privacy behavior (H8). This was for 
relationship connection boundaries.  This may signify a feature awareness problem 
preventing some individuals from using relationship connection privacy mechanisms to 
meet their desired privacy level. 
6.8.5 Burden and Privacy Behavior 
I also saw some unexpected results in the relationship between burden, privacy 
behavior, and the other latent variables.   While I did not explicitly hypothesize direct 
effects of burden on privacy behavior, this relationship was implied through the 
hypothesis of moderation. TABLE 47 shows that burden exhibited significant direct 
effects on privacy behavior for three of the boundary types (inward-facing territorial, 
outward-facing territorial, and confidant disclosures). For the most part, the beta 
coefficients suggest a negative relationship between burden and privacy behaviors.  High 
levels of burden deterred individuals from using certain privacy mechanisms. An 
interesting observation is that burden as a construct may be confounded by feature burden 
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and psychological burden.  For instance, mechanisms for outward-facing territorial 
(untagging, asking a friend to take down a photo, etc.) and relationship connection 
(unfriending, hiding, etc.) are not generally that hard to do within Facebook‘s interface.  
However, the negative betas for burden for these boundaries are large.  While the feature 
burden may not be high, it is possible that the psychological burden of pushing back on 
one‘s friends increases this level of burden. 
Burden only significantly moderated feature awareness and privacy behavior in 
the direction I predicted in the case of interactional blocking (TABLE 46). Lower levels 
of burden strengthened the relationship between desired privacy level and privacy 
behavior, and high levels of burden reduced it (H9). In two cases (inward-facing 
territories and interactional disabling), I saw the opposite, yet significant, moderation 
effect where high burden actually strengthened the relationship. I believe that this 
uncovered a nuance in the conceptualization of burden.  For certain types of interface 
controls, individuals who assess burden but have not used the feature in the past report 
lower levels of anticipated burden than the amount of actual burden reported by 
individuals who have actually used the privacy mechanism before. This is further 
supported by the significant and positive association between feature awareness and 
burden in many of the models.  
6.8.6 Additional Exploratory Results 
I found some unpredicted associations between the latent variables that are 
notable.  The first significant association that I already mentioned, for instance, was the 
positive association between feature awareness and burden that I observed in a good 
number of the boundary models. Also, I saw a few occasions when self awareness was 
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significantly associated with risk awareness and risk awareness was significantly 
associated with feature awareness. It makes sense that an individual who has a higher 
level of risk awareness would be more motivated to find technology-supported 
mechanisms within Facebook‘s interface. Consistent with the interviews, sometimes 
individuals sought out privacy mechanisms once they experienced a negative privacy 
outcome. In a few cases, risk awareness was negatively associated with burden.  Possibly, 
if an individual perceives a high level of risk, they could psychologically reduce the 
associated level of burden because the cost of privacy loss is higher than the effort 
needed to protect. 
6.9 Discussion 
In this chapter, I tested a general model of self awareness, risk awareness, desired 
privacy level, feature awareness, burden, and privacy behavior across the ten boundary 
types in the original taxonomy.  The varying results across the ten models supports the 
theory that different types of privacy boundaries have their own unique characteristics. 
However, some common and important themes emerged from these models.  First, 
feature awareness was by far the most important construct in the model in terms of 
explaining the variance in privacy behaviors.  I did not anticipate that feature awareness 
would outweigh the effects of one‘s desired privacy level. These research findings 
reinforce the fact that feature awareness is a prerequisite for mechanism use.  Therefore, 
in SNS interfaces such as Facebook‘s that change rapidly, strategies need to be developed 
for educating SNS users on how to properly use privacy mechanisms or at least make 
them aware that they even exist. Second, I consistently found clear support that risk 
awareness contributes to one‘s desired privacy level. Overall, I had mixed results when 
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trying to unpack the ―Privacy Paradox‖ itself.  In some cases, I found that SNS desired 
privacy level was reflected in one‘s technology-supported privacy behaviors. In other 
cases, there was not a significant relationship. Still in others, factors such as self 
awareness, risk awareness, feature awareness, and burden moderated this relationship.  
Another unanticipated finding was that desired privacy level for privacy behaviors 
operationalized as actual behaviors (frequency of unfriending, deleting Wall posts, 
unsubscribing from News Feeds, etc.) were more strongly and significantly related than 
desired privacy was to privacy behaviors characterized as privacy settings. Issues 
occurred because settings are often ―lumpy‖ in nature with frequencies of use that present 
themselves dichotomously instead of on a continuous scale. Privacy settings may be an 
outdated design that poorly approximates SNS users‘ actual privacy behaviors and new 
design solutions should be explored.  
It is important that I mention a few of the limitations of this study.  First, the data 
collection resulted in privacy behavior measures that were often non-normally distributed 
and skewed left, right, or even dichotomously. These distributions often resulted from 
privacy settings that are ―lumpy‖ with default settings that further degrade the 
approximation of privacy settings to behavior. Therefore, covariance based SEM analysis 
was not the optimal statistical method for examining some of these complex 
relationships. In the models, I was able to explain more variance in privacy behavior 
when the indicator variables represented a continuous approximation using a 7-point 
Likert scale of true privacy behaviors (such as frequency of unfriending, deleting posts, 
untagging, etc.). Therefore, caution should be used when using privacy settings as 
artifacts to measure privacy behavior. As designers, this may signal that privacy settings 
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model SNS user‘s desired privacy poorly, and we should focus privacy redesign with 
mechanisms that are available just-in-time, when a privacy decision is being made. 
Instead of interpreting the results as people not rationally doing what they desired to do, a 
lack of significant relationship between desired privacy level and technology-supported 
privacy mechanism use signals opportunities for improved interactional design that better 
meets privacy needs. 
Second, I relied on self-reports from SNS users and snowball sampling 
procedures.  I offset the limitation of self-reports by having SNS users sign in to their 
Facebook accounts to report their privacy settings. I believe that this was an adequate 
means for increasing recall, but I also note that it did directly impact feature awareness of 
SNS users who participated in the survey. One participant, for instance, responded, ―Dear 
Lord that was scary! Thanks for bringing some of those settings to my attention!‖ 
Another said, ―It was a real eye-opener for me.‖ And another said, ―Thanks Pam for the 
tutorial as well as the Questionnaire. It was very informative and it took me well over an 
hour as I was totally unaware of all these settings; especially since the Facebook page has 
changed recently.‖ Yet, I believe that this is a positive side effect of this research. 
Snowball sampling limits us by not providing a clear sampling frame in which to 
generalize the results.  However, I chose this approach to gain access to a more diverse 
sample.  In this case, I believe I met this goal as only 30% of the sample were students. 
Finally, I specifically tested models that were theoretically derived in the 
previous, qualitative analysis and narrowed the scope to congruent desired privacy and 
technology-supported mechanisms.  It would be useful to take a step back using more 
exploratory methods and test alternate hypotheses such as combining some of the ten 
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boundary types or identifying other types of privacy boundaries pertinent to SNSs. In 
addition, privacy behaviors are not always congruent with one‘s privacy goal.  Future 
models need to take into account incongruent boundary mechanisms. Future research 
should also work on encompassing and measuring both technology-supported and coping 
privacy behaviors in order to get a true profile of SNS user privacy behaviors. Overall, I 
have contributed to unpacking some of the pertinent, complex relationships inside the 
black box of the ―Privacy Paradox,‖ but I know there is definitely more work that needs 
to be done.  In the next study, I examine the relationship between privacy outcomes and 
social networking outcomes. 
 
7CHAPTER 7: RECONCILING PRIVACY WITH SOCIAL NETWORKING 
OUTCOMES
Referring back to the theoretical framework, this chapter focuses on the 
relationship between privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes. Privacy, often 
characterized as limiting public information disclosure (Tufekci 2008; Xu, Dinev et al. 
2008), is often depicted in SNS research as antithetical to social networking‘s goal of 
connecting and sharing. Although privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes are 
often assumed to be negatively related to one another, I hypothesize that achieving one‘s 
desired level of privacy can be positively associated with social networking benefits such 
as self-esteem and social capital. While I am the first to theoretically relate privacy 
regulation outcomes to SNS outcomes in this way, the idea of relating privacy regulation 
outcomes to social environment outcomes is not novel. For instance, environmental 
psychology research has found a positive relationship between ease of boundary 
mechanism use and effectiveness with place attachment in student-family apartments 
(Harris, Brown et al. 1996). In a study examining adjustment to older adult living 
environments, a privacy outcome of social crowding was associated with lower levels of 
personal and overall adjustment, and individuals living in assisted living facilities were 
prone to feel more crowded than those living independently (Kaya, Webb et al. 2005).  
However, very little SNS privacy research relates privacy outcomes to social 
networking benefits. Ellison et al. found that the use of advanced privacy settings was 
positively associated with social capital (2011), and Stutzman et al found a significant, 
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positive relationship between disclosure and social capital (Stutzman, Vitak et al. 2012). 
However, neither one of these studies examined the relationship between privacy 
outcomes, whether or not individuals achieve their desired privacy level, and these social 
networking benefits. Therefore, this study fills this gap by exploring privacy outcomes in 
relation to social networking outcomes. In this chapter, operationalization of these 
constructs and proposed hypotheses for the research model are discussed. 
7.1 Research Model and Hypotheses 
7.1.1 Privacy Outcomes 
Consistent with Altman, I operationalize one‘s privacy outcome as the difference 
between one‘s desired privacy level and one‘s achieved privacy level (1975). In other 
words, the privacy level one ―wants‖ versus what they ―have.‖ I adapted the discrepancy 
score approach which was used by Kaya and Weber in their examination of privacy 
regulation and crowding in American and Turkish student residence halls (Kaya and 
Weber 2003) and their research on privacy regulation in older adult living environments 
(Kaya, Webb et al. 2005). The scale I developed for desired privacy level was revised to 
reflect achieved privacy level; both were measured on 7-point Likert scales.  As an 
example, a measure for desired privacy level is, ―I want to keep my different social 
circles separate from each other on Facebook.‖  The analogous item for achieved privacy 
level would be, ―I keep my different social circles separate from each other on 
Facebook.‖ Thus, the discrepancy scores could (1) fall into a range of negative values (-1 
to -6), with desired privacy level less than what one has achieved (social isolation); (2) 
fall into a range of positive values (1 to 6), with desired privacy level higher than what 
one has achieved (social crowding); or (3) a zero value (0), indicating an optimal level of 
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achieved privacy. Kaya and Weber found a positive correlation between desired and 
achieved privacy level in their research, therefore I also hypothesize that: 
H1: Desired privacy level and achieved privacy level will be significantly 
and positively correlated. 
7.1.2 Social Networking Outcomes 
Both self-esteem and social capital (defined in detail in Chapter 5) have been 
studied as potential benefits of SNS use. The goal of this research is to better understand 
the relationship of these dependent variables to SNS privacy outcomes. 
7.1.2.1 Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem will be operationalized using Rosenberg‘s pre-validated scale for 
self-esteem (Rosenberg 1989). Consistently, interpersonal boundary literature confirms 
that boundary regulation is an integral part of personal well-being (Altman 1975; 
Katherine 1991; Whitfield 1993; Petronio 2002). Boundaries help us avoid stimulus 
overload, intrusions, and freedom from interference (Altman 1975). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that interpersonal boundary regulation outcomes directly impact self-esteem 
such that both states of crowding and isolation negatively impact one‘s self-esteem.  
H2: Higher levels of social crowding will be significantly and negatively 
associated with self-esteem. 
H3: Higher levels of social isolation will be significantly and negatively 
associated with self-esteem. 
7.1.2.2 Social Capital 
Social capital was operationalized using the three dimensions cited in past SNS 
research: bridging, bonding, and maintained (Williams 2006; Ellison, Steinfield et al. 
2007; Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011). Yet, it is unclear through the literature the relationship 
between privacy outcomes and social capital, though many researchers have implied that 
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the two are diametrically opposed. SNS privacy is often characterized as the restriction 
from sharing private information. Yet, SNS research has established that self disclosure is 
necessary in order to build social capital (Stutzman, Vitak et al. 2012). Therefore, given 
this definition of privacy, upholding one‘s privacy implies a direct reduction in social 
capital.   Because my research defines privacy as a boundary regulation process, where 
one is trying to achieve one‘s desired level of privacy, privacy outcomes vary between 
three conditions (optimal, social crowding, and social isolation) across each of the ten 
boundary types.  Thus, I propose that more optimal privacy outcomes are positively 
associated with the three dimensions of social capital. I believe that individuals benefit 
the most when their privacy needs are met. Therefore, 
H4: Higher levels of social crowding will be significantly and negatively 
associated with social capital. 
H5: Higher levels of social isolation will be significantly and negatively 
associated with social capital. 
7.2 Individual Differences 
Individual differences will be captured as contextual factors in this study and used 
as control variables. Demographic information included gender, age, ethnicity, and 
education level. The Facebook Intensity Scale (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007) and the 
types of SNS activities (Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011) SNS users engaged in were also 
included as control variables. Personality was operationalized using the Big Five 
Personality measures (Gosling, Rentfrow et al. 2003). I also asked whether or not each 
participant was a UNC Charlotte student. 
7.3 Methodology 
I created a web-based survey instrument using Survey Share. Participant 
recruitment was done through snowball sampling (Babbie 2004) using a sampling frame 
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of university students and faculty. A random sample of 10,000 UNC Charlotte email 
addresses were selected and emailed an invite to participate in the survey. Participants 
had to be over 18 and have an active Facebook account. Participation was incentivized 
through the chance to win one of two $100 Amazon gift certificates through a random 
drawing of participants. Each participant who opted in to enter the drawing received one 
drawing entry. As an extra incentive to share the survey, participants received one 
additional entry for referring someone else who completed the survey. Each survey 
participant, however, was limited to a maximum of 25 drawing entries and was eligible to 
receive at most one $100 gift card. Both the survey questions and recruitment 
methodology described were approved by the university‘s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).  
The hypotheses were tested through Pearson‘s bivariate correlation analysis using 
SPSS, separately across each of the ten boundary types.  I chose this approach because I 
am interested in the direction and significance of the relationship between each individual 
privacy outcome and the social networking outcomes. I am not proposing that privacy 
outcomes explain a large portion of the variance in social networking outcomes or any 
type of causation between the independent and dependent variables (Huck 2004). 
Consistent with Chapter 6, the ten boundary types are analyzed separately from one 
another because robust theory development regarding the relationship between the 
boundary types has not yet been established. Therefore, Pearson‘s correlation analysis 
represents the minimally sufficient analysis to address the research hypotheses and 
uphold parsimony (Kline 2011).  
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As stated above, a limitation of this approach is that Pearson correlation 
coefficients are zero-order correlations that do not control for inter-correlations between 
variables (Kline 2011). As such, this approach limits the ability to interpret the 
cumulative effects of the ten privacy outcomes for the different boundary types with 
respect to the dependent variables. Therefore, a post hoc analysis was done using 
multiple regression, CFA, and SEM in order to explore the inter-correlations between the 
ten different boundary types and their impact with respect to the dependent variables. 
Implications of the exploratory findings will be discussed in our post hoc analysis. 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Data Screening 
Data were screened for missing data, outliers, and normality prior to data analysis. 
A total of 331 surveys were completed. Twelve responses were deleted due to excessive 
missing data. Three responses were deleted because participants indicated that they did 
not have active Facebook accounts, and one additional response was deleted as a 
multivariate outlier because the participant chose the first answer for questions over 45% 
of the time. Univariate outliers existed as is expected with a large dataset (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007) and therefore were not removed from the analysis. This left a final 
sample size of 315 participants. 
7.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample included 81 males, 233 females, and one unreported gender. The 
average age of participants was 30.76 years old with a standard deviation of 11.4 years, 
ranging from 18 to 66 years old. Sample distributions for ethnicity and education level 
are provided in TABLE 49 and TABLE 50. 
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TABLE 49: Ethnicity 
 Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
-1 (Missing) 2 0.6% 
 White/Caucasian 247 78.4% 
 Black/African American 23 7.3% 
 Hispanic/Latino 11 3.5% 
 Asian/Pacific Islander 21 6.7% 
 American Indian/Alaskan Native 1 0.3% 
 Other 10 3.2% 
 Total 315 100.0% 
 
 
 
TABLE 50: Education Level 
 Education Level Frequency Percent 
Missing 2 0.6% 
Less than high school 0 0% 
 High school diploma 11 3.5% 
 Some college 50 15.9% 
 2 year college degree 18 5.7% 
 4 year college degree 30 9.5% 
 Some graduate school 91 28.9% 
 Master's degree 82 26% 
 Doctoral degree 25 7.9% 
 Professional degree (MD, JD, etc.) 6 1.9% 
 Total 315 100.0% 
 
 
 
In addition, 75% of the sample identified themselves as UNC Charlotte students. 
The majority (92.7%) of the sample reported having a Facebook account for over 2 years 
with 26.1% having an active Facebook account over six years. Based on the descriptive 
statistics of this sample, the data is skewed toward a predominantly female, white and 
well-educated adult, student population who is not new to Facebook.  Therefore, 
generalizability of the results may be constrained by the sample statistics.  
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7.4.2.1 Privacy Outcomes 
To calculate one‘s privacy outcome across each of the ten boundary types, I 
subtracted each item for achieved privacy level from the similar item for desired privacy 
level. Descriptive statistics for desired privacy level and achieved privacy level are 
included in Appendix C. Descriptive statistics for privacy outcomes are presented in 
TABLE 51.  
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TABLE 51: Descriptive Statistics Privacy Outcomes 
Item N-Valid N-Missing Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
XIN1 308 7 1.23 1.71 0.62 0.10 
XIN2 308 7 0.98 1.90 0.54 0.07 
XIN3 306 9 1.20 1.89 0.17 -0.15 
XOUT1 312 3 0.74 1.42 0.97 1.45 
XOUT2 306 9 0.75 1.82 0.09 1.31 
XOUT3 309 6 1.25 1.75 0.51 0.40 
XSELF1 310 5 0.33 1.16 0.76 3.55 
XSELF2 310 5 0.26 1.27 1.38 4.23 
XSELF3 309 6 -0.18 1.30 -0.11 1.51 
XCONF1 311 4 0.82 1.52 0.32 0.07 
XCONF2 309 6 1.27 1.84 -0.16 0.18 
XCONF3 305 10 1.15 1.60 0.25 0.41 
XCONN1 308 7 0.31 1.54 0.22 1.19 
XCONN2 305 10 1.05 1.72 0.19 0.15 
XCONN3 308 7 0.60 1.81 -0.16 0.44 
XCONT1 314 1 0.08 1.56 0.37 1.64 
XCONT2 311 4 -0.26 1.63 0.30 0.40 
XCONT3 312 3 0.45 1.72 0.15 -0.04 
XINTER1 308 7 1.01 1.79 -0.06 -0.18 
XINTER2 309 6 1.32 1.69 0.28 0.41 
XINTER3 307 8 1.19 1.75 0.13 0.21 
XDISC1 310 5 0.72 1.91 -0.16 0.28 
XDISC2 307 8 0.91 1.79 0.15 0.31 
XDISC3 310 5 0.94 1.88 0.00 0.75 
XBLOCK1 309 6 0.66 2.15 -0.05 0.98 
XBLOCK2 309 6 0.70 1.65 0.77 1.36 
XBLOCK3 308 7 1.15 1.82 0.52 0.09 
XDIS1 311 4 1.37 2.01 0.00 0.14 
XDIS2 308 7 0.60 2.11 -0.04 0.27 
XDIS3 313 2 0.60 1.72 0.17 0.10 
 
 
 
A positive mean represents an average state of social crowding whereas a 
negative mean represents a state of social isolation. TABLE 51 shows that most items 
suggest a general state of social crowding on Facebook. Only two items produced 
negative means suggesting social isolation.  ―I want to share only minimal information 
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about myself on Facebook‖ (SELF3) and ―I want my interactions on Facebook to be 
different between me and a close friend than they would be with an acquaintance,‖ 
(CONT2) were the two items where individuals achieved too much privacy. For self 
disclosure, I actually observed the same sentiment from the interviewees where they 
wanted to share more but felt like they could not. This resulted in coping mechanisms of 
self-censorship which led some to feel a loss of authentic self within their SNS. For 
relationship context, social isolation in this instance may suggest that individuals want 
Facebook to facilitate closer relationships with acquaintances, but it is not meeting their 
needs for turning acquaintances into close friends. 
Also noteworthy in the descriptive statistics presented in TABLE 51, is the 
frequent occurrence of positive kurtosis values over one.  At closer look of the data, for 
each of the items below, histograms show that zero is the most frequent reported value 
for most privacy outcome items.  This means that a large proportion of individuals feel 
that they have achieved their optimal privacy level on Facebook. I find this result 
interesting because all sixty items measuring desired and achieved privacy level were 
randomized and dispersed on different pages of the survey.  Therefore, it would have 
taken a participant hours to intentionally match each of the items to report optimal 
privacy levels.  In addition, they were not told that privacy outcome would be 
operationalized as a difference score. However, the descriptive statistics do support the 
first hypothesis that desired privacy level and achieved privacy level are highly 
correlated. 
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7.4.2.2 Social Networking Outcomes 
Next, I will present the descriptive statistics for self esteem and social capital. For 
self esteem (TABLE 52), item reports were generally high, over five on a 7-point Likert.  
Many of the items were skewed left with large, positive kurtosis.  Therefore, individuals 
generally reported consistently high levels of self esteem. 
 
TABLE 52: Descriptive Statistics for Self Esteem 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
SE1 315 6.17 .967 -1.527 .137 2.807 .274 
SE2 310 6.32 .775 -1.169 .138 1.713 .276 
SE3 314 6.15 1.119 -1.579 .138 2.209 .274 
SE4 313 5.86 .985 -1.005 .138 1.156 .275 
SE5 315 6.10 1.258 -1.633 .137 2.083 .274 
SE6 314 5.68 1.119 -.911 .138 .634 .274 
SE7 312 5.59 1.158 -.896 .138 .475 .275 
SE8 313 4.97 1.721 -.475 .138 -1.023 .275 
SE9 315 5.10 1.683 -.448 .137 -1.142 .274 
SE10 311 5.68 1.624 -1.104 .138 .004 .276 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
297             
 
 
 
I measured multiple types of social capital which included bridging (BRIDGE), 
bonding (BOND), and maintained (MAINT). Descriptive statistics are presented in 
TABLE 53. Overall, most of the items were normally distributed. Those that were not 
tended to be skewed left with high, positive kurtosis. In this case, many of the items used 
to measure maintained social capital averaged fairly high and tended to favor higher 
levels of maintained social capital than lower ones. 
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TABLE 53: Descriptive Statistics for Social Capital 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
BRIDGE1 314 4.75 1.557 -.665 .138 -.070 .274 
BRIDGE2 313 4.51 1.573 -.559 .138 -.392 .275 
BRIDGE3 313 4.87 1.478 -.690 .138 -.070 .275 
BRIDGE4 312 4.50 1.483 -.574 .138 -.075 .275 
BRIDGE5 314 3.89 1.648 -.104 .138 -.861 .274 
BRIDGE6 313 3.43 1.580 .057 .138 -.892 .275 
BRIDGE7 314 2.99 1.600 .520 .138 -.595 .274 
BRIDGE8 314 4.61 1.599 -.678 .138 -.258 .274 
BRIDGE9 314 4.32 1.709 -.400 .138 -.760 .274 
BRIDGE10 313 4.27 1.693 -.429 .138 -.673 .275 
BOND1 315 3.81 1.484 -.133 .137 -.671 .274 
BOND2 315 3.60 1.508 .000 .137 -.744 .274 
BOND3 314 5.40 1.572 -1.135 .138 .624 .274 
BOND4 314 4.75 1.671 -.634 .138 -.400 .274 
BOND5 315 4.99 1.359 -.693 .137 .364 .274 
BOND6 314 5.46 1.456 -1.163 .138 1.172 .274 
BOND7 314 4.40 1.475 -.259 .138 -.277 .274 
BOND8 313 4.56 1.657 -.529 .138 -.497 .275 
BOND9 314 4.89 1.500 -.443 .138 -.497 .274 
BOND10 315 4.67 1.837 -.531 .137 -.752 .274 
MAINT1 315 4.88 1.577 -.757 .137 -.068 .274 
MAINT2 315 5.08 1.392 -.964 .137 .872 .274 
MAINT3 314 5.46 1.183 -1.108 .138 1.701 .274 
MAINT4 314 5.75 1.209 -1.301 .138 2.001 .274 
MAINT5 315 5.32 1.392 -1.030 .137 .854 .274 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
270             
 
 
 
7.5  Construct Validity 
Although I used pre-validated measures, I wanted to confirm that the constructs 
had robust internal consistency, convergent, and discriminant validity before doing the 
analysis. Therefore, I performed a CFA for the dependent variables which included self-
esteem and the three dimensions of social capital. Items exhibiting multicollinearity, 
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discriminant validity, and internal consistency issues were removed (BRIDGE5, 
BRIDGE6, BOND1, BOND2, BOND8, SE2, SE7, and SE9). This resulted in adequate 
goodness-of-fit statistics of 
2
 (318) = 659.48, p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.058 (with a CI 
from 0.052 to 0.065), p=0.015, CFI=0.93, TLI=0.92, and SRMR=0.055. I found 
significant correlations between dimensions of social capital for bonding and bridging 
(=0.237, p <=0.000), maintained and bridging (=0.553, p <=0.000), maintained and 
bonding (=0.508, p <=0.000). Contrary to past research findings (Steinfield, Ellison et 
al. 2008), there were no significant correlations between self-esteem and any of the 
dimensions of social capital. Once construct validity was established, I calculated the 
mean of the remaining indicator items to represent the overall measure for each of the 
latent variables.  
7.6 Hypothesis Testing 
7.6.1 Desired and Achieved Privacy Level 
For hypothesis one, I tested for significant correlations between desired and 
achieved privacy levels for each of the ten boundary types. The high, positive kurtosis in 
the variables for privacy outcome already suggested a strong relationship between 
reported desired and achieved privacy levels, but TABLE 54 confirms hypothesis one. 
Not only are all the correlations significant at the 0.01 level, the effect size is relatively 
large ( > 0.45) for nine out of ten of the boundary types.  The only effect size below this 
threshold is the relationship between desired and achieved confidant disclosure 
boundaries.  This suggests that individuals may feel that they lack control over how 
others share their private information with others more so than other boundary types. 
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TABLE 54: Pearson's Correlations between Desired and Achieved Privacy Levels 
Boundary Type Pearson‘s Correlation  
Inward-Facing Territorial 0.458** 
Outward-Facing Territorial 0.463** 
Self-Disclosure 0.544** 
Confidant-Disclosure 0.395** 
Relationship Connection 0.575** 
Relationship Context 0.470** 
Network Intersection 0.499** 
Network Discovery 0.501** 
Interactional Blocking 0.538** 
Interactional Disabling 0.475** 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
7.6.2 Privacy Outcomes, Self-Esteem, and Social Capital 
Finally, I tested the remaining hypotheses dealing with the relationship between 
privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes. As a reminder, I operationalized 
privacy outcomes as the difference between desired privacy level and actual privacy 
level. I analyzed social crowding and social isolation separately; therefore, TABLE 55 
shows the Pearson‘s correlations for social crowding (privacy outcomes ranging from 0 
to 6) for each of the ten boundary types. First, it is important to note the high number of 
participants who reported overall states ranging from optimal to socially crowded. Out of 
315 total participants, I observed a range of 180-276 participants across the ten boundary 
types who reported average values in this category.  Overall, there was only one 
significant correlation between social crowding and self-esteem.  For interactional 
disabling boundaries, higher levels of social crowding were related to lower levels of 
self-esteem.  In all cases where there was a significant relationship between social 
crowding and social capital (approximately 33% of the time), higher levels of social 
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crowding were associated with lower levels of social capital. Overall, the effect sizes 
observed were fairly low, the highest effect size observed was for the relationship 
between outward-facing territories and bonding social capital (r = -0.3).  This means that 
the relationship, although significant, between privacy outcome and the dimensions of 
social capital is weak. Yet, in these cases, more optimal privacy outcomes were related to 
higher levels of social capital where individuals perceive higher levels of social capital 
when their privacy needs are met. Bridging social capital tended to be significantly 
correlated more frequently than bonding or maintained social capital.  Social crowding 
within outward-facing territories was significantly and inversely related to all three types 
of social capital. When individuals do not achieve the privacy levels they desire through 
control of their Facebook Walls/Timeline, it is associated with lower levels of bonding 
social capital. Essentially, while these finding provide only moderate support of a 
positive relationship between optimal privacy outcomes and social networking benefits, 
they do disconfirm the assumption that privacy and social networking goals are mutually 
exclusive.  If anything, privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes are generally 
unrelated.  
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TABLE 55: Pearson‘s Correlations for Social Crowding Privacy Outcomes 
Boundary Type N Self-
Esteem 
Bridging Bonding Maintained 
Inward-Facing Territorial 271 0.027 -0.171** -0.098 -0.131* 
Outward-Facing 
Territorial 
268 0.017 -0.189** -0.296** -0.143* 
Self-Disclosure 199 0.093 0.008 -0.061 -0.037 
Confidant-Disclosure 274 0.006 -0.142* -0.091 -0.065 
Relationship Connection 242 0.024 -0.122 0.066 -0.005 
Relationship Context 180 0.098 -0.219** -0.178* -0.132 
Network Intersection 276 0.081 -0.100 -0.038 -0.057 
Network Discovery 243 0.044 -0.123 -0.047 -0.072 
Interactional Blocking 259 -0.024 -0.156* -0.158* -0.036 
Interactional Disabling 237 -0.134* -0.140* -0.123 -0.067 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
TABLE 56 shows the Pearson‘s correlations for social isolation (privacy 
outcomes ranging from 0 to -6) for each of the ten boundary types. The correlation 
coefficients were multiplied by negative one to reverse the scale for a more intuitive 
presentation of the results for social isolation.  First, the number of participants reporting 
social isolation (as opposed to social crowding) dramatically dropped, ranging from 68-
186. This finding is consistent with the fact that SNSs such as Facebook promote sharing 
and connecting and often set one‘s default privacy settings to be open. Therefore, it 
makes sense that more individuals would experience social crowding within SNSs than 
social isolation.  
I found no significant correlations between self-esteem and social isolation. For 
social crowding and social capital, I only found a few significant correlations (only 17% 
significance across the bivariate pairs). Surprisingly, most of the significant coefficients 
had the opposite sign than predicted.  For most significant relationships, social isolation 
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was directly associated to social capital. Only one case out of five significant correlations 
(outward-facing territories and bonding social capital) showed a negative correlation 
between social isolation and social capital.  
For self-disclosure boundaries, social isolation was significantly and positively 
correlated with all three dimensions of social capital. This finding is contrary to past 
research that found a significant, positive relationship between disclosure and social 
capital (Stutzman, Vitak et al. 2012).  However, this paper measured disclosure 
differently, and did not operationalize privacy outcome as the difference between desired 
and achieved self-disclosure as in this model. In retrospect, this finding is not inconsistent 
with the SNS user interviews.  Some individuals wanted to be able to disclose more 
within their SNSs than they felt they were able to, resulting in a sense of social isolation.  
However, the individuals who expressed social isolation through self-disclosure 
boundaries were also the ones who were highly engaged in their network and avid SNS 
users. Therefore, a confounding factor of SNS engagement may explain the 
counterintuitive relationship between self-disclosure privacy outcomes and social capital. 
 Overall, I believe that a few different factors may contribute to the surprisingly 
positive or lacking relationship between social isolation and social capital that I observed.  
First, privacy outcome tended to be skewed left with a high, positive kurtosis.  In other 
words, individuals most often reported optimal to social crowding privacy outcomes 
instead of social isolation. Because of the overwhelming experience of social crowding, 
instances of social isolation (receiving more than one‘s desired level of social 
interaction), may have actually been a welcomed change. Another reasonable explanation 
is that individuals who experience social isolation – less social interaction than they 
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desire – value the social capital they do derive from their networks more than individuals 
who are experiencing social crowding.  
 
TABLE 56: Pearson‘s Correlations for Social Isolation Privacy Outcomes (Sign 
Reversed) 
Boundary Type N Self-
Esteem 
Bridging Bonding Maintained 
Inward-Facing Territorial 93 0.027 0.224* 0.070 0.152 
Outward-Facing 
Territorial 
95 0.008 -0.199 -0.210* -0.068 
Self-Disclosure 180 0.122 0.251** 0.154* 0.285** 
Confidant-Disclosure 68 0.035 0.070 0.218 0.061 
Relationship Connection 104 0.026 0.025 0.164 0.054 
Relationship Context 186 0.063 0.033 0.090 0.041 
Network Intersection 76 0.137 -0.057 0.031 -0.025 
Network Discovery 106 -0.015 0.153 0.125 -0.021 
Interactional Blocking 103 0.013 0.189 0.128 0.195* 
Interactional Disabling 112 0.129 0.012 0.145 0.141 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *  Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
7.7 Limitations 
As noted previously, this analysis did not control for inter-correlations between 
the ten boundary types for privacy outcomes; I want to discuss some additional 
limitations of this study as well. First, the data set had an unexpectedly low range of 
values for privacy outcome when calculated as a difference score. Due to the high 
positive kurtosis, the means of the privacy outcome variables converged around zero. 
Privacy outcome means were all less than the absolute value of 1.5 on a scale of -6 to 6 
with relatively small standard deviations (highest at 2.11). Therefore, low variability in 
the data set may contribute to the small effect sizes observed. Because the participants 
only represented active Facebook users, individuals who have abandoned Facebook due 
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to extreme social crowding or isolation were excluded from this study. I believe that a 
larger observed range in privacy outcomes across the ten boundary types may increase 
the effect size. Second, operationalizing privacy outcome as a difference score adds 
additional error to the measures, most likely suppressing the bivariate correlations. Third, 
the non-normality present in the data set may have also reduced the significance and 
effect size of the results. For instance, the lower number of instances of social isolation 
reduced the overall sample size for calculating the bivariate correlations for this 
condition. Because of these limitations, I performed additional post hoc analysis in order 
to gain more insight on the relationships between the various constructs in this model. 
7.8 Post Hoc Analysis 
7.8.1 Pearson‘s Correlation Analysis 
In order to tease out the effects of desired privacy level and achieved privacy level 
on the relationship between privacy outcome (operationalized as a difference score 
between the two) and social networking outcomes, I calculated additional Pearson‘s 
correlations for these constructs. First, I calculated the Pearson‘s correlation between 
desired privacy level and social networking outcomes. As shown in TABLE 57, I did not 
find a significant relationship between self-esteem and any of the ten boundary types.  In 
cases where desired privacy level was significantly related to social capital (30% of the 
time), it was an inverse relationship with a relatively low effect size. In other words, 
higher levels of desired privacy are weakly but significantly related to lower levels of 
social capital.  
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TABLE 57: Pearson's Correlations between Desired Privacy Levels and Social 
Networking Outcomes 
Boundary Type Self-Esteem Bridging Bonding Maintained 
Inward-Facing Territorial 0.101 -0.043 0.043 0.068 
Outward-Facing 
Territorial 
0.014 0.059 -0.009 0.049 
Self-Disclosure 0.055 -0.250** -0.110 -0.078 
Confidant-Disclosure 0.001 -0.111* -0.077 -0.077 
Relationship Connection 0.049 -0.229** -0.025 -0.251** 
Relationship Context -0.019 0.006 -0.010 0.001 
Network Intersection -0.049 -0.016 -.141* -0.155** 
Network Discovery -0.038 -0.155** -0.109 -0.172** 
Interactional Blocking 0.027 -0.112* 0.030 -0.014 
Interactional Disabling -0.070 -0.090 -0.090 -0.026 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
In this way, it appears that privacy and social capital are at odds.  A reasonable 
interpretation of this finding, however, is that individuals who inherently value privacy 
tend to do so at the expense of gaining social value from SNSs. However, one‘s desired 
privacy level is an individual characteristic that is not readily changed merely through 
interface design. Thus, SNSs forcing individuals to share more or interact more than they 
want still may not improve one‘s social capital.  
Next, I examined the relationship between achieved privacy level and social 
networking outcomes.  Again, I did not find any significant relationship between 
achieved privacy levels and self-esteem across any of the ten boundary types (TABLE 
58). However, half of the bivariate correlations between achieved privacy level and the 
dimensions of social capital were significant, representing the most significance thus far 
between any of the privacy variables and social networking outcomes. Therefore, 
achieved privacy level, regardless of one‘s desired privacy level, seems to have the most 
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significant relationship (though with small effect size) with one‘s level of social capital 
across the ten boundary types. For twelve out of fifteen pairs of significant bivariate 
correlations, the significant coefficients had a positive sign, suggesting a positive 
relationship between one‘s achieved privacy level and social capital. A significant impact 
of this finding is that it supports the need to design SNS interfaces with ample 
mechanisms to allow boundary regulation, as opposed to designing SNS interfaces biased 
toward openness and sharing. 
 
TABLE 58: Pearson's Correlations between Achieved Privacy Levels and Social 
Networking Outcomes 
Boundary Type Self-
Esteem 
Bridging Bonding Maintained 
Inward-Facing Territorial 0.040 0.164** 0.148** 0.209** 
Outward-Facing 
Territorial 
0.032 0.157** 0.187** 0.137* 
Self-Disclosure 0.077 -0.081 0.013 0.114* 
Confidant-Disclosure 0.008 0.081 0.131* 0.054 
Relationship Connection 0.064 -0.127* 0.017 -0.218** 
Relationship Context 0.010 0.125* 0.165** 0.135* 
Network Intersection -0.065 0.058 -0.106 -0.149** 
Network Discovery -0.013 -0.002 0.005 -0.087 
Interactional Blocking 0.051 0.048 0.154** 0.055 
Interactional Disabling 0.026 0.056 0.104 0.106 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Overall, the relationship between the different aspects of privacy and social 
networking outcomes is complex. The descriptive statistics suggested that individuals 
tend to desire a high level of privacy, but desired privacy level can be negatively 
associated with social capital.  There is a significant and strong overall correlation 
between desired and actual privacy levels, but privacy outcomes tend to be skewed 
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toward social crowding over social isolation. Thus, it is interesting to see a sign change in 
the correlation coefficients which suggests that achieving a high level of privacy actually 
correlates with higher social capital. It is plausible that high levels of desired privacy and 
an over abundance of social crowding helps explain why social capital is enhanced when 
achieved privacy levels are high.  However, there are a few cases where achieved privacy 
level is significantly and negatively correlated with various types of social capital. For 
instance, high levels of achieved relationship connection privacy are negatively 
associated with bridging and maintained social capital. This may suggest that relationship 
connection boundaries play a different role than other boundary types. Because 
relationship connection boundaries help individuals decide whom to let in and whom to 
keep out of their SNSs, they may have a stronger overall impact on social capital derived 
from participating within SNSs. 
To account for the inter-correlations between the ten boundary types, I performed 
additional post hoc analysis in order to better understand the impact of relationship 
between the different privacy outcomes across the boundary types with respect to the 
dependent variables. First, TABLE 59 shows the bivariate correlations between the 
privacy outcomes across the ten different boundary types.  There is a significant, positive 
association between the majority of the privacy outcomes for each of the boundary types. 
This is consistent with my theory development which suggests overlap between the 
boundary types.  However, these results may be slightly exaggerated due to the 
operationalization of privacy outcome as a difference score which presented with a high, 
positive kurtosis and an overall restricted range of values. This result is useful, however, 
as it provides evidence that there are no multicollinearity issues confounding the previous 
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analysis, as none of the bivariate correlations are greater than  0.9 (Huck 2004; Kline 
2011). 
 
TABLE 59: Pearson's Correlations between Privacy Outcomes for Ten Boundary Types 
 XIN XOU
T 
XSE
LF 
XCO
NF 
XCON
N 
XCO
NT 
XINT
ER 
XDIS
C 
XBLO
CK 
XDI
S 
XIN 1                   
XOUT .440
** 
1                 
XSELF .209
** 
.290*
* 
1               
XCON
F 
.287
** 
.317*
* 
.341*
* 
1             
XCON
N 
.211
** 
.254*
* 
.181*
* 
.255** 1           
XCON
T 
.284
** 
.318*
* 
.289*
* 
.274** .260** 1         
XINTE
R 
.236
** 
.282*
* 
.143* .331** .442** .328** 1       
XDISC .250
** 
.341*
* 
.132* .366** .317** .206** .447** 1     
XBLO
CK 
.396
** 
.474*
* 
.335*
* 
.373** .328** .248** .308** .321*
* 
1   
XDIS .330
** 
.323*
* 
0.105 .312** .207** .241** .364** .345*
* 
.313** 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
7.8.2 Regression Analysis 
To address the limitation that inter-correlations between boundary types were not 
controlled for, I performed a regression analysis using privacy outcome for each of the 
ten boundary types as independent variables to assess the explanatory value of all the 
privacy outcomes in relation to one another on the dependent variables. Because the 
hypothesis testing negated the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between privacy 
outcome and social networking outcomes (where optimum was represented by zero on a 
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scale from -6 to 6), I was able to perform a standard linear regression instead of creating 
squared terms to model a curvilinear relationship for this post hoc analysis.  
Consistent with our previous analysis for the relationship between privacy 
outcomes and self-esteem, none of the privacy outcomes were significant predictors of 
self-esteem, and actually produced a negative adjusted R-squared. Next, using bridging 
social capital as the dependent variable, we found that the ten privacy outcomes 
explained very little of the overall variance in bridging social capital (R-square = 0.078, 
Adjusted R-square = 0.05). However, this was expected. In addition, only one privacy 
outcome (XIN for inward-facing territorial boundaries) had a significant coefficient in 
this model.  The beta coefficient (-0.181) was negative with a small effect size. This, 
again, supports the idea that, within the spectrum of social isolation to social crowding, 
social crowding is negatively associated with bridging social capital for inward-facing 
territories. 
 
TABLE 60: Regression Analysis for Bridging Social Capital 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
  B Std. 
Error 
Beta     
(Constant) 4.480 .115   38.873 .000 
XIN -.159 .058 -.181 -2.755 .006 
XOUT .055 .071 .053 .770 .442 
XSELF -.101 .085 -.074 -1.191 .234 
XCONF -.070 .069 -.066 -1.007 .315 
XCONN -.007 .066 -.006 -.100 .920 
XCONT -.025 .071 -.022 -.356 .722 
XINTER .040 .065 .043 .622 .534 
XDISC -.086 .057 -.100 -1.509 .132 
XBLOCK -.028 .062 -.032 -.453 .651 
a  Dependent Variable: BRIDGE 
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The multicollinearity statistics of this model were assessed in attempt to 
understand the non-significant coefficients of the other privacy outcomes in this model.  
Both the Condition Indices and VIF scores were low, suggesting that multicollinearity 
was not the problem. Upon further analysis, I found that when I removed the significant 
independent variable from the model, the next variable became significant, and 
subsequently with the same result.  After several iterations, I found that this was the case 
for this model and the models using bonding and maintained social capital as the 
dependent variable.  (Therefore, these results are not included in this write up.) An 
explanation for this anomaly is that the significance of the independent variables in the 
regression model is, to some extent, attributable to chance, where the independent 
variable with the highest bivariate correlation achieves significance over the other 
variables because they share common variance explaining the dependent variable. This, 
however, is only meaningful in predictive models which are trying to optimize predictive 
power of the overall model through a parsimonious subset of independent variables. It 
does not necessarily mean that there is no significant relationship between the various 
privacy outcomes and dependent variables. For models that are trying to understand the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, it is 
important to also report the bivariate correlations  (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007; Kline 
2011), which were included in our original analysis. However, the regression analysis 
does confirm my assumption that privacy outcome has an overall low explanatory value 
when trying to understand the dimensions of social capital.  
 A limitation of the post hoc regression analysis was that privacy outcomes across 
the ten boundary types were treated as independent variables.  In actuality, these 
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boundary types may be more accurately described as dimensions of a higher second order 
construct of overall privacy outcome.  Therefore, it would be inappropriate in this case to 
treat them as independent variables in the regression model. A more appropriate approach 
would be to perform a CFA and SEM, taking into account the multidimensionality of the 
second order constructs and allowing all variables to be added to one cohesive model. 
Development of a full confirmatory, second order construct of privacy based on the ten 
boundary types was outside the scope of this research, but I conducted an initial, 
exploratory CFA and SEM analysis, as follows, in order to explore the relationships 
between the constructs more fully. 
7.8.3 CFA and SEM 
Prior to running a full SEM analysis, I performed CFAs separately for all 
constructs in the model (Self-Esteem, Social Capital, and Privacy Outcome) to verify 
construct validity. The MLM estimator was used in MPlus due to the non-normal data 
distribution. For self-esteem, SE2, SE7, and SE9 were removed due to redundancy in 
their measurement. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the CFA for self-esteem were: 
2
 
(14) = 32.83, p=<0.003, RMSEA=0.066 (with a CI from 0.037 to 0.096), p=0.162, 
CFI=0.97, TLI=0.96, and SRMR=0.036. For social capital, I modeled it first as a second 
order construct with three dimensions (bridging, bonding, and maintained).  However, 
this model presented with problems.  Maintained social capital was too highly correlated 
with the higher order construct of social capital.  When maintained social capital was 
removed, the second order model for bridging and bonding social capital did not 
converge. Therefore, the best model fit was to model bridging, bonding, and maintained 
social capital as separate latent variables. In addition, items BRIDGE5, BRIDGE6, 
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BRIDGE8, BRIDGE10, BOND1, BOND2, BOND8, BOND5, BOND6, MAINT2, and 
MAINT3 had to be removed from the model due to redundancy, internal consistency, and 
cross loading problems. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the CFA for social capital were: 

2
 (62) = 100.89, p=<0.0013, RMSEA=0.045 (with a CI from 0.028 to 0.061), p=0.675, 
CFI=0.97, TLI=0.97, and SRMR=0.041. The estimated correlation matrix for the latent 
variables is presented in TABLE 61. 
 
TABLE 61: Social Capital Correlation Matrix 
 BRIDGE BOND MAINT 
BRIDGE 1   
BOND 0.169 1  
MAINT 0.557 0.413 1 
 
 
 
For privacy outcome, however, modeling privacy outcome as a second order 
construct with ten dimensions of privacy based on the ten boundary types did produce an 
adequate model. After removing items XIN1, XCONF1, XINTER2, and XDISC2 due to 
redundancy and cross loadings and allowing some items across boundary types to covary 
when theoretically sound to do so, the goodness-of-fit statistics for the CFA for privacy 
outcome were 
2
 (284) = 330.80, p=<0.0292, RMSEA=0.025 (with a CI from 0.009 to 
0.037), p=1.0, CFI=0.951, TLI=0.944, and SRMR=0.057. 
Next, I performed a SEM regressing privacy outcome on both self-esteem and 
social capital. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the SEM were 
2
 (964) = 1184.3, 
p=<0.0000, RMSEA=0.031 (with a CI from 0.024 to 0.036), p=1.0, CFI=0.93, TLI=0.92, 
and SRMR=0.061. Similar to our previous results, there was not a significant path from 
privacy outcome to self-esteem ( = -0.009, p = 0.91). There was a significant path, 
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however, from privacy outcome to bridging ( = -0.24, p = 0.002) and bonding ( = -
0.19, p = 0.014) social capital. For maintained social capital, the path was significant at 
the p <= 0.10 value ( = -0.13, p = 0.084). Overall, privacy outcome explained little of 
the variance in the dependent variables (self-esteem R
2
 = 0.00, p = 0.95; bridging R
2
 = 
0.058, p = 0.128; bonding R
2
 = 0.035 p = 0.218; and maintained R
2
 = 0.016 p = 0.387). 
The estimated correlation matrix is shown in TABLE 62. These results allows us to 
interpret both the overall relationship of privacy outcomes to social networking outcomes 
as well as the individual relationships for each of the ten boundary types. For instance, 
the correlation coefficients between self-esteem and the ten privacy outcomes are all 
slightly negative though not significant. While this finding is not enough to accept the 
original hypothesis, the direction of this correlation is consistent with my prediction. 
Also, the correlation coefficients for the three types of social capital with the ten 
individual types of privacy outcomes are also all negative values with low effect sizes.  
Again, this is consistent with the hypothesized relationship.  
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TABLE 62: Correlation Matrix for Privacy Outcomes and Social Networking Outcomes 
 IN OUT SELF CONF CONN 
IN 1     
OUT 0.631 1    
SELF 0.437 0.593 1   
CONF 0.442 0.6 0.415 1  
CONN 0.415 0.563 0.389 0.394 1 
CONT 0.46 0.624 0.432 0.437 0.41 
INTER 0.284 0.385 0.266 0.27 0.499 
DISC 0.278 0.378 0.262 0.265 0.248 
BLOCK 0.599 0.813 0.562 0.569 0.534 
DIS 0.392 0.533 0.368 0.373 0.35 
SE -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
BRIDGE -0.165 -0.224 -0.155 -0.157 -0.147 
BOND -0.127 -0.173 -0.12 -0.121 -0.114 
MAINT -0.087 -0.119 -0.082 -0.083 -0.078 
PRIVOUT 0.682 0.926 0.64 0.648 0.608 
      
      
 CONT INTER DISC BLOCK DIS 
CONT 1     
INTER 0.726 1    
DISC 0.275 0.483 1   
BLOCK 0.592 0.365 0.359 1  
DIS 0.388 0.239 0.235 0.505 1 
SE -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 
BRIDGE -0.163 -0.101 -0.099 -0.212 -0.139 
BOND -0.126 -0.078 -0.076 -0.164 -0.108 
MAINT -0.086 -0.053 -0.052 -0.112 -0.074 
PRIVOUT 0.674 0.416 0.408 0.878 0.575 
      
      
 SE BRIDGE BOND MAINT PRIVOUT 
SE 1     
BRIDGE -0.02 1    
BOND -0.052 0.227 1   
MAINT 0.124 0.569 0.398 1  
PRIVOUT -0.009 -0.242 -0.187 -0.128 1 
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One main contribution of this model is that it suggests a synergistic or cumulative 
effect of privacy outcomes on the dependent variables.  For instance, the effect size for 
overall privacy outcome with bridging social capital is larger than the effect size of each 
of the individual privacy outcomes. It is also interesting to note that this model found no 
significant correlation between self-esteem and any of the three types of social capital. 
Limitations of this model include that it is an exploratory model where fitting was 
necessary to achieve adequate construct validity.  Also, I did not test any moderating 
effects to determine interactions between any of the latent variables.  
7.9 Discussion and Summary 
TABLE 63 presents a summary of the results for this study.   
 
TABLE 63: Hypothesis Testing Outcomes 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: r desired/achieved < > 0 ACCEPT 
H2: r crowding/self-esteem < > 0 (Inverse) REJECT 
H3: r isolation/self-esteem < > 0 (Inverse) REJECT 
H4: r crowding/social capital < > 0 (Inverse) ACCEPT 
H5: r isolation/self-esteem < > 0 (Inverse) REJECT 
 
 
 
For hypothesis one, there is a significant and strong positive relationship between 
desired privacy levels and achieved privacy levels.  For the most part, individuals felt that 
their privacy needs have been met. However, I also saw a larger distribution of 
participants who reported levels of social crowding more so than social isolation when 
interacting with others on Facebook. I did not find a significant relationship between self 
esteem and either state of social crowding or isolation (H2 and H3) except for one 
condition of social crowding. Therefore, I rejected hypotheses two and three. This may 
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possibly be because the negatively skewed distribution of self esteem where participants 
tended to report generally high levels of self esteem. I found partial support for 
hypothesis four during the original analysis. This relationship was significant for six of 
the ten boundary types in relation to bridging social capital and less often with bonding 
and maintained social capital.  However, I found full support of this hypotheses during 
the post hoc SEM when modeling privacy outcome as a second order construct with ten 
dimensions of privacy boundary types. Social crowding was significantly and negatively 
associated with all three types of social capital. For hypothesis five, I observed one 
instance where social isolation and social capital were related in the direction that I 
predicted, but all the other significant correlations were in the direction contrary to my 
prediction.  Thus, I rejected hypothesis five.   
There are a number of important implications from these findings.  First, the 
relationship between positive privacy outcomes and social networking outcomes is rarely 
a  negative one, whereas the common assumption is for a negative relationship. Social 
crowding, a negative privacy outcome, is negatively associated (or unassociated) with 
social capital across the ten boundary types.  In addition, finding significant and positive 
associations between social isolation and social capital empirically suggests a possible 
backlash against SNS interfaces which are designed with a bias toward sharing and 
openness. Because of the high levels of social crowding, individuals may be valuing brief 
instances of social isolation. Another interesting finding was that the relationship sign 
and significance changed across the different types of privacy boundary types for the 
different social networking outcomes. Furthermore, desired privacy, achieved privacy, 
and privacy outcome all had different relationships with social capital. Therefore, SNS 
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researchers need to be mindful of how they operationalize privacy and its related 
outcomes when trying to relate it to one‘s social networking outcomes.  
Overall, this study provides evidence that optimal privacy outcomes do not reduce 
social networking benefits.  For self-esteem, privacy outcomes had little relationship at 
all.  For social capital, more optimal privacy outcomes (and even some social isolation) 
tended to be positively associated with various dimensions of social capital. Social 
crowding, receiving more social interaction than one desires, was negatively correlated 
with dimensions of social capital. However, the overall relationship between privacy 
outcomes and social networking outcomes was often non-significant or weak. Even so, 
this disconfirms the assumption that privacy and social networking goals are in conflict, 
and is the first step in reconciling the rift perceived between privacy and social 
networking goals. My future research will continue along this path - to examine 
interpersonal boundary regulation within online social networks as a means to align 
interactional privacy needs with social networking goals. 
 
8CHAPTER 8: DESIGNING FOR INTERACTIONAL PRIVACY
This chapter will summarize key findings within this research, highlight main 
contributions, and present implications for design of SNS privacy. 
8.1 Research Summary and Contributions 
The following research questions were proposed at the onset of this dissertation:  
1. What are different types of interpersonal privacy boundaries SNS users manage, 
and what strategies do they use to do so? 
2. What are salient factors involved in the SNS interpersonal boundary regulation 
process? 
3. What factors impact SNS users‘ interpersonal boundary negotiation behaviors?  
4. What is the relationship between desirable privacy outcomes and social 
networking benefits for SNS users? 
The first research question was addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I 
created a taxonomy of ten unique types of privacy boundaries and discussed technology-
supported boundary mechanisms available to maintain these boundaries.  I did this 
through an in-depth analysis of five different SNS interfaces as well as through semi-
structured interviews of 21 SNS users. Key findings from Chapter 3 include: 
 SNS privacy encompasses multiple boundary types – not just the boundary 
between public and private disclosures. 
 SNS privacy boundaries include relationship connection, relationship context, 
network discovery, network intersection, inward-facing territorial, outward-facing 
territorial, self disclosure, confidant disclosure, interactional disabling, and 
interactional blocking. 
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 SNS interface controls (both settings and features) act as technology-supported 
boundary mechanisms to manage each of these boundary types.  However, there 
are gaps where various boundary types are poorly supported. 
 SNS users have different strategies for using SNS interface controls for boundary 
regulation. However, issues such as ease of use and lack of feature awareness of 
interface controls reduced the effectiveness of overall boundary regulation. 
 As a result, SNS users continued to experience privacy violations and 
interpersonal boundary conflicts within SNSs, motivating the need for improved 
interface design. 
A major implication of this study is the broadened scope of SNS privacy by 
framing it as a boundary regulation process. My boundary taxonomy helps define 
multiple types of privacy boundaries that have not characteristically been viewed as SNS 
―privacy settings.‖ However, these technology-supported mechanisms, such as friending 
and unfriending, clearly help SNS users manage their social interactions with others. This 
new perspective can aid both designers and SNS users.  Designers can leverage similar 
feature-oriented domain analyses as a way to benchmark how responsive their SNS 
interfaces are to privacy needs compared to other SNSs. By doing this, they can fill in 
gaps and possibly gain a competitive advantage. For instance, Google+ gained popularity 
because of its improved implementation of social circles to manage relationship context 
and network intersection boundaries (Kairam, Brzozowski et al. 2012). SNS users, once 
made aware of different privacy boundaries they have to manage, can improve their 
strategies for boundary management in ways that are more effective in meeting their 
needs. As it is, SNS users are frustrated by SNS privacy settings and struggling to 
maintain their interpersonal boundaries. Improved technology-supported mechanisms for 
boundary regulation can help reduce the need for maladaptive coping strategies. 
Chapter 4 focused on coping strategies used outside of the SNS interface controls 
that SNS users also employed. Key findings from Chapter 4 include: 
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 SNS users employ coping mechanisms, behaviors developed outside of the SNS 
interface or through the unintended use of interface features, in an attempt to 
effectively maintain or regain their interpersonal boundaries.  
 Existing social psychology theories can be leveraged to frame the specific SNS 
coping behaviors I observed. The framework of coping strategies include filtering, 
ignoring, blocking, withdrawal, aggression, compliance, and compromise. 
 Although coping strategies for interpersonal boundary regulation were consistent 
with social theory, the actual behaviors exhibited within SNSs were drastically 
different than what one would expect in the physical world. 
 Most coping strategies are maladaptive, reducing short term stress at the expense 
of increasing long term stress. Compromise, identified as a healthy coping 
strategy, had to be done outside of the SNS interface as few interface controls are 
designed explicitly for boundary negotiation with others. 
 From a design perspective, analysis of coping behaviors can help pinpoint areas 
for improved interface design for interactional privacy. 
In this chapter, we begin to see just how relevant social theory is to SNS interface 
design.  SNSs are not just websites, they are social environments that induce social 
behaviors. Applying this coping framework to specific SNS user behaviors can aid HCI 
researchers and interface designers to better understand unintended usage of interface 
controls as well as behaviors taken outside of SNS interfaces. Designers can use coping 
behaviors as a way to identify poorly designed or non-existent interface features that, 
when implemented, could enhance end user experience. For example, designers could 
attempt to capture withdrawal coping behaviors such as deactivating one‘s account 
through the use of simple exit surveys. If a privacy breach led to withdrawal, the SNS 
could present technology-supported solutions for preventing a similar breach in the 
future. For instance, when Dollie deactivated her Facebook account due to a breach in 
confident-disclosure boundaries, the exit survey may persuade her to instead moderate 
Facebook Wall posts (though currently not an option in Facebook). From a wider 
perspective, the manifestation of these SNS coping strategies shows how SNS social 
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interactions can permeate from the virtual to the real world. For instance, Allen changed 
his social behaviors with his friends at social gatherings because of the potential negative 
consequences on Facebook. Therefore, SNSs are not just changing how we interact 
online, they are changing our entire social fabric. In this way, improved SNS design has 
the potential to improve not only online interactions, but also interactions we have 
offline. 
Chapter 5 presented a theoretical model of interpersonal boundary regulation 
based on relevant literature and qualitative, empirical analysis. Key findings from 
Chapter 5 include: 
 SNS privacy can be framed as a boundary regulation process, one where 
individuals attempt to achieve their desired level of privacy – not merely 
withdrawal from social interactions. 
 Individual differences, awareness, desired privacy level, boundary negotiation, 
and privacy outcome are salient components of the process of interpersonal 
boundary process within SNSs. 
o Individual differences include personality, emotional state, culture, 
gender, and age. 
o Awareness includes self-awareness, risk awareness, and feature 
awareness. 
o Desired privacy level is unique across the ten boundary types identified in 
Chapter 3. 
o Boundary negotiation is done through the use of technology-supported and 
coping mechanisms. 
o Privacy outcomes include achieving one‘s desired privacy level (optimal), 
social crowding (more social interaction than desired), and social isolation 
(less social interaction than desired). 
 Privacy outcomes can be related to social networking outcomes such as social 
capital and self-esteem. (However, in Chapter 7, I found no support for self-
esteem.) 
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 Overall, this entire process is iterative in nature, where privacy outcomes can 
affect other aspects of the boundary regulation process. 
Chapters 6 and 7 examined some of the key relationships hypothesized in this 
theoretical model, but there are many more empirical studies that can be explored in the 
future. For instance, what is the relationship between privacy behaviors and privacy 
outcomes? How does gender affect one‘s desired privacy level? What is the relationship 
between the use of technology-supported and coping mechanism for interpersonal 
boundary regulation? This theoretical model serves as a foundation for understanding and 
designing for interactional privacy needs within SNSs. Future studies should amend and 
improve this model as we develop a better understanding of the underlying social 
processes and actual behaviors that are unique to SNS environments. This model is also 
the first model to suggest a positive relationship between optimal privacy outcomes and 
social networking benefits. 
In Chapter 6, I performed a quantitative analysis using SEM on web-based survey 
data from 308 SNS users to better understand what factors helped explain SNS users‘ 
privacy behaviors, addressing the third research question. Key findings from Chapter 6 
include: 
 Feature awareness is the most salient factor that impacts technology-supported 
SNS privacy behaviors across all ten boundary types. Therefore, feature 
awareness needs to be emphasized when discussing design implications. 
 Risk awareness contributes to one‘s desired privacy level. 
 The relationship between desired privacy level and SNS privacy behaviors varies 
across each of the ten boundary types. In some cases, there is a positive and 
significant relationship.  In others, the relationship is dependent on varying levels 
of self-awareness, risk awareness, feature awareness, and burden. Yet, in others, 
there is no clear relationship at all.  In these cases, it is important to assess 
whether or not SNS interface design is meeting SNS user privacy needs. 
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 Privacy settings are not the optimal strategy to model SNS privacy behaviors in a 
way that meets SNS users‘ privacy needs. More attention should be paid to 
privacy features that allow SNS users to make privacy decisions within the 
context of an interaction. 
This study validated that feature awareness and risk awareness play an important 
role in the interpersonal boundary regulation process. Surprisingly, self-esteem had very 
little impact. By testing separate models for each of the ten boundary types, I was able to 
tease out, at a more micro-level, the relationship between desired privacy levels and 
privacy behaviors. Overall, I found strong support for a direct or moderated relationship 
between end user stated privacy desires and privacy behaviors, which adds skepticism to 
the ―Privacy Paradox.‖ For the most part, SNS users do behave consistently with their 
desires, but this can be impeded by other factors, such as a lack of feature awareness or 
ease of use. By understanding the factors that are most salient in facilitating the ability for 
SNS users to successfully negotiate their privacy needs, educators can focus on specific 
areas. For instance, feature awareness and risk awareness can be enhanced through end 
user training.  I recently taught a Facebook class, for example, to a group of individuals 
65 years and older. This particular age group is very concerned with protecting 
themselves from identity theft and other privacy breaches. One of the key points I 
emphasized was the use of relationship connection boundaries on Facebook in order to 
protect one‘s privacy.  I told them to make sure to only friend people that they knew and 
trusted. Many of the class participants told me that they had often accepted friend 
requests from people because they felt that they had to. After taking the class, many of 
the participants said that their perspective had changed about friending and unfriending. 
Some even said they were going to go home and unfriend a few people.  
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If burden is the problem, designers may find ways to create simpler, context 
appropriate privacy features for specific types of boundary regulation. For example, 
Facebook currently has built in functionality to give feedback on the relevance and 
usefulness of particular advertisements.  A similar approach could be leveraged to ask 
users whether or not they feel privacy features, such as friend lists, meet their overall 
needs.  Google did well in implementing this feedback mechanism when they first 
launched Google+. Beta users were able to provide feedback on various parts of the 
interface. When privacy desires and behaviors are negatively or not correlated, this may 
suggest that existing interface controls simply do not accomplish the privacy goal SNS 
users are trying to achieve.  I observed this most readily in the case of relationship 
context and network intersection boundaries, which are only supported through the 
creation and use of friend lists or circles. Practically, this feature falls short of the goal of 
individualizing social interactions interpersonally or managing social interactions 
between one‘s friends or groups of friends. Therefore, this represents an opportunity for a 
more congruent goal-mechanism SNS design.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, I performed a correlation analysis between privacy 
outcomes and social networking outcomes from a web-based survey of 315 SNS users to 
address the fourth research question. Key findings from Chapter 7 include: 
 There is a strong relationship between desired and achieved privacy level across 
all ten boundary types. SNS users most often report that they have achieved their 
desired privacy level. In cases where optimal privacy was not reported, SNS users 
heavily reported a privacy outcome of social crowding more frequently than 
social isolation. 
 Higher levels of desired privacy were often significantly associated with lower 
levels of social capital while high levels of achieved privacy were positively 
associated with social capital. 
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 High levels of social crowding were often significantly associated with lower 
levels of social capital while higher levels of social isolation were positively 
associated with social capital. 
 Overall, these findings suggest that privacy does not reduce the benefits SNS 
users can reap from social networking.  In fact, in some cases, more optimal 
privacy outcomes can actually enhance social networking outcomes. 
Through this study, we can see that Zuckerberg‘s design ideology of sharing and 
openness has successfully been reflected in the design of Facebook.  SNS users tend to 
report privacy outcomes of social crowding more frequently than they do social isolation. 
However, our social norms have not changed.  SNS users tend to report high levels of 
desired privacy, suggesting that unbounded sharing is not their goal. Most research 
suggests that there has to be a tradeoff between privacy and connecting with others. In 
one sense, this is true.  Higher levels of inherent desired privacy tend to be negatively 
related to social networking benefits. Yet, I found a positive association between meeting 
one‘s desired privacy level and social capital. So, while privacy outcomes do little to 
predict one‘s overall social capital from social networking, they definitely are not 
impeding it. The biggest implication of this is for SNS researchers. We no longer have to 
rally in two camps – one touting the importance of privacy, and the other extolling the 
benefits derived through social networking.  By reconciling this rift, we can now work 
together to design responsive SNS environments that meet one‘s privacy needs and 
enhance social interactions. 
8.2 Design Guidelines 
Before concluding, I would like to provide one more significant contribution to 
the field of SNS privacy – a set of design guidelines for SNS interactional privacy based 
on the findings of this research. First, SNS design should reflect real world social 
processes that have been grounded in social psychology, such as the process of 
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interpersonal boundary regulation. Even though SNSs are virtual spaces that create new 
opportunities and challenges, they are still social environments in which basic human 
interactions occur. Imposing new social norms, such as ―frictionless sharing‖ (Eler 2011),  
deforms natural social interactions, causing boundary conflict and necessitating 
maladaptive coping behaviors. ―The goal of environmental design is to create reinforcing 
environments that are linked to the behavior of their users‖ (Altman 1975). Building SNS 
environments that intuitively support human behavior will allow SNS users to leverage 
their existing interpersonal communication skills when managing their online social 
interactions, reducing a sense of duplicity between offline and online interactions. For 
example, environments that encourage negotiation can help reinforce boundary 
development and communication skills. It may also help younger generations develop 
these vital interpersonal skills, which some suggest have been degraded due to overuse of 
social media.  
Second, SNS privacy needs to be reconceptualized as a boundary regulation 
process for optimizing social interactions, not solely as limiting private information 
disclosures. Simplifying SNS interactions to information disclosure reduces the 
complexity and richness of  human social interactions. Sharing and protecting self with 
others is so much more than the exchange of information.  It includes emotions, opinions, 
preferences, vulnerabilities, conflict, and change. SNS users have multiple types of 
interpersonal boundaries that need to be managed when they engage socially with others. 
Therefore, the entire spectrum of social interactions needs to be reflected in how 
designers conceptualize and how SNS users implement privacy. Altman provided a list of 
questions relevant to environmental designers for enhancing social interactions through 
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boundary regulation within physical spaces (1975). Surprisingly, even though his work 
was done 37 years ago, these same questions can still be applied to interactional design 
for SNSs. Therefore, I will include them verbatim here:  
 ―To what extent are designed environments responsive to different users?‖ 
 ―To what extent do environments permit changes in personal spacing?‖ 
 ―What are the psychological needs of the user that should be satisfied by the 
environment?‖  
 ―How are territories used?‖ 
 ―What mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms are employed to regulate 
social interaction?‖ 
 ―What is the combination of mechanisms used by the consumer to regulate social 
interaction?‖ 
 ―Which behaviors are predominant? Which are unimportant?‖ 
 ―What seems to be the most appropriate combination most often used?‖ 
 ―How stable or changeable does the environment need to be in regard to use of 
these mechanisms?‖ 
 ―Does the environment need to be continually fluid or can it be relatively fixed 
given the group‘s response profile?‖ 
 ―Does the proposed design look as if it will fit the projected social-regulation 
style of the users?‖ 
Third, ―attempt to design responsive environments, which permit easy alternation 
between a state of separateness and a state of togetherness‖ (Altman 1975). SNS interface 
design is biased toward sharing and connecting and provides very few mechanisms that 
support flexible alteration of one‘s changing privacy needs. Currently, when SNS privacy 
controls are provided, they are not designed to be flexible. For example, Facebook allows 
users to hide and unhide friends from their News Feed. However, once this boundary is 
created, it tends to be permanent, where a hidden friend is rarely unhidden.  This is 
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because the privacy state is not clearly visible to the user, therefore, they forget that this 
boundary was created.  The same is true for most privacy settings because they are prone 
to ―set it and forget it‖ behavior. Any privacy decisions that are enduring should be 
visually cued to the user so that they can be adjusted once they no longer meet SNS 
users‘ needs. Privacy features need to be designed so that SNS users can make 
meaningful privacy decisions in the context of interaction.  
Fourth, use maladaptive coping behaviors to pinpoint areas where SNS interface 
design is not meeting end user privacy needs. ―If privacy and its associated mechanisms 
are ignored or rigidly incorporated into designs . . . then people will have to struggle 
against the environment to achieve what they consider to be appropriate degrees of 
interaction‖ (1975). This design guideline was already presented in Chapter 4; however, 
it is worth reiterating here. By using coping theory as a framework to identify SNS 
coping behaviors, designers can improve SNS interface features to better support the 
boundary negotiation process. For instance, I observed that compromise, characterized as 
a ―healthy‖ coping mechanism, was often excluded from SNS interface design, forcing 
SNS users to negotiate their boundaries with others outside of the intended SNS interface 
controls.  Therefore, SNS interfaces may improve SNS user experience by incorporating 
more boundary signaling and negotiation features. For instance, Facebook‘s most recent 
update included an option to ask someone to take down a picture, rather than just giving 
SNS users the ability to untag themselves. A more proactive approach to pictures and 
tagging for confidant-disclosure management may be to allow SNS users to signal 
whether or not they prefer others to tag them in photos. Options could include, ―Go ahead 
and tag me,‖ ―Only if I look great,‖ and ―Please ask me first.‖ Then, when a friend 
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attempts to tag this individual in a photo, the boundary preference is communicated 
before the interaction occurs. For the most part, social psychology literature suggests that 
others are willing to comply with an individual‘s stated boundary preferences (Altman 
1975; Katherine 1991). However, this is impossible when boundaries are not 
communicated clearly. Based on the interviews in Chapters 3 and 4, many boundary 
conflicts occurred due to miscommunication, as opposed to malicious intent. 
Fifth, SNS designers should embed multiple boundary negotiation capabilities 
within SNS interfaces to support different types of users and their different approaches to 
boundary management. ―Although people may not employ all mechanisms to the same 
degree, it may be wise to allow for the possibility that more than the current repertoire 
can be used‖ (Altman 1975). Different SNS users have different privacy needs and 
different strategies for meeting these needs. It is even possible that SNS interfaces could 
adapt with the user as they go from being a novice to an expert SNS user or provide the 
capability of personalization to maximize the use of mechanisms that work best for 
different users. 
Sixth, train SNS users to properly leverage environmental capabilities. Altman 
suggests that ―environmental awareness and environmental-usage training might help 
people better use, shape, and reshape their environments‖ (Altman 1975). In Chapter 6, 
feature awareness was the most important factor contributing to technology-supported 
privacy behaviors. Given that SNSs are technological environments, they often change 
quickly and without warning. However, building new or different capabilities into SNS 
interfaces without giving users the knowledge to properly use the capabilities, is 
potentially wasted. Therefore, new interface features should be introduced to SNS users 
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each time SNS interfaces change. Quick tutorials can be added unobtrusively to SNS 
interfaces with occasional reminders, instead of requiring SNS users to explore on their 
own or search through hundreds of pages of help documentation. 
Seventh, ―ensure that primary, secondary, and public territories are recognized as 
such and that users have appropriate degrees of control over spaces‖ (Altman 1975). To 
illustrate using Facebook, users often have boundary confusion between distinct spaces 
such as one‘s Wall/Timeline, profile, and News Feed. This boundary confusion leads to 
conflict. For example, Jane posts a status update on her Wall, reflecting a strong political 
belief. She views her Wall as a primary territory where she can uniquely express herself. 
However, status updates posted on one‘s Wall filter into friends‘ News Feeds. Dick 
becomes the recipient of Jane‘s Wall post and is infuriated. He posts a comment on 
Jane‘s post saying, ―don‘t push your political beliefs on me!‖ Dick views his News Feed 
as a secondary or ―interactional‖ territory where friends post when they want to interact 
with him. In turn, Jane is upset because Dick just embarrassed her to all of her friends via 
her Wall. Therefore, both Jane and Dick feel like their boundaries have been violated. I 
also see this type of boundary confusion when friends tag one another in pictures or posts 
that subsequently get posted to one‘s Wall then filtered into one‘s friends‘ News Feeds. 
Another problem is the rights of ownership assigned to these spaces.  For instance, 
Facebook allows users to turn off their Wall, but they currently do not allow them to 
moderate Wall posts from friends before they are viewable by others. Also, Facebook 
users feel like they lack control over what content and from whom is added to their News 
Feed. If SNS designers can find ways to clarify the use and ownership of each of these 
spaces, they can clear up potential opportunities for interpersonal boundary conflict. 
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Eighth, designers should embrace the idea that meeting SNS user privacy needs 
can enhance SNS user experience and possibly even the benefits of online social 
networking. However, the current mindset is that SNSs profit from their users being more 
open and sharing more. Jeff Hammerbacher, an early Facebook prodigy, commented that 
―the best minds of my generation are thinking about how to make people click ads‖ 
(Madrigal 2012).  Thus, there is an assumed conflict of interest between designing to 
meet SNS users‘ privacy needs and profiting from their lack of privacy. Yet, such a belief 
may be a logical fallacy.  Shamelessly facilitating openness and sharing can actually have 
the opposite effect. Many SNS users cope with this by exhibiting a high level of self-
censorship within their social networks.  Thus, sharing may be widespread, but it also 
becomes shallow. Increasing SNS users‘ control over meeting their own privacy needs 
could lead to deeper, more meaningful sharing. For example, many SNS users currently 
self-censor to cater to a wide variety of audiences. They tend to emphasize the positive 
over the negative, but some still crave the ability to be more authentic within their SNS 
environments.  Friend lists seem to be an overly complex means for regulating what is 
shared and with whom.  SNS users have a hard time remembering unions and 
intersections between their friend groups.  This conundrum has created a design problem 
that the HCI research community is actively trying to tackle.  A design solution for this 
outstanding problem may be able to encourage deeper, more authentic post content from 
SNS users because it reduces the need to self-censor due to vague audiences.  From a 
business perspective, being privy to such personal communications would allow SNSs to 
refine their target marketing to more effectively appeal to my needs.  In such cases, I 
could be presented with ads for Zoloft, a drug for depression, or deals for four star hotels 
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in Juno.  Finally, boundary violations and privacy concerns prevent many individuals 
from participating on SNSs and are often the reason users abandon SNSs. SNS users are 
customers, not products. Therefore, not designing to meet their interactional privacy 
needs can decrease engagement and increase churn on these sites, which is not in the best 
interest of SNS end users or agents of SNS companies.  
8.3 Future Research 
While each chapter summarized above provides unique insight, the bigger picture 
they present is that SNSs are social environments governed by social norms and 
processes, and the technology should support these processes. By re-characterizing SNS 
privacy as an interpersonal boundary regulation process, supporting multiple types of 
interpersonal boundaries, this research examines how well SNS environments support the 
interpersonal boundary regulation process as a whole. SNS privacy research and design 
both currently center around disclosure boundaries. SNS privacy research focuses on the 
ability to restrict disclosures while SNS design goals have been to propagate disclosure.  
As such, there has been an inherent conflict between SNS privacy and design but also a 
lack of support for other types of interpersonal boundary regulation. This creates an 
opportunity for improved technology-supported privacy mechanisms for managing 
relational, network, territorial, and interactional boundaries, which both researchers and 
designers have historically de-emphasized. For example, both relationship context and 
network intersection boundaries are currently only supported through friend lists or 
groups.  My research showed that while SNS users create friend lists, they are rarely 
leveraged to manage these interpersonal boundaries. I found that a lack of feature 
awareness was partially to blame for this lack of use.  However, even at high levels of 
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feature awareness, privacy behaviors did not align with privacy desires. This suggests 
that friend lists or groups may not be a sufficient mechanism for effectively maintaining 
relationship context or network intersection boundaries.  In these types of cases, future 
research can explore new design solutions to manage gaps in boundary regulation 
support.  
Additional opportunities for future research include studies that examine 
relationships from the theoretical model that were not presented as part of this research. 
For example, it would be interesting to explore the relationship between privacy behavior 
and privacy outcomes. If SNS users exhibit more privacy behaviors, does that equate to 
more optimal privacy outcomes? In the context of information disclosure, researchers 
have already found a positive relationship between privacy behaviors and social capital 
(Stutzman, Vitak et al. 2012). Is this also the case for other types of interpersonal 
boundaries? Numerous studies can also be done to examine contextual factors from this 
research as moderating variables to see if they have a significant impact on the results 
presented in this research. For example, what is the impact of age on the relationship 
between privacy desires and privacy behavior?  Are there any between-group 
differences? Is there a gender difference when determining one‘s desired privacy level? 
Does personality impact one‘s desired privacy level, actual privacy level, privacy 
outcomes, or perceived benefits from social networking.  In addition, other dependent 
variables can be included in this model.  Although current SNS research has focused on 
self-esteem and social capital as derived benefits of social networking, studies could also 
explore the impact privacy outcomes has on SNS engagement, user satisfaction, and other 
key variables. Finally, SNS privacy does not have to be confined to social theories 
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specifically relating to interpersonal boundary regulation. I have already examined other 
social processes such as coping theory as it relates to boundary regulation.  Other social 
theories, such as conflict management, negotiation, social contract theory, social 
constructionism, contextual integrity, and more that can potentially be applied in novel 
ways to better understand and design for how SNS users engage with one another through 
online social networks. 
8.4 Conclusion 
Online social networking will continue to impact social interactions world-wide 
for decades, maybe even centuries to come.  However, the direction of this change, good 
or bad, depends on whether or not SNSs can work to improve social interactions while 
simultaneously providing users with the tools to protect themselves from the negative 
personal and relational consequences that come with an overabundance of sharing and 
connecting.  New generations are joining Facebook and other SNSs, even before they 
have fully developed their boundaries or the skills to communicate them effectively in the 
real world, and this impacts both their personal and relational development outside of the 
SNS. ―Environment and behavior are closely intertwined, almost to the point of being 
inseparable‖ (Altman 1975). Therefore, SNS environments designed to reflect real world 
social interactions can help facilitate consistent and enhanced social engagement both 
online and in the real world. For instance, the world could truly be a more connected 
place if the conventional definition of friend could somehow be modeled within SNS 
environments, instead of the real world modeling friendship after the SNS 
conceptualization of a ―friend.‖ Yes, friendship is characterized by sharing, but it is also 
characterized by respecting one another‘s boundaries and compromise.  
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Through this dissertation, I provided an in-depth analysis on interpersonal 
boundary regulation within SNSs by examining unique behaviors exhibited within these 
new social environments and applying well-established social theory to help better 
understand these behaviors. I addressed the questions of what types of interpersonal 
boundaries one must manage, how they do so, and with what means. I also provided a 
foundation of understanding about the interpersonal boundary regulation process, end 
user privacy behaviors, and the complex relationship between privacy and social 
networking goals. With this understanding, I presented design guidelines for improving 
SNS interaction design, meeting users‘ privacy needs, and enhancing their overall social 
experience. While Zuckerberg and other SNS visionaries evangelize that sharing is the 
new social norm, my research has shown that it does not have to be.  Through effective 
boundary regulation, SNS users can reap the benefits of social networking without having 
to sacrifice their privacy to do so. 
  
 
232 
9REFERENCES 
Acquisti, A. and R. Gross (2006). Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information 
Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. 
Adamic, L. A., O. Buyukkokten, et al. (2003). "A social network caught in the Web." 
First Monday 8(6): 29-29. 
Agosto, D. E. (2002). "Bounded Rationality and Satisficing in Young People's Web-
Based Decision Making." Journal of American Society for Information Science and 
Technology 53(1): 16-27. 
Altman, I. (1975). The environment and social behavior, Brooks/Cole Monterey, CA. 
Babbie, E. (2004). The Practice of Social Research. Belmont, CA, Wadsworth Publishing 
Company. 
Barkhuus, L. and J. Tashiro (2010). "Student Socialization in the Age of Facebook." 
Barnes, S. B. (2006). A privacy paradox: Social networking in the United States. 
Bellman, S., E. Johnson, et al. (2004). "International Differences in Information Privacy 
Concerns: A Global Survey of Consumers." Information Society 20(5): 313-324. 
Bernstein, I. H., G. Teng, et al. (1986). "A Confirmatory Factoring of the Self-
Consciousness Scale." Multivariate Behavioral Research 21(4): 459-475. 
Besmer, A. and H. R. Lipford (2010). Moving beyond untagging: photo privacy in a 
tagged world. Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Human factors in 
computing systems, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, ACM. 
boyd, D. (2006). "Friends, friendsters, and myspace top 8: Writing community into being 
on social network sites." First Monday 11(2). 
boyd, D. M. (2004). Friendster and publicly articulated social networking. 
boyd, D. M. and N. B. Ellison (2007). "Social network sites: Definition, history, and 
scholarship." JOURNAL OF COMPUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATION-
ELECTRONIC EDITION- 13(1): 210-210. 
Brzozowski, M. J., T. Hogg, et al. (2008). Friends and foes: Ideological social 
networking. CHI 2008, Florence, Italy. 
Burke, M., R. Kraut, et al. (2011). Social capital on facebook: differentiating uses and 
users. Proceedings of the 2011 annual conference on Human factors in computing 
systems. Vancouver, BC, Canada, ACM: 571-580. 
 
233 
Burke, M., C. Marlow, et al. (2010). Social network activity and social well-being. 
Proceedings of the 28th international conference on Human factors in computing 
systems. Atlanta, Georgia, USA, ACM: 1909-1912. 
Byrne, B. M. (2012). Structural Equation Modeling with Mplus. New York, London, 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 
Caine, K. E., L. G. Kisselburgh, et al. (2011). Audience Visualization Influences 
Disclosures in Online Social Networks. Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on 
Human factors in computing systems. 
Campbell, J. D., P. D. Trapnell, et al. (1996). "Self-concept clarity: Measurement, 
personality correlates, and cultural boundaries." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 70(1): 141-156. 
Cheung, C. M. K. and M. K. O. Lee (2010). "A theoretical model of intentional social 
action in online social networks." Decision Support Systems. 
Child, J. T. and E. A. Agyeman-Budu (2010). "Blogging privacy management rule 
development: The impact of self-monitoring skills, concern for appropriateness, and 
blogging frequency." Computers in Human Behavior 26(5): 957-963. 
Child, J. T. and S. Petronio, Eds. (2010). Unpacking the paradoxes of privacy in CMC 
relationships: the challenges of blogging and relational communication on the internet. 
Computer Mediated Communication in Personal Relationships, Cresskill, N. Hampton 
Press. 
Chin, W. (1998). "Issues and Opinion on Structural Equation Modeling." MIS Quarterly: 
vii-xvi. 
Christofides, E., A. Muise, et al. (2009). "Information Disclosure and Control on 
Facebook: Are They Two Sides of the Same Coin or Two Different Processes?" 
CyberPsychology & Behavior 12(3): 341-345. 
Crandall, D., D. Cosley, et al. (2008). Feedback effects between similarity and social 
influence in online communities. 
Debatin, B., J. P. Lovejoy, et al. (2009). "Facebook and Online Privacy: Attitudes, 
Behaviors, and Unintended Consequences." Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 15(1): 83-108. 
Eler, A. (2011). "Top Trends of 2011: Frictionless Sharing."   Retrieved July, 2012, from 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/top_trends_of_2011_frictionless_sharing.php. 
Ellison, N. B., C. Steinfield, et al. (2007). "The Benefits of Facebook ―Friends:‖ Social 
Capital and College Students‘ Use of Online Social Network Sites." Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication 12(4): 1143-1168. 
 
234 
Ellison, N. B., C. Steinfield, et al. (2010). "Connection strategies: social capital 
implications of Facebook-enabled communication practices." New Media & Society On-
Line. 
Ellison, N. B., J. Vitak, et al. (2011). Negotiating Privacy Concerns and Social Capital 
Needs in a Social Media Environments. Privacy Online: Perspectives on Privacy and 
Self-Disclosure in the Social Web. Heidelberg and New York, Springer. 
Facebook. (2011). "Statistics." from http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics. 
Faceboook. (2011, February 25, 2011). "A Privacy Policy Re-imagined For Users Like 
You."   Retrieved March, 2011, from 
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150434660350301&id=69178204322. 
Fenigstein, A., M. F. Scheier, et al. (1975). "Public and private self-consciousness: 
Assessment and theory." Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43(4): 522-527. 
Findlater, L. and J. McGrenere (2010). "Beyond performance: Feature awareness in 
personalized interfaces." International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 68(3): 121-
137. 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An 
Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley. 
Fono, D. and K. Raynes-Goldie (2006). "Hyperfriendship and Beyond: Friends and 
Social Norms on LiveJournal." Internet Research Annual 4. 
Frampton, B. R. D. (2010). "Managing Facebook Friend Requests in Workplace 
Relationships: An Application of Communication Privacy Management Theory." 
Freeze, R. D. and R. L. Raschke (2007). An Assessment of Formative and Reflective 
Constructs in IS Research. ECIS. 
Gefen, D., E. Rigdon, et al. (2011). "An Update and Extension to SEM Guidelines for 
Administrative and Social Science Research." MIS Quarterly 35(2): iii-xiv. 
Gibbs, G. R. and C. Taylor. (2010). "How and what to code." 2011, from 
http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/Intro_QDA/how_what_to_code.php. 
Gosling, S. D., P. J. Rentfrow, et al. (2003). "A very brief measure of the Big-Five 
personality domains." Journal of Research in Personality 37: 504–528. 
Gross, R. and A. Acquisti (2005). Information revelation and privacy in online social 
networks. Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, 
Alexandria, VA, USA, ACM. 
 
235 
Grossman, T., G. Fitzmaurice, et al. (2009). A survey of software learnability: metrics, 
methodologies and guidelines. Proceedings of the 27th international conference on 
Human factors in computing systems. Boston, MA, USA, ACM: 649-658. 
Grudin, J. (2001). "Desituating action: Digital representation of context." Human 
Computer Interaction 16(2,3,4): 269-286. 
Harris, P. B., B. B. Brown, et al. (1996). "PRIVACY REGULATION AND PLACE 
ATTACHMENT: PREDICTING ATTACHMENTS TO A STUDENT FAMILY 
HOUSING FACILITY." Journal of Environmental Psychology 16(4): 287-301. 
Harrison, C. L. (1993). "The Development of a Desire for Privacy Scale." 
Hesse, M. (2010). "Status symbol: Facebook is ubiquitous, but is it really an antisocial 
network?", 2011, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/22/AR2010072206154.html. 
Hogg, T., D. Wilkinson, et al. (2008). Multiple relationship types in online communities 
and social networks. 
Horney, K. (1945). Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis. New York, 
W W Norton & Company Inc. 
Huck, S. W. (2004). Reading Statistics and Research. Boston, Pearson. 
Iachello, G., and J.I. Hong (2007). "End-User Privacy in Human-Computer Interaction." 
Foundations and Trends in HCI 1(1): 1-137. 
Jiang, H. and J. M. Carroll (2009). Social capital, social network and identity bonds: a 
reconceptualization. 
John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., & Soto, C. J. (2008). Paradigm Shift to the Integrative Big-
Five Trait Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Conceptual Issues. Handbook of 
personality: Theory and research. R. W. R. O. P. John, & L. A. Pervin. New York, NY, 
Guilford Press: 114-158. 
Joinson, A. N. (2001). "Self-disclosure in computer-mediated communication: The role 
of self-awareness and visual anonymity." European Journal of Social Psychology 31(2): 
177-192. 
Kairam, S., M. J. Brzozowski, et al. (2012). Talking in Circles: Selective Sharing in 
Google+. CHI 2012, Austin, TX. 
Kang, K. C., S. G. Cohen, et al. (1990) "Feature-Oriented Domain Analysis (FODA) 
Feasibility Study." Software Engineering Institute DOI: Technical Report CMU/SEI-90-
TR-021. 
 
236 
Karr-Wisniewski, P., H. Lipford, et al. (2011). A New Social Order: Mechanisms for 
Social Network Site Boundary Regulation. Americas Conference on Information 
Systems. Detroit, MI. 
Kashima, Y., S. Yamaguchi, et al. (1995). "Culture, gender, and self: A perspective from 
individualism-collectivism research." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
69(5): 925-937. 
Katherine, A. (1991). Boundaries: Where You End and I Begin, MJF Books Hazelden 
Foundation. 
Kaya, N., J. D. Webb, et al. (2005). "Adjustment to Congregate Living Environments: 
Older Adults and Privacy Regulation." Journal of Interior Design 31(1): 14-24. 
Kaya, N. and M. J. Weber (2003). "Cross-cultural differences in the perception of 
crowding and privacy regulation: American and Turkish students." Journal of 
Environmental Psychology 23(3): 301-309. 
King, J., A. Lampinen, et al. (2011). Privacy: Is There an App for That? Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security. Pittsburgh, PA. 
Kitchen, J. (2010). "Jimmy Kimmel's "National Unfriend Day"... Imagine the 
Possibilities." 2011, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-kitchen/jimmy-kimmels-
national-un_b_785515.html. 
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New York, 
The Guilford Press. 
Koroleva, K., H. Krasnova, et al. (2011). It‘s All About Networking! Empirical 
Investigation of Social Capital Formation on Social Network Sites. ICIS 2011 Shanghai, 
China. 
Krasnova, H., E. Kolesnikova, et al. (2009). "It Won't Happen To Me!": Self-Disclosure 
in Online Social Networks. Americas Conference on Information Systems, San 
Francisco, CA. 
Kunegis, J., A. Lommatzsch, et al. (2009). The slashdot zoo: mining a social network 
with negative edges, Madrid, Spain, ACM. 
Lampe, C., R. Wash, et al. (2010). "Motivations to Participate in Online Communities." 
Lampinen, A., V. Lehtinen, et al. (2011). We're in It Together: Interpersonal 
Management of Disclosure in Social Network Services. CHI'11 Proceedings of the 
annual conference on Human factors in computing systems, Vancouver, BC. 
Lampinen, A., S. Tamminen, et al. (2009). All My People Right Here, Right Now: 
management of group co-presence on a social networking site. Proceedings of the ACM 
 
237 
2009 international conference on Supporting group work. Sanibel Island, Florida, USA, 
ACM: 281-290. 
Ledbetter, A. M., J. P. Mazer, et al. (2011). "Attitudes Toward Online Social Connection 
and Self-Disclosure as Predictors of Facebook Communication and Relational 
Closeness." Communication Research 38(1): 27-53. 
Leskovec, J., D. Huttenlocher, et al. (2010). "Predicting Positive and Negative Links in 
Online Social Networks." Arxiv preprint arXiv:1003.2429. 
Lipford, H. R., A. Besmer, et al. (2008 ). Understanding Privacy Settings in Facebook 
with an Audience View. Usability, Psychology, and Security 2008 (UPSEC 2008), 
Berkeley, CA. 
Madrigal, A. (2012). "The Jig Is Up: Time to Get Past Facebook and Invent a New 
Future."   Retrieved July, 2012, from 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/04/the-jig-is-up-time-to-get-past-
facebook-and-invent-a-new-future/256046/. 
Maia, M., J. Almeida, et al. (2008). Identifying user behavior in online social networks. 
Markus, H. R. and S. Kitayama (1991). "Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, 
emotion, and motivation." Psychological Review 98(2): 224-253. 
Matheson, K. and M. P. Zanna (1988). "The impact of computer-mediated 
communication on self-awareness." Computers in Human Behavior 4(3): 221-233. 
Matyszczyk, C. (2010). "Zuckerberg: I know that people don't want privacy."   Retrieved 
February 21, 2011, from http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10431741-
71.html?tag=digg2. 
Mazer, J., R. Murphy, et al. (2007). "I'll See You On ―Facebook‖: The Effects of 
Computer-Mediated Teacher Self-Disclosure on Student Motivation, Affective Learning, 
and Classroom ClimateThis project was funded in part by a Teaching-Learning 
Development Grant from the Center for Teaching, Learning, and Technology at Illinois 
State University." Communication Education 56(1): 1-17. 
Media, N. (2010). "What Americans Do Online: Social Media And Games Dominate 
Activity."   Retrieved 2011, from http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile. 
Milgram, S. (1970). "The experience of living in cities." Science 167: 1461-1468. 
Moore, G. C. a. B., I. (1991). . , Vol. 2 Issue 3, p192-223. (1991). "Development of an 
Instrument to Measure the Perceptions of Adopting an Information Technology 
Innovation." Information Systems Research 2(3): 192-223. 
Muthen, L. K. and B. O. Muthen (2010). Mplus Statistical Analysis with Latent Variables 
User's Guide. 
 
238 
Norberg, P. A., D. R. Horne, et al. (2007). "The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information 
Disclosure Intentions versus Behaviors." Journal of Consumer Affairs 41(1): 100-126. 
Nosko, A., E. Wood, et al. (2010). "All about me: Disclosure in online social networking 
profiles: The case of FACEBOOK." Computers in Human Behavior 26(3): 406-418. 
Olivero, N. and P. Lunt (2004). "Privacy versus willingness to disclose in e-commerce 
exchanges: The effect of risk awareness on the relative role of trust and control." Journal 
of Economic Psychology 25(2): 243-262. 
OptimalWorkshop.com. "Optimal Workshop." from 
https://apps.optimalworkshop.com/suite/optimalsort/admin/dashboard.jsf. 
Oyserman, D., H. M. Coon, et al. (2002). "Rethinking individualism and collectivism: 
Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses." Psychological Bulletin 128(1): 
3-72. 
Paine-Gernee, K. and T. Hunt (1990). Emotional Healing: A program for emotional 
sovriety. Warner, NY. 
Palen, L. and P. Dourish (2003). Unpacking "privacy" for a networked world. 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems, Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida, USA, ACM. 
Park, N., B. Jin, et al. (2011). "Effects of self-disclosure on relational intimacy in 
Facebook." Computers in Human Behavior 27(5): 1974-1983. 
Patriquin, A. (2007). "Connecting the Social Graph: Member Overlap at OpenSocial and 
Facebook.", from http://blog.compete.com/2007/11/12/connecting-the-social-graph-
member-overlap-at-opensocial-and-facebook/. 
Petronio, S. (2002). Boundaries of privacy: dialectics of disclosure, SUNY Press. 
Petronio, S., J. Martin, et al. (1984). "PREREQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR SELF-
DISCLOSING: A GENDER ISSUE." Communication Monographs 51(3): 268. 
Prentice-Dunn, S. and R. W. Rogers (1982). "Effects of public and private self-awareness 
on deindividuation and aggression." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43(3): 
503-513. 
Rosenberg, M. (1989). Society and the Adolescent Self-image. Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press. 
Sassenberg, K., M. Boos, et al. (2005). "Attitude change in face-to-face and computer-
mediated communication: private self-awareness as mediator and moderator." European 
Journal of Social Psychology 35(3): 361-374. 
Scott, J. (2009). Social Network Analysis. Los Angeles, CA, Sage. 
 
239 
Simon, H. A. (1955). "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 69(1): 99-118. 
Steinfield, C., N. B. Ellison, et al. (2008). "Social capital, self-esteem, and use of online 
social network sites: A longitudinal analysis." Journal of Applied Developmental 
Psychology 29(6): 434-445. 
Strater, K. and H. R. Lipford (2008). Strategies and struggles with privacy in an online 
social networking community. Proceedings of the 22nd British HCI Group Annual 
Conference on People and Computers: Culture, Creativity, Interaction - Volume 1. 
Liverpool, United Kingdom, British Computer Society: 111-119. 
Straub, D., Boudreau, M. & Gefen, D. (2004). "Validation Guidelines for IS Positivist 
Research." Communications of AIS 2004(13): 380-427. 
Strauss, A. L. and J. M. Corbin (1998). Basics of qualitative research: techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory, Sage Publications. 
Stutzman, F. (2006). "An evaluation of identity-sharing behavior in social network 
communities." International Digital and Media Arts Journal 3(1): 10-18. 
Stutzman, F. (2006). "Student life on the Facebook." Retrieved May 14: 2006-2006. 
Stutzman, F., R. Capra, et al. (2011). "Factors mediating disclosure in social network 
sites." Computers in Human Behavior 27(1): 590-598. 
Stutzman, F. and W. Hartzog (2009). Boundary Regulation in Social Media. AOIR 2009, 
Milwaukee, WI. 
Stutzman, F. and J. Kramer-Duffield (2010). Friends Only: Examining a Privacy-
Enhancing Behavior in Facebook. CHI 2010, Atlanta, Georgia. 
Stutzman, F., J. Vitak, et al. (2012). Privacy in Interaction: Exploring Disclosure and 
Social Capital in Facebook. International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 
Dublin, IE. 
SuicideMachine.org. 2011, from http://suicidemachine.org/. 
Tabachnick, B. G. and L. S. Fidell (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics, Pearson. 
Thelwall, M., D. Wilkinson, et al. (2009). "Data mining emotion in social network 
communication: Gender differences in MySpace." Journal of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology: 1-10. 
Tufekci, Z. (2008). "Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in 
Online Social Network Sites." Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 28(1): 20-36. 
 
240 
Tyma, A. (2007). "Rules of Interchange: Privacy in Online Social Communities–A 
Rhetorical Critique of MySpace. Com." JCSTAND: 31-31. 
Utz, S. and N. Krämer (2009). "The privacy paradox on social network sites revisited: 
The role of individual characteristics and group norms." Cyberpsychology: Journal of 
Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace 3(2). 
Valenzuela, S., N. Park, et al. (2008). Lessons from Facebook: the effect of social 
network sites on college students‘ social capital. 
Valenzuela, S., N. Park, et al. (2009). "Is There Social Capital in a Social Network Site?: 
Facebook Use and College Students' Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation1." Journal 
of Computer-Mediated Communication 14(4): 875-901. 
Watson, D., L. A. Clark, et al. (1988). "Development and validation of brief measures of 
positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology & Marketing 54(6): 1063-1070. 
Whitfield, C. L., Ed. (1993). Knowing, Protecting, and Enjoying the Self. Deerfield 
Beach, FL. 
Wikipedia. (2011). "MySpace." 2011, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myspace. 
Williams, D. (2006). "On and Off the ‘Net: Scales for Social Capital in an Online Era." 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 11(2): 593-628. 
Xiang, R., J. Neville, et al. (2010). Modeling Relationship Strength in Online Social 
Networks. 
Xu, H., T. Dinev, et al. (2008). Examining the Formation of Individual's Privacy 
Concerns: Toward an Integrative View. Twenty Ninth International Conference on 
Information Systems, Paris, France. 
Yan, S. (2010). "How to Disappear from Facebook and Twitter." 2011, from 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1954631,00.html. 
Yao, M. Z. and A. J. Flanagin (2006). "A self-awareness approach to computer-mediated 
communication." Computers in Human Behavior 22(3): 518-544. 
Zinoviev, D. and V. Duong (2009). "Toward Understanding Friendship in Online Social 
Networks." Arxiv preprint arXiv:0902.4658. 
Zuckerberg, M. "Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook Profile." from 
http://www.facebook.com/zuck/info. 
 
  
 
241 
10APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 6 SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
To facilitate the ability to replicate this study, the survey details from Chapter 6 
are presented in this Appendix. Screen shots for the privacy behaviors specific to the 
Facebook interface have not been included due to frequency of changes within the 
interface. All items were optional except acceptance of informed consent. Please contact 
the author if you want access to the survey in its entirety. 
10.1 Statement of Informed Consent 
Project Title and Purpose - Relationship Management within Online Social 
Networks (Phase 2)   We are distributing a survey to better understand how people 
interact with others on Facebook, including individual characteristics and personality 
traits that make that interaction unique for different people. Part of this study will require 
you to log in to your Facebook account while completing the survey. By better 
understanding the personal experiences of Facebook users, we will be able to propose 
ways to improve the design of online social networking websites such as Facebook in the 
future.        
Investigator(s) -  Pamela Karr-Wisniewski, UNC Charlotte – pjkarr@uncc.edu 
(Primary)   Dr. Heather Lipford, UNC Charlotte - Heather.Lipford@uncc.edu   Dr. David 
Wilson, UNC Charlotte - davils@uncc.edu   Kim Rosser, UNC Charlotte - 
krosser@uncc.edu        
Eligibility -  You may participate in this study if you are over 18 years old and 
have an active Facebook account. You may not participate in this study if you are not 
over 18 years old or do not have an active Facebook account.        
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Overall Description of Participation -  You will be asked to answer questions 
through a web-based survey. You should answer the questions as honestly as 
possible.  For the last part of the survey, you will be asked to log into Facebook to report 
some of your current usage and settings.  For instance, we may ask how many Facebook 
friends you have or what specific permissions you allow via your privacy settings.  The 
survey should take less than an hour.        
Incentive to Participate  - There will be a random drawing of survey participants 
for two $200 gift cards to Amazon.com once the survey is closed. Entering the drawing is 
optional. Each participant who opts in to enter the drawing will receive one drawing 
entry.   As an extra incentive, if you share the survey with your friends (through 
Facebook, email, etc.), and they complete the survey and specify that you referred them 
(by supplying your email address), you will get an extra contest entry for each person you 
referred. Each survey participant, however, is limited to a maximum of 25 drawing 
entries and is eligible to receive at most one $200 gift card.     
Risks and Benefits of Participation - By participating in this study, you are 
helping researchers develop a better understanding of how individuals interact with 
others on Facebook. With a better understanding of this behavior, we will be able to help 
educate and design interfaces that can improve this form of communication. The project 
may involve risks that are not currently known.    
Length of Participation - Participation in this study will require no more than an 
hour of your time.  At the end of the survey, you will be given the opportunity to sign up 
for a drawing for various prizes to thank you for your participation.   Volunteer Statement   
You are a volunteer.  The decision to participate in this study is completely up to you.  If 
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you decide to be in the study, you may stop at any time.  You will not be treated any 
differently if you decide not to participate in the study or if you stop once you have 
started.    
Confidentiality Statement - Any information about your participation, including 
your identity, is completely confidential.  The following steps will be taken to ensure this 
confidentiality:  All digital and physical information retained from your participation will 
be stored in a secure location only accessible by the investigators listed on this study.  All 
data results will be anonymized or aggregated in the presentation to the academic 
community so that your identity will not be known.     
Statement of Fair Treatment and Respect - UNC Charlotte wants to make sure 
that you are treated in a fair and respectful manner.  Contact the university‘s Research 
Compliance Office (704-687-3309) if you have questions about how you are treated as a 
study participant.  If you have any questions about the actual project or study, please 
contact Pamela Karr-Wisniewski (704-293-8978, pjkarr@uncc.edu) or Dr. Heather 
Lipford (704-687-8376, Heather.Lipford@uncc.edu).    
Approval Date - This form was approved for use on February 8, 2012 for use for 
one year.        
Participant Consent* - I have read the information in this consent form.  I have 
had the chance to ask questions about this study, and those questions have been answered 
to my satisfaction.   I am at least 18 years of age, and I agree to participate in this 
research project.  
*Participants were required to agree before proceeding with the survey. 
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10.2 Survey Questions 
TABLE 64: Demographic Information 
QUESTION SCALE 
What is your age? 18 – 100, over 100 
What is the highest level of education you have 
completed? 
 Less than high school 
 High school diploma 
 Some college 
 2 year college degree (Associates) 
 4 year college degree (Bachelors) 
 Some graduate school 
 Master's degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 Professional degree (MD, JD) 
What is your ethnicity? (Pick one in which you 
most closely identify) 
 White/Caucasian 
 Black/African-American 
 Hispanic/Latino 
 Asian/Pacific Islander 
 American Indian/Alaska Native 
 Other 
What is your gender?  Male 
 Female 
What is your occupation? Open Response 
Are you a UNC Charlotte Student?  Yes 
 No 
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TABLE 65: Information for Optional Drawing 
ITEM TEXT 
ALTCON Alternate Contact Information (Optional). By default, drawing winners will be 
contacted via the email address they provided.  If this is not how you would 
like to be contacted in the event you win the drawing, please provide the best 
point of contact information for you below. 
DRAW Drawing for one of two $200 gift cards to Amazon.com     There will be a 
random drawing of survey participants for one of two $200 gift cards to 
Amazon.com once the survey is closed (approximately mid-May). Entering the 
drawing is optional. Each participant who opts in to enter the drawing will 
receive one drawing entry.    As an extra incentive, if you share the survey with 
your friends (through Facebook, email, etc.), and they complete the survey and 
specify that you referred them (by supplying your email address as their 
referrer), you will get an extra contest entry for each person you referred. Each 
survey participant, however, is limited to a maximum of 25 drawing entries 
and is eligible to receive at most one $200 gift card.     Contest entry 
information is not associated with any of the information you just provided 
through the survey (except we will verify that each contest entrant successfully 
completed the survey). As a reminder, here is our confidentiality policy:    
Confidentiality Statement: Any information about your participation, including 
your identity, is completely confidential.  The following steps will be taken to 
ensure this confidentiality:  All digital and physical information retained from 
your participation will be stored in a secure location only accessible by the 
investigators listed on this study.  All data results will be anonymized or 
aggregated in the presentation to the academic community so that your identity 
will not be known.    Would you like to enter this drawing? 
EMAIL What is your email address? (We need this in order for you to participate in the 
drawing.) 
REFER Did anyone refer you to take this survey?  If so, please provide their email 
address in the space provided. 
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TABLE 66: Self-Awareness (Fenigstein, Scheier et al. 1975)   
Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you. There are no ‗right‘ or ‗wrong‘ answers—just be honest. (1 
= Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
ITEM DIMENSION MEASURE 
ANX1 Anxiety I get embarrassed very easily. 
ANX2R Anxiety I don't find it hard to talk to strangers. 
ANX3 Anxiety I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. 
ANX4 Anxiety It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new 
situations. 
ANX5 Anxiety I have trouble working when someone is watching me. 
ANX6 Anxiety Large groups make me nervous. 
APRIV1 Private Self-
Awareness 
I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work 
through a problem. 
APRIV10 Private Self-
Awareness 
I'm always trying to figure myself out. 
APRIV2 Private Self-
Awareness 
I'm alert to changes in my mood. 
APRIV3 Private Self-
Awareness 
I'm often the subject of my own fantasies. 
APRIV4 Private Self-
Awareness 
I reflect about myself a lot. 
APRIV5R Private Self-
Awareness 
I never scrutinize myself. 
APRIV6R Private Self-
Awareness 
I'm constantly examining my motives. 
APRIV7R Private Self-
Awareness 
Generally, I'm not very aware of myself. 
APRIV8 Private Self-
Awareness 
I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings. 
APRIV9 Private Self-
Awareness 
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere 
watching myself. 
APUB1 Public Self-Awareness I'm usually aware of my appearance. 
APUB2 Public Self-Awareness One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look 
in the mirror. 
APUB3 Public Self-Awareness I'm concerned about what other people think of me. 
APUB4 Public Self-Awareness I'm concerned about my style of doing things. 
APUB5 Public Self-Awareness I usually worry about making a good impression. 
APUB6 Public Self-Awareness I'm concerned about the way I present myself. 
APUB7 Public Self-Awareness I'm self-conscious about the way I look. 
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TABLE 67: SNS Activities (Koroleva, Krasnova et al. 2011)  
How often do you perform the following social networking activities on 
Facebook? (1 = Almost Never, 7 = Almost Every Day) 
 
ITEM DIMENSION MEASURE 
ACT1 Active 
Participation 
Share thoughts and feelings 
ACT2 Active 
Participation 
React to what friends post 
ACT3 Active 
Participation 
Share something you are interested in 
ACT4 Active 
Participation 
Post something (status update, photos, links) 
ACT5 Active 
Participation 
Comment on what friends post 
ACT6 Active 
Participation 
Share your impression with your friends 
CHAT Active 
Participation 
Use Facebook chat 
BROW1 Social Browsing Browse through friends of your friends 
BROW2 Social Browsing Browse the profiles of your friends 
BROW3 Social Browsing Look at profiles of people not in your friend list 
PASS1 Passive 
Consumption 
Click on the content shared by friends (photos, videos, 
links) 
PASS2 Passive 
Consumption 
Follow the news of your friends 
PASS3 Passive 
Consumption 
Look through the News Feed 
SEAR1 Social Search Add people suggested by Facebook 
SEAR2 Social Search Search for people to add 
SEAR3 Social Search Send friend requests 
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TABLE 68: Facebook Intensity Index (Ellison, Steinfield et al. 2007; Ellison, Steinfield 
et al. 2010)  
  Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you. (Does not apply to items FBI1, FBUSE, FRIENDS below.) 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Strongly Agree) 
ITEM MEASURE 
FBI1 In the past week, on average, approximately how many 
minutes per day have you spent on Facebook? 
 less than 10 
 10-30 
 31-60 
 1-2 hours 
 2-3 hours 
 more than 3 hours 
FBI2 Facebook is part of my everyday activity. 
FBI3 I am proud to tell people I'm on Facebook. 
FBI4 Facebook has become part of my daily routine. 
FBI5 I feel out of touch when I haven't logged onto Facebook 
for a while. 
FBI6 I feel I am part of the Facebook community. 
FBI7 I would be sorry if Facebook shut down. 
FBUSE How long have you been an active member of Facebook? 
 I do not have a Facebook account 
 Less than 6 months 
 More than 6 months but less than a year 
 Over a year but less than 2 years 
 Over 2 years but less than 4 years 
 Over 4 years but less than 6 years 
 Over 6 years 
FRIENDS How many Facebook Friends do you have?   To find this:      
Your Answer: (Enter a numeric value) 
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TABLE 69: Desired Privacy Level  
Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you in regards to Facebook. Please read each statement 
carefully so that you do not confuse things you "do" want with those that you "do not." (1 
= Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
MEASURE 
CONN1 Relationship 
Connection 
I only want to accept intimate friends and family members as 
Facebook friends. 
CONN2 Relationship 
Connection 
I do not want to have Facebook friends who are no longer real 
friends. 
CONN3 Relationship 
Connection 
I only want people in my Facebook social network who I 
associate with on a regular basis in real life. 
CONT1 Relationship 
Context 
I want my one-on-one interactions on Facebook to be 
appropriate and unique based on my relationship with that 
specific person. 
CONT2 Relationship 
Context 
I want my interactions on Facebook to be different between me 
and a close friend than they would be with an acquaintance. 
CONT3 Relationship 
Context 
I want to make a distinction between my friends based on the 
type of relationship I have with them. For example, family, 
friends, co-workers, etc. 
DISC1 Network 
Discovery 
I do not want others to have access to my friends through my 
Facebook friend list. 
DISC2 Network 
Discovery 
I want to hide my friend list so that others cannot browse my 
Facebook friends. 
DISC3 Network 
Discovery 
I want to restrict others in my network from being able to see 
who I am and am not friends with on Facebook. 
INTER1 Network 
Intersection 
I want to avoid letting specific groups of friends interact with 
each other on Facebook. 
INTER2 Network 
Intersection 
I want to moderate how my different groups of friends interact 
with one another on my Facebook page. 
INTER3 Network 
Intersection 
I want to keep my different social circles separate from each 
other on Facebook. 
IN1 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
I want to hide News Feed updates from others that I would 
rather not see. 
IN2 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
I want to decide whose updates show up in my News Feed. 
IN3 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
I want to pick and choose what kinds of updates show up in my 
News Feed. 
OUT1 Outward-Facing 
Territories 
I want to remove any content I do not want from my 
Timeline/Wall. 
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Table 69 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
MEASURE 
OUT2 Outward-Facing 
Territories 
I want to manage everything that shows up on my Timeline/Wall 
for others to see. 
OUT3 Outward-Facing 
Territories 
I want to approve all content before it is posted to my Facebook 
Timeline/Wall. 
SELF1 Self Disclosure I do not want to post very intimate things about myself on 
Facebook. 
SELF2 Self Disclosure I want to be able to choose what to share and what to hold back 
on Facebook. 
SELF3 Self Disclosure I want to share only minimal information about myself on 
Facebook. 
CONF1 Confidant 
Disclosure 
I want my Facebook friends to keep personal information they 
know about me between us. 
CONF2 Confidant 
Disclosure 
I do not want my friends to tag me in photos or posts without my 
permission. 
CONF3 Confidant 
Disclosure 
I want to limit what personal information my friends share about 
me on Facebook. 
DIS1 Interactional 
Disabling 
I want to be able to turn off chat, my Wall, or other Facebook 
features that allow others to interact with me anytime they want 
to. 
DIS2 Interactional 
Disabling 
I want to disable the ability for my friends to contact me on 
Facebook when I want to be left alone. 
DIS3 Interactional 
Disabling 
I want to limit the different ways my friends can communicate 
with me via Facebook. 
BLOCK1 Interactional 
Blocking 
I want to prevent some people on Facebook from having any 
access to me what-so-ever. 
BLOCK2 Interactional 
Blocking 
I want to block certain people from finding me or knowing what 
I am up to on Facebook. 
BLOCK3 Interactional 
Blocking 
When I do not want to interact with someone anymore, I want to 
be able to sever all contact with them on Facebook. 
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TABLE 70: Risk Awareness  
Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you in regards to Facebook. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree) 
ITEM BOUNDARY TYPE MEASURE 
RCONN1 Relationship 
Connection 
Being too open about who I accept as friends on 
Facebook creates a high potential for privacy loss. 
RCONN2 Relationship 
Connection 
Being too open about who I accept as friends on 
Facebook has caused problems for me in the past. 
RCONT1 Relationship Context The way Facebook treats all of my connections as 
'friends' with equal footing creates a high potential 
for privacy loss. 
RCONT2 Relationship Context The way Facebook treats all of my connections as 
'friends' with equal footing has caused problems for 
me in the past. 
RDISC1 Network Discovery Others being able to browse my friend list creates a 
high potential for privacy loss. 
RDISC2 Network Discovery Others being able to browse my friend list has 
caused problems for me in the past. 
RINTER1 Network Intersection Overlap between my different social circles on 
Facebook creates a high potential for privacy loss. 
RINTER2 Network Intersection Overlap between my different social circles on 
Facebook has caused problems for me in the past. 
RIN1 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
Not being able to regulate what filters into my News 
Feed creates a high potential for privacy loss. 
RIN2 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
Not being able to regulate what filters into my News 
Feed has caused problems for me in the past. 
ROUT1 Outward-Facing 
Territories 
Content posted by me or others on my Facebook 
Timeline/Wall creates a high potential for privacy 
loss. 
ROUT2 Outward-Facing 
Territories 
Content posted by me or others on my Facebook 
Timeline/Wall has caused problems for me in the 
past. 
RSELF1 Self Disclosure Disclosing too much personal information on 
Facebook creates a high potential for privacy loss. 
RSELF2 Self Disclosure Disclosing too much personal information on 
Facebook has caused problems for me in the past. 
RCONF1 Confidant Disclosure My Facebook friends sharing personal information 
about me via Facebook creates a high potential for 
privacy loss. 
RCONF2 Confidant Disclosure My Facebook friends sharing personal information 
about me via Facebook has caused problems for me 
in the past. 
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Table 70 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY TYPE MEASURE 
RDIS1 Interactional Disabling My Facebook friends being able to initiate contact 
with me (through chat or posting on my 
Timeline/Wall) creates a high potential for privacy 
loss. 
RDIS2 Interactional Disabling My Facebook friends being able to initiate contact 
with me (through chat or posting on my Wall) has 
caused problems for me in the past. 
RBLOCK1 Interactional Blocking When people who are not my Facebook friends try 
to interact with me on Facebook, it creates a high 
potential for privacy loss. 
RBLOCK2 Interactional Blocking People who are not my Facebook friends but try to 
interact with me on Facebook anyway have caused 
problems for me in the past. 
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TABLE 71: Technology-Supported Privacy Negotiation Behaviors 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
NFHID Inward-Facing 
Territories 
  How often have you done 
the following to modify posts 
on your News Feed?   To do 
this: You would have had to 
click on the drop down arrow 
at the top, right corner of a 
post on your News Feed as 
shown below.                
Hidden a 
story 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
NFS Inward-Facing 
Territories 
  How often have you done 
the following to modify posts 
on your News Feed?   To do 
this: You would have had to 
click on the drop down arrow 
at the top, right corner of a 
post on your News Feed as 
shown below.                
Changed 
your 
subscriptio
n settings 
to a 
Facebook 
friend (All 
Updates, 
Most 
Updates, 
Only 
Important) 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
NFUN Inward-Facing 
Territories 
  How often have you done 
the following to modify posts 
on your News Feed?   To do 
this: You would have had to 
click on the drop down arrow 
at the top, right corner of a 
post on your News Feed as 
shown below.                
Unsubscri
bed from a 
Facebook 
friend 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
NFUNP Inward-Facing 
Territories 
  How often have you done 
the following to modify posts 
on your News Feed?   To do 
this: You would have had to 
click on the drop down arrow 
at the top, right corner of a 
post on your News Feed as 
shown below.                
Unsubscri
bed from 
status 
updates by 
a 
Facebook 
friend 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
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Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
NFSP Inward-Facing 
Territories 
  How often have you done 
the following to modify posts 
on your News Feed?   To do 
this: You would have had to 
click on the drop down arrow 
at the top, right corner of a 
post on your News Feed as 
shown below.                
Reported 
story or 
spam 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
UNFRIEND Relationship 
Connection 
  How often have you 
"Unfriended" in the past?   
To do this, you could have 
gone to a Facebook friend's 
Timeline/Wall, clicked on 
"Friends" then clicked 
"Unfriend" as shown below.    
Your 
Answer: 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
HIDDEN Relationship 
Connection 
  How many "Hidden" friend 
requests do you have?   To 
find this:    From the same 
screen as the previous 
question, click "See Hidden 
Requests."      Count and 
Report the number of 
"Hidden Requests" that you 
have.  Note: Click "Show 
More" if all hidden friend 
requests do not show up on 
the first page.      Your 
Answer: 
   0 
 1-3 
 4-6 
 7-10 
 More than 10 
HIDO Relationship 
Connection 
  How often have you 
"Hidden" a friend request 
(instead of "Confirming" the 
friend request)?   To do this, 
you would have chosen "Not 
Now" instead of "Confirm" 
the friend request as shown 
below. Note: This is 
essentially the same thing as 
rejecting or not accepting the 
friend request.    
Your 
Answer: 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
  
 
255 
Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
BLUS Interactional 
Blocking 
  From the same "Blocked 
People and Apps" privacy 
settings screen, report how 
many "Blocked users" you 
have.   To find this:      Count 
and report the number of 
"Blocked users" you have 
listed.   Your Answer: 
  0 
 1-3 
 4-6 
 7-10 
 More than 10 
RESTR Interactional 
Blocking 
  Please find and report your 
privacy settings for "Blocked 
People and Apps."    How 
many Facebook friends have 
you added to your "Restricted 
List?"    To find this:    From 
your "Privacy Settings" page, 
Click "Manage Blocking" 
next to "Blocked People and 
Apps."      Click on "Edit 
List" by "Add friends to your 
Restricted list."          Count 
and report the number of 
friends on your restricted list 
as shown below:          Your 
Answer: 
   0 
 1-3 
 4-6 
 7-10 
More than 10 
CIEM Self-
Disclosure 
  Report your Facebook 
Profile settings for your 
"Contact Info."   To do this, 
click on the "pencil" icon to 
"Edit" your "Contact Info" as 
shown below. Click the drop 
down arrow to the rght of 
each type of information and 
report your current privacy 
settings for each of the 
following.      Your Answers: 
Email 
(Primary 
Only) 
 I did not 
provide this 
information to 
Facebook  
 Public   
 Friends   
 Only Me  
 Custom  
 Friend List 
(Any 
customized 
friend list) 
  
 
256 
Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
CIAD Self-
Disclosure 
  Report your Facebook 
Profile settings for your 
"Contact Info."   To do this, 
click on the "pencil" icon to 
"Edit" your "Contact Info" as 
shown below. Click the drop 
down arrow to the rght of 
each type of information and 
report your current privacy 
settings for each of the 
following.      Your Answers: 
Address 
(Street 
Address) 
 I did not 
provide this 
information to 
Facebook  
 Public   
 Friends   
 Only Me  
 Custom  
Friend List (Any 
customized friend 
list) 
CIIM Self-
Disclosure 
  Report your Facebook 
Profile settings for your 
"Contact Info."   To do this, 
click on the "pencil" icon to 
"Edit" your "Contact Info" as 
shown below. Click the drop 
down arrow to the rght of 
each type of information and 
report your current privacy 
settings for each of the 
following.      Your Answers: 
IM Screen 
Name 
(Primary 
Only) 
 I did not 
provide this 
information to 
Facebook  
 Public   
 Friends   
 Only Me  
 Custom  
Friend List (Any 
customized friend 
list) 
CIMOB Self-
Disclosure 
  Report your Facebook 
Profile settings for your 
"Contact Info."   To do this, 
click on the "pencil" icon to 
"Edit" your "Contact Info" as 
shown below. Click the drop 
down arrow to the rght of 
each type of information and 
report your current privacy 
settings for each of the 
following.      Your Answers: 
Mobile 
Phone 
(Primary 
Only) 
 I did not 
provide this 
information to 
Facebook  
 Public   
 Friends   
 Only Me  
 Custom  
Friend List (Any 
customized friend 
list) 
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Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
CIOP Self-
Disclosure 
  Report your Facebook 
Profile settings for your 
"Contact Info."   To do this, 
click on the "pencil" icon to 
"Edit" your "Contact Info" as 
shown below. Click the drop 
down arrow to the rght of 
each type of information and 
report your current privacy 
settings for each of the 
following.      Your Answers: 
Other 
Phone 
(Primary 
Only) 
 I did not 
provide this 
information to 
Facebook  
 Public   
 Friends   
 Only Me  
 Custom  
Friend List (Any 
customized friend 
list) 
LIST Relationship 
Context/ 
Network 
Intersection 
  How many Facebook 
friends lists have you 
created?   To find this:    
Count and Report the friend 
lists that you have created 
(Note: Facebook creates 
some friend lists for you by 
default).  The ones you 
created are the lists that have 
an icon of a person by them 
as shown below.          Your 
Answer: 
   0 
 1-3 
 4-6 
 7-10 
More than 10 
LISTN Relationship 
Context/ 
Network 
Intersection 
  Here are a number of 
statements that may or may 
not apply to you. Select the 
answer that indicates the 
degree of frequency each 
statement applies to you. 
I 
categorize 
new 
Facebook 
friends 
into friend 
lists. 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
LISTO Relationship 
Context/ 
Network 
Intersection 
  Here are a number of 
statements that may or may 
not apply to you. Select the 
answer that indicates the 
degree of frequency each 
statement applies to you. 
I go back 
and 
categorize
d existing 
Facebook 
friends 
into friend 
lists. 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
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Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
PICL Relationship 
Context/ 
Network 
Intersection 
  How often have you posted 
a PHOTO ALBUM  to ONE 
or MORE of these friend lists 
(opposed to all your 
Facebook friends)?   To do 
this: You would have had to 
specify which friend list(s) at 
the bottom right corner of the 
photo album as shown 
below.          Or, you could do 
this for an existing photo 
album by clicking on drop 
down box on the bottom, 
right corner of the album and 
choosing a friend list as 
shown below.        
Your 
Answer: 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
POSTL Relationship 
Context/ 
Network 
Intersection 
  How often have you posted 
a STATUS UPDATE to 
ONE or MORE of these 
friend lists (opposed to all 
your Facebook friends)?   To 
do this: You would have had 
to specify which friend list(s) 
at the bottom right corner of 
the status update bar as 
shown below.          Or, you 
could do this by clicking on 
the friend list to see updates 
for that friend list, then post a 
status update via that page.        
Your 
Answer: 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
CWALD Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  How often have you done 
any of the following to posts 
that your Facebook friends 
made on your Timeline or 
Wall?   To do this, from your 
Timeline or Wall, you would 
have had to click the "pencil" 
icon on the top, right hand 
corner of the post as shown 
below.    
Deleted 
Post 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
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Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
CWALS Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  How often have you done 
any of the following to posts 
that your Facebook friends 
made on your Timeline or 
Wall?   To do this, from your 
Timeline or Wall, you would 
have had to click the "pencil" 
icon on the top, right hand 
corner of the post as shown 
below.    
Reported/
Marked as 
Spam 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
TAKED Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  How often have you asked a 
Facebook friend to "take 
down" a POST or PHOTO 
that they tagged to show up 
on your Timeline or Wall?   
To do this, from your 
Timeline/Wall, you would 
have had to click the "pencil" 
icon on the top, right hand 
corner then click "Remove 
Tag" as shown below.      
Next, you would choose, "I 
want to remove this tag" and 
click "Continue."      Next, 
you would choose "Ask 
[Facebook friend] to take 
down the post."      Then, you 
would be able to type a 
Facebook message to your 
friend to ask them to remove 
the post.    
Your 
Answer: 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
CWALH Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  How often have you done 
any of the following to posts 
that your Facebook friends 
made on your Timeline or 
Wall?   To do this, from your 
Timeline or Wall, you would 
have had to click the "pencil" 
icon on the top, right hand 
corner of the post as shown 
below.    
Hidden 
from 
Timeline 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
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Table 71 (Continued) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
INSTRUCTIONS MEASUR
E 
SCALE 
UNTAG Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  How often have you 
"Untagged" POSTS or 
PHOTOS that your Facebook 
friends made on your 
Timeline or Wall?   To do 
this, from your Timeline or 
Wall, you would have had to 
click the "pencil" icon on the 
top, right hand corner then 
click "Remove Tag" as 
shown below.      Next, you 
would choose, "I want to 
remove this tag" and click 
"Continue."      Next, you 
would choose "Remove the 
tag [Facebook friend] 
created."      Then, you would 
click "Okay."    
Your 
Answer: 
1 = Never, 7 = 
Always 
SEE Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  From the same "Timeline 
and Tagging" privacy 
settings screen, report the 
setting for "Who can see 
what others post on your 
timeline?"   To find 
this:          Your Answer: 
  Public 
 Friends of 
Friends 
 Friends 
 Only Me 
 Custom 
 Friend List 
(Any 
customized 
friend list) 
TAG Outward-
Facing 
Territories/ 
Confidant 
Disclosure 
  From the same "Timeline 
and Tagging" privacy 
settings screen, report the 
setting for "Who can see 
posts that appear on your 
timeline because you've been 
tagged?"   To find 
this:          Your Answer: 
  Public 
 Friends of 
Friends 
 Friends 
 Custom 
 Friend List 
(Any 
customized 
friend list) 
 
  
 
261 
TABLE 72: Burden and Feature Awareness 
Measures for Burden and Feature Awareness (Findlater and McGrenere 2010) 
were asked subsequent to each of the technology-supported privacy negotiation behaviors 
shown above. 
 
CONSTRUCT MEASURE SCALE 
BURDEN   Please answer this question 
based on the feature or setting 
shown above. How much 
effort do you feel it takes to 
customize this feature or 
setting effectively? 
1 = None at All, 7 = A Great Deal 
FEATURE 
AWARENESS 
  For the feature or setting 
shown above, please indicate 
whether you remember 
noticing  it prior to 
participating in this survey. 
 Yes, I definitely recall seeing this item 
 I vaguely recall seeing this item 
 No, I didn‘t see this item   
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11APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 6 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS 
Appendix B supplements the statistical analysis provided in Chapter 6. 
TABLE 73: Normality Assumption Violations 
Construct Item Name Skewness Kurtosis 
Private Self Awareness APRIV1 -1.578 5.135 
 APRIV2 -1.041 1.865 
 APRIV5 -1.242 2.039 
 APRIV7 -1.427 2.192 
 APRIV8 -1.490 3.610 
 PRIV10 -0.225 -1.039 
Public Self Awareness APUB1 -1.204 1.976 
 APUB2 0.261 -1.144 
 APUB6 -1.346 2.656 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Inward-facing Territories IN2 -1.130 0.848 
 IN3 -1.648 3.987 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Outward-facing Territories OUT1 -1.522 2.517 
 OUT2 -1.511 2.493 
 OUT3 -1.242 1.627 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Self Disclosure SELF1 -2.528 7.920 
 SELF2 -3.974 21.117 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Confidant Disclosure CONF1 -2.561 9.755 
 CONF3 -1.024 1.270 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Relationship Connection CONN1 1.549 -0.608 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Relationship Context CONT1 -1.816 5.408 
 CONT2 -1.565 3.958 
 CONT3 -0.987 1.098 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Network Intersection INTER1 1.684 -0.510 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Interactional Blocking BLOCK1 -1.32 1.734 
 BLOCK2 -1.066 0.802 
 BLOCK3 -1.023 1.021 
SNS Desired Privacy Level – Interactional Disabling DIS1 1.694 0.304 
Risk Awareness – Self Disclosure RSELF1 -1.722 3.663 
Risk Awareness – Confidant Disclosure RCONF1 -1.199 1.667 
Technology-Supported Boundary Negotiation Behaviors 
(All) DEFAULT -0.98387 2.964049 
 CONNECT 0.002712 -1.21441 
 REQ 0.046314 4.352075 
 WALL -0.74564 18.02973 
 SEE -0.44634 3.551196 
 TAG -1.48499 5.049941 
 TAGR -0.71065 3.122638 
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Table 73 (Continued) 
 
Construct Item Name Skewness Kurtosis 
 TAGRO -0.20953 1.922738 
 APP -0.19443 -1.66391 
 RESTR 2.011189 4.094433 
 BLUS 1.769776 3.270361 
 BLAPI 1.608938 2.382883 
 BLEV 2.90007 12.54701 
 BLAP 0.473212 -1.05926 
 FRLIST 0.05542 2.025017 
 PEND 1.309779 0.521974 
 POSTL 1.408508 1.470179 
 PICL 1.810232 2.542763 
 NFHID 0.15077 -1.07137 
 CWALS 1.215477 1.636348 
 TAKED 1.638733 3.594557 
 SCHAT 0.689416 -1.22008 
 SCHATF 0.14559 -1.40947 
 BASBD 1.058837 0.597498 
 BADIN -0.24932 -1.28849 
 BARE -0.26847 -1.14768 
 CIEM 1.007579 0.725047 
 CIMOB -1.07598 0.39339 
 CIOP -2.2202 4.755085 
 CIAD -2.08849 3.863399 
Feature Awareness (All) DEFAULT1 -2.18091 5.606166 
 REQ1 -1.12646 0.966618 
 MESS1 -1.14386 1.09681 
 RESTR1 0.061547 -1.51518 
 BLUS1 -0.26531 -1.08883 
 BLAPI1 0.135998 -1.0827 
 PEND1 -2.08117 4.286642 
 HIDO1 -1.2842 1.493378 
 UNFRIEND1 -1.5604 2.328349 
 NF1 -1.2838 1.378208 
 CWAL1 -1.30062 1.431382 
 BA1 -2.29164 5.778788 
 CI1 -2.26383 5.670405 
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TABLE 74: 1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Self-Awareness 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
APRIV1 307 5.73 1.001 
APRIV2 308 5.41 1.111 
APRIV3 305 4.39 1.557 
APRIV4* 307 5.03 1.355 
APRIV5 308 5.68 1.166 
APRIV6 306 4.22 1.528 
APRIV7* 308 5.56 1.279 
APRIV8 305 5.30 1.219 
APRIV9* 308 2.68 1.646 
APRIV10 308 4.22 1.709 
APUB1 308 5.71 1.087 
APUB2 306 3.55 1.928 
APUB3* 308 4.47 1.465 
APUB4 304 4.15 1.525 
APUB5* 307 4.78 1.458 
APUB6* 305 4.97 1.268 
APUB7* 306 4.49 1.571 
ANX1 305 3.95 1.566 
ANX2* 307 3.41 1.742 
ANX3 308 4.47 1.912 
ANX4 306 4.15 1.743 
ANX5* 308 3.86 1.777 
ANX6* 306 3.55 1.791 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
279     
 
*Item remained in final measure for analysis 
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12APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 7 SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
To facilitate the ability to replicate this study, the survey details from Chapter 7 
are presented in this Appendix. All items were optional except acceptance of informed 
consent. For items to measure desired privacy level, reference Appendix A, TABLE 69. 
Please contact the author if you want access to the survey in its entirety. 
12.1 Statement of Informed Consent 
Project Title and Purpose   -    Relationship Management within Online Social 
Networks (Phase 2)   We are distributing a survey to better understand how people 
interact with others on Facebook, including individual characteristics and personality 
traits that make that interaction unique for different people. By better understanding the 
personal experiences of Facebook users, we will be able to propose ways to improve the 
design of online social networking websites such as Facebook in the future.        
Investigator(s) -  Pamela Karr-Wisniewski, UNC Charlotte – pjkarr@uncc.edu 
(Primary)   Dr. Heather Lipford, UNC Charlotte - Heather.Lipford@uncc.edu   Dr. David 
Wilson, UNC Charlotte - davils@uncc.edu   Kim Rosser, UNC Charlotte - 
krosser@uncc.edu        
Eligibility -  You may participate in this study if you are over 18 years old and 
have an active Facebook account. You may not participate in this study if you are not 
over 18 years old or do not have an active Facebook account.        
Overall Description of Participation  - You will be asked to answer questions 
through a web-based survey. You should answer the questions as honestly as 
possible.  The survey should take approximately half an hour.        
 
266 
Incentive to Participate -  There will be a random drawing of survey participants 
for two $100 gift cards to Amazon.com once the survey is closed. Entering the drawing is 
optional. Each participant who opts in to enter the drawing will receive one drawing 
entry.   As an extra incentive, if you share the survey with your friends (through 
Facebook, email, etc.), and they complete the survey and specify that you referred them 
(by supplying your email address), you will get an extra contest entry for each person you 
referred. Each survey participant, however, is limited to a maximum of 25 drawing 
entries and is eligible to receive at most one $100 gift card.     
Risks and Benefits of Participation  - By participating in this study, you are 
helping researchers develop a better understanding of how individuals interact with 
others on Facebook. With a better understanding of this behavior, we will be able to help 
educate and design interfaces that can improve this form of communication. The project 
may involve risks that are not currently known.    
Length of Participation  - Participation in this study will require no more than 
thirty minutes of your time.  At the end of the survey, you will be given the opportunity 
to sign up for a drawing to thank you for your participation.    
Volunteer Statement  - You are a volunteer.  The decision to participate in this 
study is completely up to you.  If you decide to be in the study, you may stop at any 
time.  You will not be treated any differently if you decide not to participate in the study 
or if you stop once you have started.    
Confidentiality Statement -  Any information about your participation, including 
your identity, is completely confidential.  The following steps will be taken to ensure this 
confidentiality:  All digital and physical information retained from your participation will 
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be stored in a secure location only accessible by the investigators listed on this study.  All 
data results will be anonymized or aggregated in the presentation to the academic 
community so that your identity will not be known.     
Statement of Fair Treatment and Respect -  UNC Charlotte wants to make sure 
that you are treated in a fair and respectful manner.  Contact the university‘s Research 
Compliance Office (704-687-3309) if you have questions about how you are treated as a 
study participant.  If you have any questions about the actual project or study, please 
contact Pamela Karr-Wisniewski (704-293-8978, pjkarr@uncc.edu) or Dr. Heather 
Lipford (704-687-8376, Heather.Lipford@uncc.edu).    
Approval Date  - This form was approved for use on February 8, 2012 for use for 
one year.        
Participant Consent*  - I have read the information in this consent form.  I have 
had the chance to ask questions about this study, and those questions have been answered 
to my satisfaction.   I am at least 18 years of age, and I agree to participate in this 
research project.  
*Participants were required to agree before proceeding with the survey. 
12.2 Survey Questions 
For measures for desired privacy level, Facebook intensity index, SNS Activities, 
demographics, and optional drawing information, please refer to Appendix A. 
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TABLE 75: Big 5 Personality (Gosling, Rentfrow et al. 2003)  
 
Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits 
applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.       I see 
myself as (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree): 
 
ITEM MEASURE 
PERS1 Extroverted, enthusiastic 
PERS2 Critical, quarrelsome 
PERS3 Dependable, self-disciplined 
PERS4 Anxious, easily upset 
PERS5 Open to new experiences, complex 
PERS6 Reserved, quiet 
PERS7 Sympathetic, warm 
PERS8 Disorganized, careless 
PERS9 Calm, emotionally stable 
PERS10 Conventional, uncreative 
 
TABLE 76: Self-Esteem (Rosenberg 1989)  
Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
ITEM MEASURE 
SE1 I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
SE2 I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
SE3 All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
SE4 I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
SE5 I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
SE6 I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
SE7 On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
SE8 I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
SE9 I certainly feel useless at times. 
SE10 At times I think I am no good at all. 
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TABLE 77: Achieved Privacy Level  
The following statements should reflect your actual experience using Facebook. Also, 
pay attention to read the question carefully so that you do not confuse things you "have" 
experienced with those that you "have not." (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
MEASURE 
AIN1 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
I hide News Feed updates from others that I would rather not 
see. 
AIN2 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
I decide whose updates show up in my News Feed. 
AIN3 Inward-Facing 
Territories 
I pick and choose what kinds of updates show up in my News 
Feed. 
AOUT1 Outward-
Facing 
Territories 
I remove any content I do not want from my Timeline/Wall. 
AOUT2 Outward-
Facing 
Territories 
I manage everything that shows up on my Timeline/Wall for 
others to see. 
AOUT3 Outward-
Facing 
Territories 
I approve all content before it is posted to my Facebook 
Timeline/Wall. 
ASELF1 Self Disclosure I do not post very intimate things about myself on Facebook. 
ASELF2 Self Disclosure I choose what to share and what to hold back on Facebook. 
ASELF3 Self Disclosure I share only minimal information about myself on Facebook. 
ACONF1 Confidant 
Disclosure 
My Facebook friends keep personal information they know 
about me between us. 
ACONF2 Confidant 
Disclosure 
My friends do not tag me in photos or posts without my 
permission. 
ACONF3 Confidant 
Disclosure 
I limit what personal information my friends share about me on 
Facebook. 
ACONN1 Relationship 
Connection 
I only accept intimate friends and family members as Facebook 
friends. 
ACONN2 Relationship 
Connection 
I do not have Facebook friends who are no longer real friends. 
ACONN3 Relationship 
Connection 
I only have people in my Facebook social network who I 
associate with on a regular basis in real life. 
ACONT1 Relationship 
Context 
My one-on-one interactions on Facebook are appropriate and 
unique based on my relationship with that specific person. 
ACONT2 Relationship 
Context 
My interactions on Facebook are different between me and a 
close friend than they are with an acquaintance. 
ACONT3 Relationship 
Context 
I make a distinction between my friends based on the type of 
relationship I have with them. For example, family, friends, co-
workers, etc. 
AINTER1 Network 
Intersection 
I avoid letting specific groups of friends interact with each 
other on Facebook. 
AINTER2 Network 
Intersection 
I moderate how my different groups of friends interact with one 
another on my Facebook page. 
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Table 77 (Continued) 
ITEM BOUNDARY 
TYPE 
MEASURE 
AINTER3 Network 
Intersection 
I keep my different social circles separate from each other on 
Facebook. 
ADISC1 Network 
Discovery 
Others do not have access to my friends through my Facebook 
friend list. 
ADISC2 Network 
Discovery 
I hide my friend list so that others cannot browse my Facebook 
friends. 
ADISC3 Network 
Discovery 
I restrict others in my social network from being able to see 
who I am and am not friends with on Facebook. 
ABLOCK1 Interactional 
Blocking 
I prevent some people on Facebook from having any access to 
me what-so-ever. 
ABLOCK2 Interactional 
Blocking 
I block certain people from finding me or knowing what I am 
up to on Facebook. 
ABLOCK3 Interactional 
Blocking 
When I do not want to interact with someone anymore, I sever 
all contact with them on Facebook. 
ADIS1 Interactional 
Disabling 
I turn off chat, my Timeline/Wall, or other Facebook features 
that allow others to interact with me anytime they want to. 
ADIS2 Interactional 
Disabling 
I disable the ability for my friends to contact me on Facebook 
when I want to be left alone. 
ADIS3 Interactional 
Disabling 
I limit the different ways my friends can communicate with me 
via Facebook. 
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TABLE 78: Social Capital (Williams 2006; Ellison, Vitak et al. 2011)  
Select the answer that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree that 
each statement applies to you regarding your Facebook friends (on average). (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
ITEM DIMENSION MEASURE 
BRIDGE1 Bridging Talking with people on Facebook makes me 
curious about other places in the world. 
BRIDGE2 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook makes me 
feel like a part of a larger community. 
BRIDGE3 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook reminds 
me that everyone in the world is connected. 
BRIDGE4 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook makes me 
want to try new things. 
BRIDGE5 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook gives me 
new people to talk to. 
BRIDGE6 Bridging I am willing to spend time to support general 
Facebook community activities. 
BRIDGE7 Bridging On Facebook, I come into contact with new 
people all the time. 
BRIDGE8 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook makes me 
interested in things that happen outside of my 
town. 
BRIDGE9 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook makes me 
interested in what people unlike me are 
thinking. 
BRIDGE10 Bridging Interacting with people on Facebook makes me 
feel connected to the bigger picture. 
BOND1 Bonding The people I interact with on Facebook would 
be good job references for me. 
BOND2 Bonding The people I interact with on Facebook would 
share their last dollar with me. 
BOND3R Bonding There is no one on Facebook that I feel 
comfortable talking to about intimate personal 
problems. 
BOND4 Bonding There are several people on Facebook I trust to 
solve my problems. 
BOND5 Bonding The people I interact with on Facebook would 
help me fight an injustice. 
BOND6 Bonding There is someone on Facebook I can turn to for 
advice about making very important decisions. 
BOND7 Bonding The people I interact with on Facebook would 
put their reputation on the line for me. 
BOND8 Bonding When I feel lonely, there are several people on 
Facebook I can talk to. 
BOND9R Bonding I do not know people on Facebook well enough 
to get them to do anything important. 
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Table 78 (Continued) 
ITEM DIMENSION MEASURE 
BOND10 Bonding If I needed an emergency loan of $500, I know 
someone on Facebook I can turn to. 
MAINT1 Maintained I would be able to find information about a job 
or internship from a past acquaintance on 
Facebook. 
MAINT2 Maintained If I needed to, I could ask a past acquaintance 
to do a small favor for me through Facebook. 
MAINT3 Maintained On Facebook, I'd be able to find out about 
events in another town from a past 
acquaintance living there. 
MAINT4 Maintained It would be easy to find people on Facebook to 
invite to a school reunion. 
MAINT5 Maintained Because of Facebook, I'd be able to stay with a 
past acquaintance if traveling to a different city. 
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13APPENDIX D: CHAPTER 7 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS 
Appendix D supplements the statistical analysis presented in Chapter 7. 
TABLE 79: Descriptive Statistics for Desired Privacy Level and Achieved Privacy Level 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
IN1 311 5.78 1.198 -.986 .541 
IN2 314 5.43 1.295 -.813 .484 
IN3 313 5.55 1.255 -.844 .530 
OUT1 314 6.26 .973 -1.606 2.865 
OUT2 313 5.50 1.446 -.826 .025 
OUT3 315 5.09 1.559 -.529 -.501 
SELF1 315 6.30 1.103 -2.031 4.357 
SELF2 315 6.25 .866 -1.255 1.548 
SELF3 315 5.28 1.382 -.563 -.350 
CONF1 315 5.80 1.167 -1.111 1.382 
CONF2 315 4.82 1.724 -.392 -.774 
CONF3 313 5.96 1.183 -1.265 1.427 
CONN1 312 3.48 1.580 .441 -.654 
CONN2 312 4.69 1.480 -.148 -.791 
CONN3 314 4.02 1.627 .013 -.979 
CONT1 315 5.33 1.262 -.668 .243 
CONT2 315 5.12 1.319 -.352 -.407 
CONT3 315 4.48 1.558 -.200 -.623 
INTER1 315 3.83 1.752 .130 -.761 
INTER2 311 4.26 1.507 -.029 -.327 
INTER3 312 4.31 1.564 .047 -.676 
DISC1 315 4.44 1.723 -.107 -.954 
DISC2 314 4.00 1.580 .230 -.572 
DISC3 315 4.31 1.691 -.027 -.874 
BLOCK1 315 5.28 1.744 -.861 -.202 
BLOCK2 315 5.43 1.551 -.781 -.285 
BLOCK3 313 5.66 1.171 -.588 -.308 
DIS1 311 5.41 1.622 -.927 .033 
DIS2 314 4.53 1.681 -.251 -.832 
DIS3 314 4.53 1.421 -.129 -.385 
AIN1 312 4.55 1.873 -.413 -1.100 
AIN2 309 4.47 1.880 -.333 -1.128 
AIN3 308 4.33 1.792 -.248 -1.169 
AOUT1 313 5.52 1.538 -1.193 .830 
AOUT2 308 4.74 1.700 -.563 -.582 
AOUT3 309 3.85 1.849 .170 -1.096 
ASELF1 310 5.96 1.274 -1.524 2.171 
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Table 79 (Continued) 
 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
ASELF2 310 5.99 1.213 -1.830 4.124 
ASELF3 309 5.45 1.387 -.962 .518 
ACONF1 311 4.99 1.317 -.530 -.275 
ACONF2 309 3.53 1.706 .526 -.823 
ACONF3 307 4.79 1.607 -.531 -.447 
ACONN1 311 3.19 1.639 .529 -.794 
ACONN2 308 3.64 1.744 .429 -.800 
ACONN3 309 3.41 1.725 .396 -.947 
ACONT1 314 5.25 1.391 -1.066 1.002 
ACONT2 311 5.37 1.448 -1.191 1.032 
ACONT3 312 4.02 1.818 -.061 -1.228 
AINTER1 308 2.81 1.493 .804 .123 
AINTER2 313 2.95 1.536 .652 -.334 
AINTER3 310 3.13 1.580 .538 -.564 
ADISC1 310 3.70 1.769 .337 -1.076 
ADISC2 308 3.09 1.728 .851 -.244 
ADISC3 310 3.37 1.796 .517 -.834 
ABLOCK1 309 4.63 1.981 -.426 -1.151 
ABLOCK2 309 4.74 1.959 -.401 -1.143 
ABLOCK3 310 4.51 1.823 -.246 -1.078 
ADIS1 315 4.04 1.941 .048 -1.325 
ADIS2 309 3.91 1.897 .187 -1.341 
ADIS3 314 3.94 1.754 -.031 -1.049 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
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